Mr. ISAKSON. Thank you, Madam Chairperson. Only a couple of observations. One is that I don't think there's any question that the major threat to our people in the 21st century is from terrorism and from terrorism on our own soil. We have seen in the World Trade Center, we saw in Oklahoma City those two instances which were warnings. There is no question that it can and there is, unfortunately, no question that it will happen again.

In preparing to listen today to the testimony by studying what was provided to us a few days earlier, it is apparent that there does have to be a place where the buck stops. There does have to be a line of accountability. And wherever there is duplication it needs to be streamlined. Regardless of what we do in the Federal Government, the first line of defense in our home communities are the firemen and the law enforcement officers.

In fact, if we look back on the two terrorist attacks most prominent in America in recent years, it was a law enforcement officer who saw an expired license tag on Mr. McVeigh's car that actually arrested him. And the World Trade Center, it's only because they attempted to go back and get a refund from the U-Haul agency on the van they rented that we were able to secure those and prosecute those individuals.

Again, local law enforcement in both those cases played the primary role. We owe it to our citizens for them to have as much comfort as they can possibly have that we are prepared to respond quickly, and we're prepared at the Federal level to support those in the local level who ultimately will be the first line of defense and the first response in any terrorist attack.

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Isakson. I believe that is all of our members here. I have a unanimous consent request to allow members who are not members of the subcommittee to sit in today and these are Representative Chris Shays who is Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform; and Representative Ike Skelton who has been closely following this subject for a number of years. I ask unanimous consent to allow Mr. Shays and Mr. Skelton to participate in today's hearing. Any objection?

Without objection it is so ordered.

Now, I would like to-when we had our first subcommittee hearing-just remind people that what we had decided in the subcommittee that we will adhere to the 5-minute rule today which will apply not only to witnesses but also to the Members.

And what we'll do, there aren't too many members, we can go back around, but at least make sure everybody gets a chance to ask some of their questions and we'll go around again for their other questions also.

I would also like to tell both of the first witnesses and all the witnesses that your testimony and that of all the other witnesses will be included in its entirety in the record. As you speak, if you could summarize your testimony that would be very helpful to us as we go through the hearing today.

Before we proceed with testimony, we will swear in the witnesses. This has been the practice of this Subcommittee going back to its earliest days. The Chair notes that this is not a hostile hear

ing. Nevertheless, copies of committee rules spelling out your rights and the limitations on the power of the subcommittee are available. The Chair also notes that you're entitled to be advised by counsel during your testimony if you so desire.

I would like now to introduce our first panel, Mr. Mark Gebicke who is director of national security and preparedness issues for the General Accounting Office. I believe you have two other members from the General Accounting Office with you today, Mr. Gebicke. If you would like to introduce them and then I'll swear all three of you in.

Mr. GEBICKE. To my left is Richard McGeary and to my right is Davi D'Agostino.

Mrs. FOWLER. If you would please rise and raise your right hand. [Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you so much. You can be seated.
Mr. Gebicke, if you would proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MARK E. GEBICKE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AND PREPAREDNESS ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE

Mr. GEBICKE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. We're pleased to be here to continue our dialogue with members of the Congress about this important issue. And what I'll do within my 5 minutes is to share some observations in just three key areas:

One, the threat of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident taking place in the United States. Secondly, the rapid Federal growth of both training activities as well as response activities on the part of the Federal sector that you alluded to in your opening remarks. And finally, some of the steps that the executive branch has recently taken and most importantly some steps, some very important fundamental steps, that we think are still missing from the whole program.

Let's turn first to the threat of terrorism in the United States. Now, the U.S. intelligence agencies are continuously monitoring threats both from inside the country as well as from outside the country. And what they tell us is that terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological and nuclear weapons than they are to use explosives and firearms for a couple reasons.

Number one, it's much more difficult to actually procure and produce and disseminate chemical weapons and biological weapons than it is the more conventional types of weapons. Also those weapons are much more unpredictable. You just don't know what's going to happen when you release them.

Now, the intelligence community also tells us that over the next decade or so threats from these types of weapons-chemical, biological and nuclear-might be increasing. So it's something we need to watch and something that is evolving.

Unfortunately, we find also that there are a lot of conflicting statements made in public forums, particularly with regard to chemical and biological weapons and with regard specifically to the ease or difficulty with which they can be delivered.

On the one hand, some people have suggested that it's relatively easy to produce effective chemical or biological weapons at home

using recipes off the Internet. Others suggest that it's far more difficult than that.

In addition, there appears to be a disconnect between the intelligence agencies' judgments and the focus of at least one program that we're aware of. And we can get into that a little bit later.

My second point-and you alluded to it in the charts that you put up at the very beginning of the hearing-significant increase in the budget requests-$6.5 billion in 1998, $10 billion budgeted or proposed for the upcoming fiscal year. The Federal Government has created similar programs, both to provide training to the State and local responders as well as to actually provide a Federal response capability.

In our statement we've laid out some details of those programs and also the Federal responses that are involved. It goes without saying that the more players you have involved, the more difficult it becomes to coordinate and integrate the response.

The final point is to acknowledge and recognize some steps that the executive branch has taken. These are very positive steps and they shouldn't be minimized. In the last couple of years OMB put together all of the budgets for the Federal agencies in combating terrorism. That's the first time that had been done.

We now have that information. We know who the players are, and we know to some extent the resources from the taxpayer are going into this program. The attorney general has issued a classified 5-year interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology. The plan was very well done.

