Mr. WEBB. That's the problem with it. It's wrapped up in very accurate detail. Little things are very accurate.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to take the committee's time on that question.

Chairman NUNN. No. I think it was an excellent question. I'm delighted to get Mr. Webb's answer to it.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Just one last question.

Would you like to take a moment here to provide us with what your goals, your personal goals, would be in this office in the next 20 some odd months? You will serve in it, I am confident. In reading your books I find that you have an unusual ability to relate the past to the future. I'd be quite interested. Have you thought through several goals that you would like to achieve as Secretary of the Navy?

Mr. WEBB. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I bring no sweeping agenda to this job. I think that the sea services are in good shape. It's rather like taking over on an aircraft carrier while it's launching.

I would like to see these programs through. My benchmark on what the Navy and the Marine Corps should be is not 1979 when it had bottomed out at 479 ships, but 1968 when we had 931 ships and essentially the same missions that we have today.

We need to build the Navy back to where it was before we hit the bottom. We need to use something other than a 479-ship Navy as a benchmark. We are a maritime Nation. Over the past 5 or 6 years our balance of trade has shifted more and more into the maritime areas that we have. I would like to leave the sea services in a position of irrefutable strength.

As to specifics I think the only one immediate goal that I have is to reassure the officer corps that its integrity is my No. 1 priority. Senator WARNER. That would be commissioned officers, and I hope petty officers.

Mr. WEBB. Absolutely.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, and good luck.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Webb, thank you for being here. I want to thank all of the committee Members for a splendid turnout on a Monday afternoon. We will try to take up this nomination at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday morning. I'm not sure whether we are going to be able to get it through the committee and through the Senate this week.

I have been very impressed with your background and have known you in your recent job. I am enormously impressed with the depth of your thinking and your answers. I don't agree with all of them, but that is immaterial. I think you bring a thoughtful, soul searching examination to critical issues that face the Nation and the country. I congratulate you for it. I certainly will be one of those supporting your nomination.

We will have questions for the record. We will ask you to get those back as soon as you can. I'm going to ask the counsel on both sides, minority and majority, to make sure those questions are not redundant and to make sure that we're not simply going over what has already been gone over. If we are going to vote on Wednesday

in the committee, and I hope we will, that gives Mr. Webb 1 day to provide answers. So I hope we have a minimum number of written questions. But they may be important to those who are asking them and they may be important and relevant by Wednesday morning. So I don't know what you were planning tomorrow, but we would ask you to

Mr. WEBB. I'm all yours, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [continuing]. To set aside a little time on that one, and we would appreciate that. We thank your family for being here and are delighted to have them here. They are a fine looking family. We are pleased that you are willing to offer your service to your country in this respect. We are indeed grateful for your previous service.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Questions for the hearing record, with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

DEFENSE REORGANIZATION

Senator NUNN. Secretary Webb, as you may know, there was considerable opposition with the Department of the Navy to Defense reorganization.

What are you views on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986? What, in your view, were the major objectives of that legislation? Do you support them?

Mr. WEBB. Under the general rubric of enhancing DOD's ability to discharge its responsibilities for the execution of national defense policy, there were, in my opinion, several major objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Foremost was the desire to emphasize jointness, and to increase the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Unified and Specified Commanders. I am in general agreement with this desire, especially after having spent 3 years as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, where in my responsibility as an evaluator of resourcing directed toward war plans I was in frequent contact with the CINCs, and was a proponent of their greater participation in the planning process. In this regard, I believe Secretaries Weinberger and Taft deserve much credit for their early decision to involve the CINCS as evaluators in the Defense Resources Board process.

I do have serious concerns, however, with some portions of the law, particularly with some sections of Title IV. My personal belief is that the law as presently stated is procrustean, failing to recognize different needs of the different services, and that it requires joint service far too early in a Naval officer's career. I would hope to discuss this matter with this committee at an early date following my confirmation.

ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Senator NUNN. Secretarty Webb, as you may know, prior to enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments in a unified Department of Defense were poorly defined. The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave considerable attention to clarifying the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Would you explain to the committee what you see as the roles of the Secretary of the Navy, particularly concerning his responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense? Mr. WEBB. My reading of the Goldwater-Nichols Act as it relates to the role of the Secretary of the Navy is that it more clearly established the service £ ecretary's predominance with respect to uniformed leaders inside the Navy Depart nent, and that it also more clearly defined the overarching authority of the Secretary of Defense as the articulator and promulgator of Defense policy.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Webb, recently we have seen a number of responsibilities that have traditionally been performed by the uniformed Navy being carried out by the Department's senior civilians. Most notable in this regard has been civilian dominance of the Navy's contributions to strategy formulation.

Do you plan to continue this reallocation of responsibilities, especially regarding strategy formulation?

Mr. WEBB. In general terms, it should be pointed out that the Goldwater-Nichols Act dictates more responsibilities at the Secretarial level. These matters will be ad

dressed through appropriate Departmental Instructions. Specifically with respect to strategy formulation, my view is that this is historically, and continues to be, a bilateral process. The service Secretary has a responsibility to participate in the strategy formulation process, particularly as the process relates to carrying out the President's objectives, the development of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance, and in evaluating the resourcing of the strategy. The uniformed military chiefs have a responsibility to advise the Service Secretaries on such matters, and also directly participate in strategy development as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Quite frankly, I believe it much more inappropriate for a service Secretary to become directly involved in operational matters than in strategic matters.

MARITIME STRATEGY

Senator NUNN. Secretary Webb, in recent years, the Navy has promoted what is called the Maritime Strategy. There has been considerable criticism of the Maritime Strategy. Some believe that it is disconnected from the strategic priorities of U.S. military strategy. Others argue that it is nothing more than a marketing strategy to obtain more resources for the Navy. Admiral Crowe has the following statement about the Maritime Strategy, and I quote:

66* *

* There is no such thing as a 'Maritime' or a 'Navy' strategy for the United States. We have a strategy . . . I do not believe the scheme known as a 'Maritime Strategy' is a strategy. It is a conceptual way that we might use naval forces."

Mr. Secretary, would you please give us your views on the Maritime Strategy? Mr. WEBB. I believe there is nothing wrong with articulating strategic concepts that pertain to the use of naval forces, and relating them to the national military strategy. I believe the credible use of seapower is the linchpin of our national military strategy. Nonetheless, seapower cannot be used in a vacuum, or simply on a navy-to-navy basis. It is essential that our nation control the seas in order to project our ground forces and sustain our commercial interests, in war and in peace.

KOLA PENINSULA

Senator NUNN. Secretary Webb, Secretary Weinberger's written testimony on U.S. National Security Strategy listed several options for reducing threats to U.S. interests. One of these options was to, and I quote: “Align enduring U.S. strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses

In your view, is sending our aircraft carriers around Northern Norway to attack the heavily defended Kola Peninsula an example of aligning our enduring strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses?

Mr. WEBB. Here I agree with Admiral Crowe's earlier statement. Sending aircraft carriers to attack the Kola Peninsula is not a strategy. It is a tactical option, dependent on the initiative and judgment of the commander who is fighting the battle. A strategic concept in this regard might be to force the enemy to realign forces in order to take into account this tactical option. I personally would see this option as viable under rather narrow circumstances, but not out of the question.

HEAVY MARINE CORPS

Senator NUNN. Secretary Webb, during the 1970's the Marine Corps was forced to add more armored and mechanized capability to be able to fight in a NATO war. Was the "heavying up" of Marine forces a mistake? Have heavier Marine Forces exacerbated the problem of limited amphibious shipping and diminished the strategic mobility of Marine Forces?

