STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARL E. VUONO The major Army systems being employed in Operation Desert Storm today, developed over the past several decades, are serving our soldiers extremely well. In one of the harshest combat environments in the world, all major Army land and air systems are operating superbly and are exceeding Army performance and readiness goals. The Apache helicopter has been used extensively and was still exceeding Army readiness goals by more than 15% at the beginning of February. Two batteries of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) were initially fielded during Operation Desert Storm and have also been effectively employed. The now worldfamous Patriot PAC-2 missile (also initially fielded during Operation Desert Storm) has achieved spectacular results. Additionally, the Air Force Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System and the Army Interim Ground Station Modules have combined to provide effective widearea surveillance and deep targeting support to coalition air and land force commanders. Numerous other systems such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Copperhead 155mm guided projectile to name but two have also enjoyed great success. Our modernization efforts have clearly produced weapon systems that effectively exploit our nation's technological advantages and give our soldiers the lethality they need to win and survive. This vast deployment of soldiers and equipment to Saudi Arabia was truly a joint effort that involved the Total Force. In August, the President authorized the call-up of the Selected Reserve to permit the use of Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units and individuals whose unique skills and capabilities were essential for the success of the deployment. In November, this initial authority was expanded to increase the Army's call-up authorization and to provide for the call-up of Reserve Component combat units for 180 days (with the option of renewing this for a second 180 days). On January 18, 1991, the President signed an executive order that increased the Army's call-up authorization to 220,000 soldiers for a period not to exceed 12 months STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARL E. VUONO and permitted the Army to call up Individual Ready Reservists in addition to members of the Selected Reserve. To date, the Army has called up almost 150,000 soldiers and over 1,000 units from virtually every state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. Thousands of these soldiers are serving overseas in Saudi Arabia, providing such critical capabilities as water purification and distribution, transportation, port operations, fuel handling, supply and services, maintenance, and medical support. Many others serve in CONUS and overseas, assisting the deployment in such functional areas as port security and terminal operations. In addition, activated reserve soldiers and units are filling critical responsibilities and functions left vacant by active units deployed to Saudi Arabia. This latter category includes medical, legal, military police, and air ambulance units, as well as garrison support units and engineers. Selected combat units, such as Army National Guard artillery brigades and three round out maneuver brigades of Active Army divisions, also have been called to active duty. These units are now either in Saudi Arabia or undergoing post-mobilization training at Fort Hood, Texas and Fort Irwin, California. The 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, consisting of 8" Howitzer and MLRS battalions from the Arkansas and Oklahoma ARNG, was called up in late November and deployed in late January. The 196th Field Artillery Brigade, consisting of 8" and 155mm Howitzer battalions from the Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia ARNG, was called up in early December and deployed in early February. The brigades in Saudi Arabia are performing well, making a substantial contribution to the Army's firepower in the desert. I have visited each of the round out brigades the 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia ARNG, the 155th Armored Brigade, Mississippi ARNG, and the 256th Infantry Brigade, Louisiana ARNG several times throughout their training. They are working hard to hone their individual and unit combat skills, and I am confident that they will perform well, if and when they are deployed. I should note that the task facing these maneuver STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARL E. VUONO brigades that of effectively integrating the combined arms capabilities of their armored, mechanized infantry, aviation and artillery units is one that requires extensive training to master effectively. It is, however, a precondition for victory and survival on today's battlefield. We also cannot forget the magnificent performance of the logisticians of the Total Force. In the first 80 days, the deployment system moved over 170,000 soldiers and civilians and over 160,000 tons of cargo by air, and over 7,500,000 square feet of cargo and equipment into the area of operations by sea, and another almost 3,000,000 square feet of cargo were enroute. The 1192d Terminal Transfer Unit (USAR), working out of Beaumont, Texas, alone moved 1.3 million square feet of cargo onto 12 ships during the seven weeks it was on active duty — three times the normal work load. Receiving, processing and distributing this cargo and equipment, and these soldiers and civilians, took a herculean