And the Attorney General has also planned to establish a National Domestic Preparedness Office at the FBI, which will hopefully coordinate better the various activities that are taking place and make it easier for the State and local responders to understand what's available to them.

Now, having said that, and having talked about the positive nature of these steps, there are still three opportunities where we see that things can be improved. One is that we still don't have a government-wide strategy, and we don't have a defined end-state.

If we had an end-state I think we could answer some of these following questions, if not all of them. What's the end game for all of the nations' investment and programs? How are we going to get there? What's our road map? How are we going to know when we have achieved what it is we want to achieve? Is the desired endstate for every city and every local entity to have a full capability to respond to terrorist threat? Is that reasonable?

Secondly, I think we need to establish firm program requirements. And these have to be based on threat and risk assessments. They have to be. If we put these in place, these assessments and these inputs, we can make decisions then on programs, requirements, and investments. And we can make sure that those investments are geared towards the more likely threats.

Right now it appears as if we're trying to prepare for the most catastrophic threats, which may not necessarily be the most likely. And then finally-and I'll close in just a minute-we really need a comprehensive inventory of all the assets that are involved in combating terrorism at the Federal, State, and local levels. Only

when we know what's out there and what the requirements are, can we figure out what we need to add.

Now, if we put these three program elements-very fundamental elements-in place, I think we'll be in a better position to know whether or not we have established the right programs funded in the right relative amounts. And then I think we're on the right track.

In closing, I would just say that we are not here to say that this is not a good investment for the Federal Government. It obviously is very critical-it is a good investment. What we are saying is we think we can make it a more effective investment through better focus and better direction. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Gebicke.

The general accounting office always does such a good job. We always depend on you to help us wade through the myriad of details with these programs and help us come to some decisions. I think the questions you have raised are very good, valued ones. We share your concerns. We'll be looking at some of these today and in the coming months.

One point I would like to make from something you said in the beginning-and this is maybe because I'm on the Armed Services Committee I have great respect for our intelligence committee, but they were way off base by about 8 years on the missile capabilities of some of the rogue countries around this world.

So if they're that off base on whether we're going to be facing terrorist attacks using any of these weapons of mass destruction, I think we better be getting ready now rather than waiting years down the road.

We have seen that with missile defense. I'm concerned with seeing what happened in Japan a couple years ago. It's very easy nowadays to acquire a weapon and use it if someone so chose. So I have a little dispute with our intelligence committee evaluation that you were quoting there.

As you pointed out in your testimony, there are about 40 different Federal agencies that are involved right now in combating terrorism. There's more and more money being spent each year on this and we all agree we need to spend the money to do it right.

In reading through your testimony, do you see who in the Federal bureaucracy is in charge of all this? Have you been able to identify any one entity that is in charge?

Mr. GEBICKE. Well, probably the closest person we have to being in charge is at the National Security Council, the National Coordinator for terrorism. But obviously there are some inherent limitations in that particular function. The coordinator does not have the role to direct the agencies to do things. It is more of a coordinating role, as the name implies. It's an integrating role. It's a role of persuasion.

And also I guess from your perspective I would have some concerns as to whether or not that individual also would report to the Congress. So if that person-I think a true coordinator or person in charge would be somebody who would come up and sit before you and discuss the issues. I guess for the reasons that I just laid out it's probably not truly somebody 'in charge.' But that's the closest thing that we see at this point in time.

Now, there is something that I will add that we are just embarking on right now. We are getting ready to do a review of how other countries specifically countries who have dealt with terrorism issues for a long period of time are organized to address this issue in their countries. And right now in our scope we're thinking about going to Israel, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. It will be awhile before we have the results, but we hope from that study to bring back some good practices, if you will, that can be considered and possibly determine if they might be applicable to our situation here in this country.

Mrs. FOWLER. That's interesting. I look forward to reviewing the results of that study. I know if you have been doing some of your work, you have been talking to State and local officials around this country. Do you get any specific feedback as to what Federal entity they think should be in charge of this or who they should be looking to be coordinating this?

Mr. GEBICKE. No, I don't think we have heard exactly who should be in charge. What we hear most often is there are too many of them. It's just too confusing and too hard to deal with.

Mrs. FOWLER. I agree. Based on your research and people you had been meeting with, what do the people you have talked to think about FEMA's training programs? Is there any criticism regarding the way these training programs of FEMA's have been implemented?

Mr. GEBICKE. We really haven't looked at the FEMA training program in detail so I can't comment on that. We are in the process of starting two other assignments; and if you would like, I could go into those just briefly.

Mrs.FOWLER. OK.

Mr. GEBICKE. We are looking at all the various training programs that the Federal Government is providing. So we're going to be doing a fairly comprehensive inventory trying to determine where there's overlap and where there are gaps in those training programs. In another assignment we're also going to be looking at the duplication and overlap, if it exists, in the Federal response assets. We're going to look at both.

Mrs. FOWLER. I think the members of the subcommittee will see, as we work our way through this today, there's a great need for those studies and the answer to those questions that we can take and move forward with.

If the Department of Defense had taken a different approach in their training programs than just going directly to the cities, could their programs have covered a greater proportion of the population than they're currently covering?

Mr. GEBICKE. Yes, ma'am. That's very possible. There are other approaches that we identified in our work that DOD could have considered. One could have been a county-wide approach and instead of covering 22 percent of the population by using a city approach, they could have doubled that and picked up 44 percent.

And in addition, if they had taken an approach directed at the metropolitan statistical areas, it's also possible that they could have picked up up to 64 percent of the total population. But more importantly than even expanding the message, what they told us at the State and local level is had the approach to the course been