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CONCLUSION

Your Army today has drawn its strength and character from the traditions and achievements of the past. Throughout its history, the Army has been the nation's loyal servant at home as well as in overseas locations. It has been an organized, disciplined resource that the nation could rely on to do whatever had to be done. During peacetime, the American people knew that they could count on their Army to take care of priorities at home, and when trouble broke out overseas, the Army was trained and ready to fight.

Our soldiers today are a priceless asset that the nation can count on. These soldiers are a testimony to the success of the policies and programs designed to train and equip an Army that can stand up to any threat, any time, any place, and under any conditions.

The American people must always know that they can count on their Army as a stabilizing force abroad and as a resource at home. Together, America and its Army can continue to provide for the common defense while helping to strengthen our position abroad and improving our lives at home.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to tell you and your committee of the magnificent men and women that serve the cause of peace around the world. It is because of their dedication to this nation's ideals that your Army is the best in our nation's history. I will be happy to address your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General Vuono.

STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL E. VUONO, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

General VUONO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is a privilege to appear again before the committee. We are delighted to see that you are off your back and back on your feet, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General VUONO. The 1992-1993 budget is the first of the Army's 6-year program, and it represents the continuation of our plan to shape a smaller, capable Total Force for the future. Yet there is somewhat of a striking contrast in testifying today on the Army's future-basically, on our blueprint for reducing the Army to its smallest size since before World War II-while the United States Army has almost 300,000 men and women deployed today in the Persian Gulf.

I believe this situation is unprecedented in our history. I hope it makes us all stop to consider the risk to the Nation; because there are indeed risks inherent in building down the most trained and ready Army in our history during a period of intense international turbulence.

Now, the focus of your Army today is on simultaneously meeting the requirements of three critical tasks that lie upon what I call three separate but interrelated vectors.

First, we must provide all the support necessary to accomplish United States national objectives in Operation Desert Storm and to properly reconstitute the force after the successful conclusion of hostilities. The Army is central, I believe, to success, particularly in convincing or compelling the Iraqi Army to quit Kuwait,

Second, we must maintain a trained and ready force to meet ongoing commitments worldwide and for rapid action in unforeseeable contingencies. Finally, we must continue to shape the total force for the future.

Now on Desert Storm, the Army executing Operation Desert Storm is an indispensable instrument of national policy. I do not believe any other military in the world could have matched the feats of American Armed Forces in Operation Desert Storm. Clearly, we could not have done it without the sacrifices and superb performance of our soldiers, active and reserve, who are part of the Total Army.

This Army was built on an uncompromising adherence to what Congressman Dickinson talked about as six fundamental imperatives that guide the Army of today, and serve as a beacon for the Army that we are building for the future.

Today's Army is made up of quality volunteer soldiers, who are manning technologically superior weapons systems developed over the past two decades. They are guided by an effective warfighting doctrine. They are trained to a razor's edge. They serve in a mix of armored, light, and special operations units, and they are led by leaders whose skills have been honed by training and development over a lifetime of service.

Maintaining the quality of this force must be our overarching objective as we shape the Army of the future.

Even as we focus on Desert Storm, we must sustain the readiness of our forces throughout the world. Within the last 14 months, U.S. forces have been committed to combat twice. Both operations required rapid, short-notice projection of substantial land combat power from the United States, and in the latter case from Europe. To give you an idea of just how ready our forces must be, one Patriot unit deployed from Europe to Israel and was operational in less than 20 hours from the time the alert order was issued. That does not leave much time for correcting readiness deficiencies.

Finally, we remain committed to a comprehensive plan for reshaping the Army into our vision of the future-an Army trained and ready to defend vital U.S. interests wherever they may be threatened.

The original plan that we laid out for this committee last year has proven to be remarkably resilient. You will recall, we concluded that the evolving international environment would require an Army with three fundamental qualities: versatility, deployability, and lethality. These characteristics, along with the requirement to expand the force as a hedge against the uncertain future, continue to form the basis of our efforts to reshape the Army.

We have adjusted our plan based on the changes in our national military strategy. The strategy has shifted from one based on containment of the Soviet Union through forward defense to one based on achieving U.S. objectives by the projection of power, through peacetime forward presence, and by the ability to reconstitute a larger force should the need arise. This shift in strategy has fundamental implications for the Army.