Mr. WEBB. I should first point out my view that the Marine Corps is not simply an amphibious force. Its history demonstrates that it is a tactically complete, immediately mobilized force in readiness, with an included amphibious mission. The question becomes what range of options for the use of the Marine Corps can be maintained without pulling it in so many directions that it no longer can train toward objectives or deploy immediately.

There are some indications that the Marine Corps is becoming too heavy, and also, that its helicopter doctrine is becoming too concentrated on large, expensive platforms that would be vulnerable in heavy combat. I intend to ask the Marine Corps leadership to address this question in detail soon after confirmation.

COMPENSATION

Senator NUNN. Mr. Webb I think the Congress has done a good job of providing for our men and women in uniform. An analysis of compensation trends over the

last 3 years indicate that overall compensation for enlisted members has increased by over 12% and for officers by over 10%.

This was done during a period of tight budgets requiring some pretty tough tradeoffs. Therefore, it was a bit dismaying to hear VADM Carlson, the Chief of Navy Manpower, say that one good way to retain experienced officers is "give them a bag of money.

Do you agree with what appears to be the intent of VADM Carlson's statement that "bags of money" are the route to deal with personnel recruiting and retention? Mr. WEBB. I am unable to judge the intent of Admiral Carlson's comments without having read them in context. However, as I mentioned several times during my confirmation hearing, I believe our men and women in uniform have been treated quite well by the Congress on the issue of compensation. I say this as one who grew up in a military family and who is deeply dedicated to the well-being of those who serve and their dependents.

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING

Senator NUNN. Secretary Webb, including Reserves, the Marine Corps has four division/wing teams. Yet, the Navy has only enough amphibious shipping to deploy in an assault configuration about one-third of Marine Forces.

Do you believe that there is a serious imbalance between Marine Forces and amphibious shipping?

Mr. WEBB. While current Navy amphibious lift capability reflects some shortfalls, Navy is aggressively pursuing an amphibious lift improvement program to address requirements of National Strategy. Present amphibious lift is capable of supporting four of nine Marine infantry regiments, with air and other support forces, for amphibious assault. Three infantry regiments are allocated to Maritime Prepositioning Forces and support combat operations not involving forcible entry. The remaining combat forces of the Marine Corps, two active infantry regiments and reserve forces, with supporting air assets, will require turn-around shipping, air lift, or other strategic transport for movement to theater. The Navy program for improvement of amphibious lift capability is in accordance with Defense Guidance and is structured to meet specific Marine Corps requirements as defined in the Department of the Navy Amphibious Lift Study. The program, as submitted in the President's budget, supports attainment of intermediate lift capability of simultaneous Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) operations in both Atlantic and Pacific areas plus conduct two independent Maritime Prepositioning Force supported operations elsewhere by the end of fiscal year 1992. Our goal, also supported by the President's budget, is to expand our amphibious lift capability to a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) plus MAB by 1996. The shipbuilding program proposed in the President's budget supports these goals in requests for authorization for the WASP class LHD, the LSD-41 (Cargo Variant) and LCAC. Navy plans, programs, and budgets to support amphibious lift objectives have been developed in the context of National Strategy and within factof-life fiscal constraints of Total Obligational Authority (TOA). I intend to ask the Marine Corps leadership to address this question in detail soon after confirmation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED KENNEDY

NAVY PRIORITIES

Senator KENNEDY. You are of course familiar with the Navy's surprise proposal for two nuclear aircraft carriers in this year's budget request. Until this request, we had been told no new carriers would be needed until the 1990s.

*

In response to the Navy's early carrier replacement proposal, Admiral Crowe in a memo to the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated, and I quote, "when painful choices have to be made, I would give first priority to sustainability, modern munitions, ASW, and the SSN program.'

Do you share Admiral Crowe's priorities? If so, should we approve the carrier modernization proposal only if these higher priority programs can be adequately funded? If not, what priority would you give the early carrier modernization proposal?

