And so we are sitting here saying that you have to have this perfect person to put in this job. Now, you know, the Redskin replacements did a pretty good job down in Dallas.

And I realize, you know, we have to have a charter, and the direction. I notice that my colleague from Nebraska was laughing when I made the comments about whether or not we are qualified to be here.

And I agree with you, Jim. They are still questioning that on my part. But I have a very difficult time with this question of who has the ability to do what, until you put them in there and hand them the reins.

You really do not know. And if they get the support of the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense, and of the administration, and the support of the Congress, they should be able to discharge these duties admirably; do you not think that is true, General?

Have you not seen troops in combat that took over? Or in a tough situation, maybe not in combat, and did an exemplary job in leadership and management, or whatever the task was?

General STILWELL. Senator, I could give you an example to parallel that of General Lee. And if you will look at the history of Gen. Ulysses Simpson Grant, you will find that he was almost cashiered from the Army at a very early age, and returned to be the formidable opponent to General Lee.

Senator SYMMS. Now, General, if we have to debate the virtues of General Grant in front of Senators Nunn and Warner, we have already lost.

General STILWELL. But you can make the point that the demonstrated experience of General Grant, again, would not have given people any great measure of confidence in 1861 or 1862, that he would demonstrate that fantastic capability that he did; and indeed, as did General Lee, in both instances.

They were operating under slightly different imperatives, I suggest. And in any case, sir, my task here was to lay out a job description, if you will, and I have done that with all the sincerity and objectivity that I can.

As I say, these may be impossibly high criteria. But on the other hand, I think the individual has to hit the ground running, because there is not a great deal of time.

Senator SYMMS. I did not hear you say, General. Did you say that you think candidate Bergquist does or does not fulfill these credentials that you laid out?

General STILWELL. I am not here to comment in any way on his qualifications vis-a-vis my list, or that of any other individual. Senator SYMMs. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair

man.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Our next witness is Mr. Noel Koch. We would be delighted to hear from you, Mr. Koch, and then we will hear from Mr. Kieff, and then we will open it up for questions from the whole panel.

Senator ExON. I have to leave. Could I ask just one brief ques

Chairman NUNN. Certainly.

Senator EXON. General, I welcome you here. You are one of my favorites. And I was interested in hearing your testimony.

I suspect you made no recommendation on the nominee before us. You articulated very well what you thought should be the qualifications for the one serving in this particular position.

You evidently are leaving it up to us to make the determination as to whether the nominee fits that criteria without making an observation on that yourself?

General STILWELL. That is correct, sir. I understood that my limited role and contribution was to add one dimension to the framework within which this committee would make its decision.

Senator EXON. I thank you very much. And I just would add, Mr. Chairman, that all that talk of past generals brought up by Senator Symms went completely over my head, because as a man of the North, I never heard of Gen. Robert E. Lee of Virginia, but we'll leave it at that.

Chairman NUNN. Well, you were not part of the Union, then, or you would have heard of him. [Laughter.]

Unless you had had the Strategic Air Command out there.
Mr. Koch.

STATEMENT OF NOEL C. KOCH, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. Kocн. Senator, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cohen.

I do appreciate the opportunity to discuss the nomination of Mr. Bergquist to the newly appointed post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

A written statement was not requested, but as I tried to think through this matter, I concluded that it would be helpful to have such a statement so that my views are made clear.

So with your permission, I will submit this statement for the record, and I will summarize the substance of it.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, it will be part of the record. Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, in the interests of brevity, it is really not necessary to dwell at length on the events that have led to this hearing.

The course of our efforts to restore our special operation forces are pretty well known by now. It is especially well known here in the Congress, where Congressman Dan Daniel and Congressman Hutto kept the initiative alive for so long.

And where you, Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen, powerfully embraced it. And where both Houses, driven by events, gave it legislative reality.

Indeed, the principal tactical error made by those who sought to kill this special operations initiative was to underestimate Congress' commitment to this effort.

Neither is it necessary to dwell at length on the fact that this has been a rancorous procedure. I think this hearing is part of the fruits of that procedure.

Mr. Chairman, when I was invited to testify today, I was quite confident of what I would say to you, to this committee. As I

thought on it at some length over a period of weeks, I became increasingly less confident.

I remember the long struggle waged to get these assets restored, properly provided for, properly treated, and properly used.

There were three invaluable allies in this effort. One was the Congress. One was the media. And one was the people who opposed the effort.

The special operations community had the best enemies anybody could have wished for. Every time we shouted, let's cooperate, the echo came back, you cannot tell us what to do.

The legislation which made the existence of these forces a matter of law, and which created the position at issue here today, was very much in the manner of a last resort response to those who confused cooperation with capitulation.

This nomination comes wrapped in ambiguous circumstances, and a broken history. There is dispute over the motives involved in naming Mr. Bergquist in the first place. There is a dispute over Mr. Bergquist's own motives.

I know this has been discussed earlier. I am sure it will be discussed more today, and I have addressed it in my longer written statement.

The ambiguity, Mr. Chairman, arises from the fact that Mr. Carlucci has adopted the nominee of his predecessor, and has not contented himself only in waiting with studied indifference, as his predecessor did, to see whether the Congress would bite into what may or may not have been intended to be a poisoned apple, but now actively endorses the nominee and presses for his confirmation.