The most notable changes are that the future Army will be substantially smaller and largely CONUS (continental United States) based. The Army in CONUS will consist of a contingency force that is rapidly tailorable for crisis response and other immediate requirements worldwide. We will have an early reinforcing force of active divisions rounded out by Army National Guard brigades. We will have a follow-on reinforcing force of Army National Guard divisions, cadre divisions to assist us in reconstitution, and the requisite general support forces in both the active and the reserve components.

Now a more CONUS-based Army, coupled with rising dangers inherent in regional conflicts and the increase in technological sophistication in the armies of developing countries, will place a greater premium on the capability to project massive combat power rapidly from the United States or from forward deployed locations. Such a visible, capable power projection capability will be central to our Nation's continued ability to deter aggression and to defend our national interests worldwide. This is the essence of the new strategy, and it cannot be executed without trained and ready land forces and adequate strategic lift.

While we plan to reduce a number of forward deployed units where the situation warrants, we must retain sufficient forces overseas to sustain our alliance commitments and to contribute to regional stability.

If the current trends with the Soviet Union continue, the increase in the time we forecast to detect and counter a major Soviet retrenchment permits the United States to rely on its capability to

reconstitute additional forces over a longer period of time. In the future, the Army's contribution to deterring or winning a protracted major conflict will necessarily rely on our ability to generate additional forces when they are required.

I cannot overemphasize the need for a prudent and managed reconstitution of the Army at the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm-to include the return of our forces to Europe-and the rational resumption of our planned force reductions.

It has taken, Mr. Chairman, over a decade to build the Army that we have today. It has come about through the vision of our predecessors, yours and mine, and with the support of the American people. It is now our turn, I believe, to exercise the same far reaching vision, recognizing that the armed forces that we build today will be our legacy for the future.

Tragic lessons of history have taught us that we cannot expect to quickly rebuild this force, if we squander its quality and readiness through arbitrary reductions in force structure and personnel.

When our planned build-down is completed, we will have reached the lowest possible level of strength, in my view. The Army of the mid-1990s will be a perilously small ground force for a Nation with superpower responsibilities. At these levels, it will be essential to minimize the risks inherent in a smaller force by limiting the turbulence created by rapid force reductions. The Army's plans for the future have been structured to accomplish this vital objective.

The decisions this committee will make concerning the reconstitution following Operation Desert Storm, which will be the subject of supplemental requests beyond the limits of this budget, will shape the direction of the Army for the decade of the 1990s and beyond. I fervently hope that our successors are not faced with the need to confront a future Saddam Hussein. But more than that, I hope that if they do, both the Army and the Nation are prepared. We have a significant challenge, you and I, Mr. Chairman, when we conclude the war in the Persian Gulf and resume the builddown and reshaping of the Army. We believe we have taken the best possible path by consciously choosing to preserve the quality, the readiness, and the warfighting competence of the Army at the expense of reducing it to the smallest level in half a century. We can succeed with a small Army, if we keep it second to none. In my judgment, quality and readiness are essential, not optional. There is no substitute for quality, and there can be no retreat from readi

ness.

As the Chief of Staff of the Army, my greatest reward has been the opportunity to serve with the magnificent young men and women of America's Army, almost 300,000 of whom are now serving in the Persian Gulf at no small sacrifice, and who are defending the principles of peace and freedom on which our Nation is based. The all-volunteer total force has clearly been a resounding success, and I am proud to have been a part of it.

So in closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the other members of the committee, whom I have worked with over the past 4 years, for your support of America's Army. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL E. VUONO

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is a privilege for me to appear before the Committee today to report on the state of the United States Army and to explain the Army's plans and priorities for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 and beyond. There is a striking paradox in testifying on the Army's future — basically on our blueprint for reducing the Army to its smallest size since before World War II while the United States has over one-half million men and women deployed at war to liberate Kuwait. This situation is unprecedented in our history. It should make us all stop to consider the risks for there are, indeed, risks associated with the course we are on inherent in building down the most trained and ready Army in our nation's history during a period of intense international turbulence.

I want to begin my testimony today, much as the Secretary of Defense did two weeks ago, with an important caveat. This budget is based on some extremely positive assumptions about the continuation of the democratic and cooperative trends in the Soviet Union and the outcome of Operation Desert Storm. Should the Soviet Union return to the aggressive and confrontational policies of the past, we should substantially reexamine the military posture we are projecting for the future. Further, we must reevaluate the schedule for building down the force once Operation Desert Storm has been concluded. With that in mind, this is the first budget of the Army's six-year program, and it represents the continuation of our plan to shape a smaller, capable Total Force for the future.

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