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So I'm a little concerned that we are putting them in areas that haven't signed mutual aid pacts. Particularly, when you get up in the northeast where you already got a lot of blank spots anyway, and then we have a RAID team in a State that's not part of the mutual aid compact that can't go help Maine or Connecticut or whatever when you're so close.

Mr. CRAGIN. We have an answer for that.

Mrs. FOWLER. Good. I'm glad.

Mr. CRAGIN. First answer is just because a State has not signed a mutual aid compact does not mean that a governor can't authorize a RAID team to go across State lines. They can do that. However, in the event-and I mean, you can consider the scenario and I'm from Maine so I'll use Maine and Massachusetts. We have a problem in Portland, Maine, and Governor King calls up Governor Cellucci and says, send me the RAID team. And Governor Cellucci says, well, wait a minute. If you have a problem in Portland, maybe we're going to have a problem in Boston. Well, at that point that team gets Federalized because that is the beauty of having National Guard personnel who wear a State hat and Federal hat. And the Federal Government sends them to Portland, Maine.

Mrs. FOWLER. So you can override whether they have compacts or not.

Mr. CRAGIN. That's right.

Mrs. FOWLER. Interesting. Another question for FEMA. On paper when you look at all this, FEMA is the lead Federal agency, as you said, for consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack. But as we go through all of this, it appears that FEMA has been providing very little leadership.

It just seems FEMA is one of a number of agencies out there that have training programs and expertise but doesn't seem to exercise much leadership authority nor getting a very significant amount of resources through this.

Could you tell me why this is the case and what would it take for FEMA to assert the leadership it has on paper and make it a reality. Because if on paper you're supposed to be doing this but in reality it's not happening, what is it going to take to make it happen?

Ms. LIGHT. From a consequence management perspective, I believe that FEMA is exercising leadership with respect to that. As you know, the Federal Response Plan is the plan that we use to respond to all type of disasters. So from that perspective we get training opportunities, we get exercising opportunities, we developed a terrorism incident annex to the Federal response plan to focus specifically on terrorism and have provided that to States and to locals. And we are working very closely with the FBI to dovetail the lead agency responsibilities for crisis management and for consequence management.

And in the area of training, it's true we are in some capacities definitely supporting DOD in the Nunn-Lugar program and supporting DOJ in the DOJ FEMA program. But I think we are also taking the initiative to make good use of the money that we do have available. Of the money that we get, two-thirds of it actually goes out to the States.

And we are taking the opportunity to use that money to provide it to those States and localities who are not, in essence, receiving the training through the other programs.

Mrs. FOWLER. Well, I would just like to recommend that each of you read Councilwoman Simank's testimony if you didn't hear it. Because according to it, as well as her statement that she gave here, the problem got worse due to the Federal response plan; that they were doing much better before the Federal teams came in than after.

I'm just saying read it, and, you know, I'm concerned. But I think we need to move on from there. I do want to thank all of you. Because you have really given very good testimony. I spent a lot of time on it. This is going to be an ongoing topic that we're going to be working on.

I think we know that from Oklahoma City, that we heard today, to New York City that we're all familiar with; we do have to prepare to confront domestic terrorisms.

What we have heard today from several of our witnesses is that the Federal Government's current complex organizational structure may be contributing to confusion and resulting in some unnecessary duplication and waste.

The executive branch has taken a number of steps to improve the overall development of this growing array of agencies' and offices' efforts to combat terrorism. But I'm not satisfied that the Nation has a comprehensive plan or clear priorities, and I think that's what we're hearing today from our other witnesses.

So for our support, for Federal support, to be effective and I don't mind however many dollars we need to spend because this is a critical problem facing our country-but we have got to have a comprehensive national strategy that defines a concrete end-state and is based on some valid assessments of threat and risk of terrorist attacks and what our current capabilities are.

Because without it, we might not be targeting these resources properly. When one of the larger questions you kept hearing from us today is who is in charge, it doesn't appear that any one agency, even though on paper they're saying it's going to be yours, but does anyone have the authority? That's what it all comes down to in this town is who has the authority to control or eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication.

It's important that this cross-cutting delineation of authority be developed and I think these charts certainly showed it-in order to direct some coordinated efforts. Each time we talk, when one of these tragic events occurs, we all assume our firemen, police, medics are ready. But we have heard today and we have seen this in large parts of our country they may not be ready because they're not getting the training and the resources that they need.

And we've got to make sure that every Federal dollar counts so that the protection that we're taking for granted is actually there for everybody in this country. Since our subcommittee has oversight and legislative authority over Federal emergency management issues, and we're going to be continuing to take a closer look at these questions in the coming months. We look forward to continuing to work with you as we try to make sure that we do keep this country hopefully ahead of it and make sure that in the case

I agree with my ranking member-we want to prevent these attacks. To make sure that every effort is being done to prevent them. If they happen to occur, make sure that every part of this country has people in the State and local level who are prepared. At the Federal level, when our people go in there to help, they help and not to hinder.

Thank you very much for what you have done. We can look forward to continuing to work with you. I thank Mr. Isakson who has stuck through this whole hearing today. I appreciate the work of the staff. They worked very hard in putting all this information together. And we will continue to be working on it throughout the summer. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

STATEMENT OF

HONORABLE CHARLES L. CRAGIN

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(RESERVE AFFAIRS)

BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

PREPAREDNESS FOR TERRORISM RESPONSE

JUNE 9, 1999

Good morning, Madam Chairman and distinguished members of this Subcommittee. Let me begin by thanking you for inviting me to discuss the role of the Department of Defense in supporting the nation's domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In the wake of the bombings at the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in New York, it became readily apparent that we as a nation were less than well prepared to respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD. As a result, President Clinton has undertaken significant efforts to galvanize federal agencies and prompt them to work more effectively, both together at the interagency level and in support of first responders, to provide our nation with an enhanced, flexible and integrated response capability.

As a nation, we are also facing the fact that the front lines in the war against terrorism are no longer only overseas-they are also right here at home. As Secretary Cohen has said, we must face the fact that "the next terrorist attack will come to U.S. soil in a bottle or a briefcase." I believe the heightened security measures undertaken during the recent NATO conference here in Washington provides ample evidence of our concern for terrorist activities right here at home. We are determined to ensure that we are prepared for a deadly chemical or biological attack against our country. A comprehensive and coordinated government-wide interagency effort is now underway.

Under the direction of President Clinton, and in partnership with Congress, plans, policies and laws are being developed or revised to help us prepare better for the day when terrorists or rogue nations attack with unconventional means. President Clinton believes we must do more to protect our civilian population from the scourge of chemical and biological weapons, and that we must prepare better to respond to attacks against our Homeland. In May of 1998, in his commencement address at the Naval Academy, the President announced that the government would do more to protect our civilian population from these threats.

Specifically, the President has signed Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62)—the Combating Terrorism directive—which highlights the growing threat of unconventional attacks against the United States. In essence, PDD-62 helps bring a program management approach to our national counter-terrorism efforts; it details a new and more systematic method of working together to fight terrorism here at home.

PDD-62 established the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism to oversee national counter-terrorism efforts. This National Security Council (NSC)-directed framework is bringing a new impetus and a new urgency to our efforts to support state and local authorities.

The NSC-chaired Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness (WMDP) senior management group coordinates interagency WMDP policy issues and oversees the activities of seven subgroups. These subgroups are engaged in coordinating policies involving federal assistance to state and local authorities, research and development, prevention of WMD from entering the US, security of US WMD facilities and materials, contingency planning and exercises, legislative and legal issues, and intelligence. Each subgroup membership is comprised

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