The evolving national security environment:
A symbol of the East-West divide is removed in Berlin.

Challenges, Risks, and Opportunities

In the years ahead, the United States will face unprecedented challenges, risks, and opportunities in a volatile and unpredictable world.... The challenge for the Army in this era of change will be to prepare for the future without losing sight of both the present opportunities and the inherent, yet uncertain risks of evolving security challenges around the world.

As the attention of the world is focused on the greatest foreign commitment of U.S. combat power since the Vietnam War - Operation Desert Storm and the efforts of coalition forces to liberate Kuwait, those words from last year's Army Posture Statement take on even greater significance. In 1990 many aspects of the evolving international environment were hopeful, particularly the

rapid unification of Germany, the accelerating relinquishment of Soviet control over the Warsaw Pact, and the less threatening tone of Soviet foreign policy. Mindful of the pressing need to reduce the burgeoning federal deficit, the United States focused more on the opportunities presented by reduced superpower confrontation than on the challenges and risks inherent in the evolving international environment.

The brutal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has been a reminder of the vulnerability of the global political and economic order, the variety of threats to U.S. national interests, and the technological sophistication possible in the warfighting capabilities of developing countries. Further, while the new Soviet nonconfrontational, and even supportive, policy toward the United States and its allies and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) are heartening examples of what the future can hold, the political, economic, and social forces that have fostered change and turmoil worldwide continue to produce unforeseeable results. As the Soviet Union and its former allies struggle to shed the burdens of the past, the daunting goal of simultaneously converting from command-directed economies and Communist political systems to market economies and democracies is proving unattainable in the short term. The recent Soviet use of military force to suppress dissent in the Baltic Republics may be a harbinger of things to come. International drug trafficking, state-sponsored terrorism, insurgency, and subversion of legitimate regimes also continue to pose serious threats to U.S. interests around the world. The post-Cold War era clearly has begun, but with the volatility and unpredictability so characteristic of major transitional periods, not with the hoped-for and well-deserved respite after four decades of superpower confrontation.

The Three Vectors

The focus of the Army today is on simultaneously meeting the requirements of three critical tasks, or vectors. Quite obviously, we need to provide all the support necessary to accomplish U.S. national objectives in Operation Desert Storm. The Army is central to success, particularly to the eviction of the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Accordingly, Army forces will continue to be trained, organized, equipped, and sustained to meet Operation Desert Storm's requirements. As in any military operation, the Army's commitment to Operation Desert Storm includes the obligation to prudently reconstitute the force once the mission is accomplished. The extent of this reconstitution will depend substantially on the duration and lethality of the war. (The term reconstitution in this context applies to returning operationally deployed units to their pre-hostility levels of capability. It should not be confused with the strategic concept of reconstitution discussed later in this chapter.) Even without combat losses, we must return over one-quarter million soldiers, their equipment, and their supplies to home stations in an orderly fashion. This includes the return of units to Europe. The Army must then rapidly, but not hastily, release over 150,000 reservists and over 20,000 soldiers involuntarily retained on active duty by the Stop Loss Program with the dignity befitting volunteers who have served their country well. Finally, equipment must be refurbished and supplies replenished. Funds to accomplish this reconstitution have not been included in the FY92/93 budget.

Yet even as the Army supports this complex and vital mission, our challenge is to focus simultaneously on two other major vectors -- we must maintain a trained and ready force to meet ongoing commitments worldwide and for rapid action in unforeseeable contingencies, and we must continue to shape the Total Force for the future.

The Army must remain prepared to defend U.S. national interests worldwide. Uncommitted Army forces must be kept trained and ready for conflicts, crises, and contingencies that may develop in other parts of the world

An Iraqi armored personnel carrier in Kuwait after the invasion. Reuters

and for reinforcement, as required, of Army forces in Saudi Arabia. There will be few units in the Army untouched by Operation Desert Storm. Nevertheless, the Army must maintain the capabilities to forward station forces in Europe and the Pacific and to act elsewhere should the circumstances warrant.