effort. As the deployment of Army units and equipment continued with the movement of the additional units in November, the logistical challenge increased dramatically. The challenges of long supply lines, an austere infrastructure, and the harsh desert environment were met with the professionalism and imaginative logistics strategies you would expect of America's Army. Equipment readiness, supplies and services, support to other services, host nation support, security assistance, transportation, and industrial readiness are all logistical functions that have been critical to the success of the operation to date. This success rests substantially on the sturdy shoulders of our logisticians. As in any military operation, the Army's commitment to Operation Desert Storm includes the obligation to prudently reconstitute (e.g., redeploy and refurbish) the force once the mission is accomplished. The extent of this requirement will depend substantially on the duration and lethality of the war. (Note: The term "reconstitution" in this context applies to returning operationally deployed units to their pre-hostility levels of capability. It should not be confused with the strategic concept 43-346-91 - 6 STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARL E. VUONO of reconstitution I discussed earlier.) Yet even without further combat losses, we must return over one-quarter million of our soldiers, their equipment and their supplies to home stations in an orderly fashion. This includes the return of units to Europe as well as to the United States and to other areas from which they deployed. The Army must then rationally and rapidly, but not hastily, release approximately 150,000 reservists, and over 20,000 soldiers involuntarily retained on active duty by the Stop Loss program, all with the dignity befitting volunteers who have served their country well. Finally, equipment must be refurbished and supplies replenished. Funds to accomplish this reconstitution have not been included in this budget for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, but rather will be included in supplemental requests. Finally, the fact that Operation Desert Storm occurred as the nation debated its future national security policy and the future size and composition of its Armed Forces has enabled the Army to examine some of the assumptions, policies, and capabilities that underlie our vision for the future. For example, the Total Force, the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet were all employed in this operation. The lessons of Operation Desert Storm will be extremely useful in refining our plans, programs, and policies for the future. As these lessons are reviewed, however, we cannot allow ourselves to become transfixed by the "last war." The Army requires capabilities that enable it to operate from peacetime engagement to general war. Especially in this era of declining defense resources, lessons learned must be applied toward improving the versatility, deployability, lethality, and expansibility of the Total Army and not restricted to "quick fixes" for shortcomings identified in the current operation. I know that you are extremely proud of the efforts and performance of the men and women of America's Armed Forces in Operation Desert Storm. Members of this Committee have played a significant role over the past decade in creating the quality force that is the overarching reason for our success. You can be justifiably proud of your roles in providing the STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARL E. VUONO basis for the most rapid and massive projection of combat power in history and in shaping the Army as a strategic force for the 1990s and beyond. Even as we focus on Operation Desert Storm, we must sustain readiness throughout the force, worldwide, for a turbulent world will not permit the United States the luxury of addressing crises at our leisure, one at a time. Within the last 14 months, Army forces have been committed to major combat operations twice. Both operations required rapid, short-notice projection of combat power from the United States, and, in the latter case, from forward-deployed forces in Europe. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm have unequivocally demonstrated the need to maintain a trained and ready Army throughout this period of great uncertainty. In December 1989, the Army rapidly deployed light and special operations units to Panama where, in conjunction with armored units and the forces of the other services, they went directly into combat in less than 60 hours from the time they were alerted in the middle of the night 2000-3000 miles away from their home bases. In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as I have just discussed, the Army rapidly deployed forces over 8000 miles from the United States to Saudi Arabia in as little as 31 hours from their initial alert notification. Our European-based forces were also deployed on short notice. In fact, one Patriot air defense missile section deployed from Europe to Israel, and was operational in 191/2 hours from the time the Joint Alert Order was issued. The circumstances that required the deployment of American forces in Operations Just Cause and, Desert Storm are clearly not aberrations. They are an unfortunate by-product of the transition to the post-Cold War era. While we may no longer give credence to the old Mao Tse-tung axiom that "Power flows from the barrel of a gun," it is obviously still an operative rule elsewhere in the world. |