Mr. WEBB. First, I would like to point out that Admiral Crowe's memorandum dated October 1986 was an internal document and formed only a small part of the active dialogue which was underway at the time. Chairman Crowe's concerns for the vital programs referred to in the memo have been addressed, and he supports the requirement and the Navy's priority for acquisition of the carriers.

77-336 0 - 88 - 4

The Chairman and I both share the same concerns for having balanced programs and are apparently in agreement. Some critics think that Readiness and Sustainability were shortchanged. This is simply not true. Special care was taken to preserve operating resources at levels requested by the CINCs. In fact, Sustainability growth from fiscal year 1980 to fiscal year 1990 has more than doubled that of force modernization. Readiness and Sustainability spending has risen from 60.5 percent of Navy Total Obligation Authority (TOA) from fiscal year 1983 to fiscal year 1987 to 63.5 percent of Navy TOA in the current budget for fiscal year 1988/1989. The important programs to which you refer are adequately funded.

Regarding the priority placed on the carrier replacement program, it is important to put it in perspective. During budget deliberations CVN procurement emerged as the most pressing priority and an even strain was placed across Navy programs to support our number one priority. If ships have to be retired because of funding reductions, based on CINCS stated requirements, carriers would be the last to go. The key point is that at any budget level, the carriers must be replaced and, the lower the topline is depressed, the greater the premium on replacement to avoid being eaten up by trying to operate and maintain aging carriers.

There is an additional area affected by this carrier replacement program which is absolutely vital to our readiness and that area is people. This program impacts time our people spend away from home, their quality of life at sea, the equipments we give them to operate and many other important aspects relating to job satisfaction and retention. Sustaining the proper number of carriers directly affects operational tempo-the rotation between deployed operations and stateside operations. Newer ships, of course, provide substantial quality of life advantages over those ships approaching their fifth decade of service. The kinds of equipment we give our personnel to operate provide clear signals about our concern-are they modern and up to date or are they nearly obsolete and maintenance intensive? People concerns are among my highest priorities and I will consider the impact on personnel in each and every decision as I assume my new position.

Most importantly, the carriers are critical to deterring aggression and adventurism. The bottom line comes down to this. Our national security strategy mandates a Navy sized around 15 deployable aircraft carriers, and we have an opportunity to sustain that goal at greatly reduced costs to the taxpayer.

INTENTIONS REGARDING WOMEN IN THE NAVY

Senator KENNEDY. The Navy appears to be the most restrictive of the three military departments in providing improved career opportunities for women. Both the Army and the Air Force have increased the number of positions open to women. The Navy on the other hand, appears to be moving in the other direction. Until the decision was overturned by Secretary Weinberger, the Navy planned to place a 5year cap on the number of women in the service.

As Secretary of the Navy, would you seek to open more positions to women? Do you support the Navy's proposed cap on the number of women?

Mr. WEBB. As I mentioned in my hearing, I strongly support the assimilation of women into non-traditional career paths short of combat service in skills and units suitable to the needs of the service. In addition, I am told that to date there have been no responsible surveys measuring the experiences and attitudes of women in the Navy, particularly of enlisted women, regarding such matters as sea duty and isolated service. Nor does there appear to be any analysis of the pool of potential female enlistees in the general population regarding the impact of such policies on potential enlistees. I am prepared to conduct a thorough and objective examination of all current issues regarding women in the naval service, to report the findings to the Secretary of Defense, and to share the results with this committee, in a timely fashion.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ALBERT GORE, JR.

FEMALE ISSUES IN MY PRESENT POSITION

Senator GORE. As Assistant Secretary of Defense, what issues pertaining to the role of women in the armed services has he dealt with, and how has he come down on those issues?

As Secretary, what issues does he foresee in this connection? Would he, for example, expect that demographic pressures (shortage of military age males) will push women into roles that are short of combat, but increasingly in harm's way? How might that apply, if at all, in the case of the Navy?