ly avail himself of every defect in an adversary's proof which the rules of evidence, or accident, or time, may have created; three propositions, every one of which is without foundation. Suppose that a client makes claim to land, in the possession and apparent ownership of another, whose evi dence of title, however, has been destroyed by accident. The advocate knows from confidential communications, made to him as counsel, that his client has not a just claim to the land; but from defect of proof on the part of the possessor, it is easy for him to recover it. If the client asks it, is he bound to assist him? Few persons will maintain that. But if the doctrine is a sound one, does it not embrace this case? There is, as it strikes us, no middle ground. If the advocate is to overlook the moral aspects of the claim, he must recover this property for his client. Putting so extreme a case tests the principle, and shows it to be unsound, by showing that it leads to a consequence so revolting.

The law, moreover, is not so clear and precise, but that it may be mistaken or perverted. A strong mind at the bar, and a weak one on the bench, lead often to erroneous judgments. The argument we oppose, takes for granted the infallibility of judges, and the certainty of law. Who, conversant with the proceedings of courts, does not know that neither can be counted on? Before ordinary tribunals, more depends on the advocate than is generally imagined.

Is it lawful to use the power of reason and eloquence, to sustain a bad cause, to support the guilty, or what is more revolting, to persecute innocence? May the faculties be abused, and learning perverted, to make false reasons seem true, to cover up weak points, to give undue prominence to some facts, to conceal others, to magnify one's own cause, to vilify an adversary's? To hold this proceeds upon the fallacy that truth and right cannot be misrepresented or concealed. Who does not know the contrary?

If it be said, that it is the duty of an advocate to go no farther than to present the cause of his client truly, leaving the results to the courts and juries, it may be answered, that truth is absolute, not relative. To present a case truly requires the whole truth on both sides, as well that which makes against,

as that which makes for, a client. If he present the favorable circumstances, and suppress the unfavorable, does he present the case truly? Does he not rather impose a false impression on those who have to judge?

We by no means assert, that an advocate may not take upon himself the defence of a man whom he believes to be guilty. He may. The section we propose permits him to do so. If he have derived his belief from the confession of the accused, he should pause in assuming his defence. The law gives to every man charged with crime, the benefit of the rule that his innocence is to be presumed by his judges, until the prosecution have established his guilt, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Of this rule the advocate is the intermediate minister. Notwithstanding his own conjectures, surmises, or even belief as to the guilt of his client; he may not become his judge, but is justified if not bound to enforce its application to the inconclusiveness of the evidence of guilt. He may do this, the more readily, because even the jury themselves are bound to secure to the accused the benefit of its application. He may also undertake to show the circumstances of his case; to present the palliating circumstances of temptation, or of provocation, or anything else, that may affect the moral quality of the action, or determine the degree of punishment. He may also in civil cases present defences recognised and provided by law, although he may himself disapprove of the principle and policy of the law.

But here the advocate should stop. The law and all its machinery are means, not ends; the purpose of their creation is justice; and he, who, in his zeal for the means, forgets the ends, betrays not only an unsound heart, but an unsound understanding.

§ 512. An attorney and counsellor who is guilty of deceit or collusion or consents thereto, with intent to deceive a court or judge, or a party to an action or judicial proceeding, is punishable for a misdemeanor, and shall also forfeit to the party injured, treble damages, recoverable in a civil action.

§ 513. If an attorney and counsellor knowingly permit a person not his general law partner, to sue out process, or to prosecute or defend an action or proceedin his name, he and every person who so uses his name, shall severally forfeit to the party against whom the process was issued, or the action or proceeding prosecuted or defended, the sum of fifty dollars, recoverable in a civil action.

ARTICLE IV.

AUTHORITY OF AN ATTORNEY AND ITS DURATION.

SECTION 514. Authority of an attorney.

515. Proceedings, when he appears without authority.
516. Compelling him to produce authority.

§ 514. An attorney and counsellor has authority,

1. To bind his client, in any of the proceedings in an action or special proceeding, by his agreement filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise:

2. To receive money claimed by his client in an aetion or special proceeding, during the pendency thereof, or within one year after judgment; and upon the payment thereof, and not otherwise, to discharge the claim, or acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment.

But this section does not prevent a party from employing a new attorney, to issue an execution upon a judgment, or to take the other proceedings, prescribed by this code, for its enforcement; and when he does so, the authority of the former attorney ceases.

§ 515. If it be alleged by a party for whom an attorney appears, that he does so without authority, the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, relieve the party for whom the attorney has assumed to appear, from the consequences of his acts. It may also summarily, upon motion, compel the attorney to repair the injury to either party, consequent upon his assumption of authority.

§ 516. The court, or a judge, may, on motion of either party, and on showing reasonable ground therefor, require the attorney for the adverse party, or for any one of several adverse parties, to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and until he does so, may stay all proceedings by him on behalf of the party for whom he assumes to appear.

ARTICLE V.

CHANGE OF ATTORNEY.

SECTION 517. Attorney, how changed.

518. Notice of change.

519. When attorney dies, or ceases to act as such, notice thereof

to be served on adverse party.

§ 517. The attorney in an action or special proceeding, may be changed at any time before judgment or final determination, as follows:

1. Upon his own consent filed with the clerk or entered upon the minutes: or,

2. Upon the order of the court or a judge thereof, on the application of the client or for other sufficient

cause.

directed, to satisfy the lien, when determined in an

action; or,

2. Summarily inquire into the facts on which the claim of a lien is founded, and determine the same:

or

3. Direct the trial of the controversy by a jury, or refer it, and upon the verdict or report, determine the same as in other cases.

ATICLE VIII.

RESIGNATION OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS, AND THE EFFECT THEREOF.

SECTION 523. Resignation, how made, and its effect.

524. May be re-admitted.

§ 523. An attorney and counsellor may, at any time, file in the office of the clerk of the county in which he resides, a written resignation; and after the filing thereof, he is not entitled to the rights, nor is he subject to the disabilities or prohibitions, incident to that relation; except that he is still subject to the power of the court, as provided in the last three sections, in respect to matters arising while he was an attorney and counsellor.

§ 524. An attorney and counsellor who shall have resigned as provided in the last section, may at any time thereafter be re-admitted to practice as such, in the same manner, as if he had never been so admitted.