While supporting Operation Desert Storm and sustaining our readiness worldwide, we also must continue to reshape the Army in light of the changing international environment and the diminished resources available for national defense. The Army remains committed to a comprehensive plan for reshaping the Total Force. The essence of this plan is to reduce significantly the size of the Army and to limit our near-term modernization in order to shape the smaller, but versatile, deployable, and lethal Army needed for the future. While the outcome of Operation Desert Storm is certain, its duration and impact on the Army are not. Thus, we have temporarily delayed action on elements of this plan until the accomplishment of U.S objectives in Operation Desert Storm. We do, however, continue to plan for the future. The Army must ensure that near-term actions to support Operation Desert Storm and to meet pressing budgetary shortfalls do not place essential long-term Army capabilities in jeopardy. It should be remembered that the success of the deployment and the current operation are the result of a decade of investment, planning, training, and other efforts. The Army has structured programs and budgets so as not to mortgage capabilities needed for the Nation's future security to near-term fiscal pressures. Our challenge over the next year will be to minimize the risks to the Nation as we pursue these three, often competing, vectors throughout this turbulent transitional period.

International Security
Environment

The United States faces a complex and varied security environment. The turmoil within the Soviet Union and the emergence of militarily and economically powerful regional actors have left the United States as the only multidimensional superpower. In a world in which economic, social, and political issues are becoming increasingly global, such developments have changed the focus of the threat to the United States and, to some extent, its form. Instead of the clear and predominant Soviet-led threat, the United States now faces multiple challenges in the forms of a still-potent Soviet capability; continuing regional instability; the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and missile technology among many developing nations; and aggressive, well-armed regional powers.

New centers of economic, military, and political influence also are taking shape. The rising integration of

the world's economies continues. The influence of economics on international affairs is pervasive. Although some of these trends are welcome, events in Iraq demonstrate the rapidity with which a regional conflict can involve worldwide military and economic power. Further, the growing diffusion of power suggests that multilateral actions, including shared costs and obligations, must continue to be developed, nurtured, and implemented to enhance U.S. security and the prospects for peaceful change worldwide. Crafting these cooperative arrangements, however, will be increasingly challenging as developing countries become militarily powerful and national interests diverge.

Transition in the Post-Communist
Countries

The European security environment has changed considerably over the past year. The Soviet military presence in Central Europe is expected to continue to decline greatly in the next few years. President Gorbachev has emphasized internal restructuring and the lessening of the military burden on a faltering economy. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union has adopted a less confrontational attitude toward the United States. There are indications that the deepening Soviet economic crisis will put increasing pressure on Soviet defense budgets. Furthermore, Soviet military readiness and effectiveness increasingly are open to question as a result of competing domestic resource pressures and widespread civil unrest. Finally, the Soviet Union has announced a new defense posture, which, when implemented, could make its re

sidual force structure less threatening to its neighbors. These positive developments are to be encouraged.

tral power and Soviet regional influence. The occurrence of such events represents a distinct possibility that could pose a significant threat to U.S. security interests.

Elsewhere in Europe, the Warsaw Pact no longer functions as a military alliance. Hungary already has declared its intent to leave the Pact, and other members may follow over the next few years as the divisions between East and West continue to diminish and the new non-Communist governments of Central Europe maintain their democratic evolution.

While Cold War antagonisms recede, traditional rivalries have re-emerged, posing a renewed threat to European security. Yugoslavia appears on the verge of disintegration, threatening to rekindle historic Balkan unrest, and ethnic rivalries have exacerbated already strained relations between Hungary and Romania as well as between Turkey and Bulgaria. One significant element of the post-Cold War challenge to Europe will be to resolve the resurgent animosities that historically have led to regional and even global conflict.

The unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal from Central Europe, announced by President Gorbachev in December 1988, is over half completed. In March 1990, the Soviet Union signed agreements with both Hungary and Czechoslovakia to withdraw all Soviet troops from those countries by July 1991. This withdrawal is well under way. Poland is attempting to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal. Unification of Germany was completed in October 1990, and the Soviets have agreed to withdraw all their troops stationed there by 1994; it is possible that the Soviets may be pressed to withdraw their troops even earlier. These adjustments parallel restructuring on the Soviet Union's southern and eastern borders, somewhat assuaging Chinese and Japanese concerns about the Soviet military presence in Asia. The CFE Treaty has been signed, codifying Soviet reductions in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) area. However, as this statement is being prepared, there is controversy about some Soviet actions involving treaty provisions, and the Treaty still remains to be ratified by the participating governments. Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union may lead to a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the use of force to impose central control over increasingly restive nationalities and deteriorating economic conditions is cause for serious concern. Such use of force should be closely monitored and vigorously discouraged. Perhaps the most alarming prospect is that the Soviet Union may disintegrate in violent civil war. Conflict within the Soviet Union would have serious spill-over effects that would endanger security throughout Europe and elsewhere along Soviet borders. The threat of disintegration could lead to the emergence of revanchist groups seeking to reassert cen

The result of these continuing changes is that the military threat to NATO, especially if the CFE and START treaties are ratified and implemented, will be significantly reduced. Nevertheless, there are still some issues that the Army cannot ignore. U.S. military posture must be designed to meet potential adversaries' long-term capabilities, not their current stated intentions. Despite President Gorbachev's unilateral cuts, the Soviets are not destroying much of the modern equipment that they are withdrawing from the ATTU as part of their unilateral withdrawal. For the most part, the Soviets are redeploying this equipment in the interior of the USSR. At the same time, the Soviets are continuing an active, though somewhat reduced, modernization program to upgrade their conventional forces. Older equipment withdrawn from Europe is either reallocated or destroyed, but residual units are being provided with more modern equipment. Even with a military reduced by unilateral reductions and arms control treaties, Moscow will still possess the largest standing army in Europe, consisting of 50 to 60 maneuver divisions within the ATTU zone. The Soviet Union also continues to modernize its strategic nuclear arsenal, thus remaining the only country able to threaten the existence of the United States.

While there may be some slowing in the pace of their modernization, we expect the Soviets to continue their focus on modernizing both conventional and nuclear forces, pursuing vigorous technological research, and exploiting space to support military operations. Additionally, the sale of sophisticated Soviet combat systems to other countries means that the United States and its partners will confront those systems in other regions.

While the positive changes and the beginning of democratization in the Soviet Union and Central Europe should be applauded, the ultimate outcome of President Gorbachev's program and the future course of the Soviet Union remain in doubt, particularly regarding the reform of the Soviet military. The Army must remain prepared to adjust to this uncertainty and to deal with the Soviet military's long-term capabilities.

Developing Countries

Instability in other parts of the world also has the potential to nurture threats to U.S. interests. Particularly in the developing countries, advances toward democracy and economic prosperity are generally tentative and often not widely distributed. The challenges for these developing countries also are increasingly complex. Radical nationalism and religious and ethnic chauvinism continuously generate friction. Economic and political systems are often unable to meet popular demands for improved standards of living and basic political rights. Adverse climatic conditions, population growth, unstable com

modity prices, and disease further damage the economic prospects of many developing nations. The situation often leads to the erosion of national unity, political unrest, and violence.

Radical leaders can exploit legitimate grievances and adverse political and economic conditions to foment insurgencies that threaten existing governments, create instability, and retard the development of democratic institutions. Some government leaders, on the other hand, have looked for solutions to internal problems by resorting to authoritarian rule or by shifting the focus of popular passions outside the country, leading to heightened interstate frictions. Frictions between states also are generated by groups opposed to current regimes seeking assistance from external sources. This assistance is often manifested as state-sponsored terrorism. This grim combination of trends portends increased violence and instability around the world as developing countries struggle to surmount these difficulties and pursue human rights and economic well-being.