This seems to be one of those situations that alter cases. The issue now is much more one of the reliability of Frank Carlucci than of Ken Bergquist, and that is probably appropriate, since no matter where the authority for dealing with special operations forces lies, the responsibility in DOD lies entirely with the Secretary of Defense.

Less than a month ago, this body gave Frank Carlucci an overwhelming vote of confidence in the brief and laudatory fashion by which it confirmed him as Secretary of Defense.

What is happening here now is that Mr. Carlucci is cosigning for Ken Bergquist a request for the loan of the confidence of this committee.

It does not seem to me to be consistent with the mandate so recently given to him for you to deny him that confidence, or to deny him his nominee.

The new Secretary, and I am saying Secretary Carlucci, by training and experience, has an understanding of the problems and vulnerabilities of the developing nations far exceeding that of any previous Secretary of Defense. I believe he will have a keener appreciation of the role of special operations forces in defending U.S. interests in the Third World, in low intensity conflicts, than any previous Secretary of Defense; and that he will not be a party to any effort to divest the Nation of this capability.

As for Ken Bergquist, I have not spoken to him in several years. And what I know of the genesis of this whole matter, I know from others.

I would rather give him the benefit of the doubts that have been expressed about him, and expect the best of him. And I do expect the best of him, Mr. Chairman.

But if we imputed the worst will in the world to him, and if we assumed that he would have free rein to do his worst, which he won't have, I do not believe there can be any more damage done by putting him in the job than by leaving the slot empty.

The ship has as much chance of being washed up on the rocks with no one at the helm as it has of being deliberately steered onto the rocks by a malevolent helmsman.

Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier of our efforts to get cooperation in rebuilding our special operations forces. Our approach was always de minimus. We just wanted the services, and the JCS, to do what needed to be done, as efficiently, as painlessly, as possible; and all under their control.

We could not get that cooperation, and in my judgment, a golden opportunity was missed, was missed by them.

This restoration process has been corrosive, and real progress is not going to come until the bad feelings are put by and real cooperation comes.

All my sense of what I have read and seen since Frank Carlucci was nominated to be Secretary of Defense has been of a desire to cooperate.

If this nomination is defeated, I think it will erode just a little bit that spirit of cooperation, at least in this area of such vital concern to us.

What I do know from working this issue in the Pentagon for more than 5 years is that it must have the ungrudging, above and beyond, direct support of the Secretary of Defense, if progress is to be made.

By his efforts on behalf of this nomination, Frank Carlucci has virtually gone surety for the initiative in the building.

I think it would be shortsighted not to take advantage of that by confirming Mr. Bergquist.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Koch follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NOEL C. KOCH

It is customary to give some expression of pleasure and appreciation at being afforded the opportunity to testify before Congress; I do appreciate this opportunity, but I come with considerable trepidation.

I have tried as best I know how to reason through the matter that brings us here today.

At one level it involves merely the confirmation of an individual to the newly created post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/ Low Intensity Conflict.

At another level this is no mere confirmation. What is decided here today may mark a conclusion to a long and often bitter dispute, or it may prove to be only one more symptom of that dispute.

At one level it derives its chief concern from allegations about the character and the motivation of the nominee.

At another level the nominee is incidental to circumstances which are more compelling than his qualifications, and far more germane to the fortunes and the future of this new post.

It is not necessary to elaborate at length on the history of the current effort to restore our special operations force capability, but certain aspects of these efforts should be noted.

First, the train of events that brings us here today persistently defied all popular wisdom governing the defense establishment conjoined in the Pentagon and the Congress. (I am speaking here only of the Reagan Administration, but I believe it is accurate that almost the entire part of the current effort has been coextensive with the days of the Reagan Administration.)

From the beginning, our efforts were considered pointless at best, frivolous at worst. It was assumed that since there was no serious money involved in these forces and, hence, no serious consequences for jobs, for pork, for the attention of the major defense contractors, that the Congress would evince little interest in restoring these forces, and that such interest as there was would not be sustainable. There was little credence placed in the possibility that Congress might act in this matter on the basis of what it perceived as the national interest.

There was little credence placed in the possibility that the political appointees pressing this initiative would persist in their efforts, or that they would prevail if they did persist.

There is nothing to be gained by recounting the actions of the various services, though it was from the service staffs -- or, two of them -- and the Joint Staff, that the real opposition came. It never came from the fighting CinCs. But each small step essayed to advance the goal of restoring these forces had always these two characteristics: they were designed to keep the responsibility for these forces entirely with the services, and they were designed to do as little violence to existing force structure as possible. These were our working criteria from the beginning.

At anytime, anyone in the military leadership with a smidgen of political savvy could have co-opted our efforts and run us off the field, simply by taking the most minimal steps to accomodate (or even to appear to accomodate) this restoration effort. Indeed, it was this that we feared more than anything else, as the greatest threat to these efforts. But each step requested by OSD was taken as a threat to the hegemony of the service staffs -- and, in some cases, as a challenge to the prerogatives of certain individuals on