to assist the committee's efforts to understand the Pentagon's approach to these issues.

I believe that I have already made this letter from eight Members of Congress a part of the record, but I would ask unanimous consent that it be part of the record here. And I think that the clerk has said that it has already been done, so it will be admitted as part of the record.

General Stilwell, we are delighted to have you before this committee. You have been here a number of times, and we have always enjoyed your testimony and benefited from it. So we are at your disposal, and we will let you lead off.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD G. STILWELL, USA (RET.), FORMER DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY General STILWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor to have been summoned by this prestigious committee to provide one man's view of the professional qualifications required of the individual destined to occupy the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

In that general connection I applaud section 102 of the DOD reorganization bill bearing the names of Senator Goldwater, Representative Nichols, and the distinguished chairman of this committee, which stipulates that the Secretary of Defense establish specific qualifications for each Assistant Secretaryship and other positions requiring Presidential nominating and Senate confirmation.

In the instant case, sir, it is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense has set forth those professional qualifications which the Assistant Secretary must possess.

However, I have not seen that document, and there was no consultation with the DOD Special Operations Policy Advisory Group on that subject, though there might well have been.

Thus my list of qualifications may not conform with the official DOD position. I must take that risk.

The law assigns this particular Assistant Secretary of Defense the principal duty of overall supervision of the special operations activities and low intensity conflict activities of the Department.

There is much in the law by way of substance and guidance directly relevant to special operations activities, but nothing as regards low intensity conflict.

As the proponents of the legislation certainly recognize, special operations and low intensity conflict are largely discrete, one from the other. They overlap in only modest degree.

Special operations forces have missions across the entire spectrum of war; and, indeed, are basically structured for contingencies defined as mid- and high-intensity conflict.

While special operations capabilities are almost wholly military, the forces brought to bear in low intensity situations are, for the most part, nonmilitary.

And as regards the military component of a U.S. aid program for an ally or friend threatened from within, as witness the Philippines today, special operations forces are not likely to be the most useful assets.

Because these two functions are so very different, it is best to look at the qualifications for the discharge of the two functions separately.

As to the first, overall supervision of special operations activities, this involves, inter alia, departmental oversight, establishment of policies, assuring that special operations forces are adequately resourced for the short term; and most importantly, backed by a robust R&D program leading to significant material upgrades in the mid and longer term; and finally, advocacy for special operations in inter-agency, interdepartmental, and international

arenas.

These tasks are relatively straightforward, but they are by no means easy to accomplish. They demand of the incumbent an unflagging devotion to this newly created unified combatant command; the resolve to argue persistently-and the credibility to do so effectively-for essential resources; and thorough familiarity with the entire special operations forces arena, from doctrine to strategic concepts to contingency planning to training activities to personnel policies to major elements of research and development programs for special operations-peculiar equipment.

Although it would be desirable for the ASD to have held senior level active duty assignment in the special forces of one of the services, and preferably overseas, I do not consider this essential.

The qualifications I consider essential are, first, intellectual understanding and acceptance of the national importance of the continuum of special operations capabilities across the spectrum of potential international conflict, from independent action to deal with isolated terrorist threat, to intensive training of elite foreign contingents, to the conduct of a deployment so rapid and audacious as to deter an outbreak of hostilities, to support of national resistance movements in a major conflict.

The normal precondition to that understanding is long association with practitioners and theorists in this category of military activity.

Relatedly, the ability to be from the outset a recognized, respected, convincing spokesman for special operations activities, not only in U.S. circles, but in foreign ones as well, in driving home their uniquely important virtues, in deterrence and in conflict, employed independently, or as a multiplier, when in conjunction with other forces.

As an executive charged with programming and budgeting responsibilities for a major force program, demonstrated managerial and negotiating skills are key. He must be able to hold his own with seasoned rivals competing for resources never n abundant supply.

And again, as the individual to be empowered by the Secretary of Defense to see that the mandate of Congress is carried out, the assurance of effective working communications and relationships with relevent committees of both Chambers of this Congress is selfevident.

There is so little time available that that professional respect and confidence ought to be implicit from the outset. This is of all the more moment in paving the way for the recission of certain very detailed legislative provisos, which are clearly onerous for the

Secretary of Defense, and, indeed, have been cited by the Congress as constituting a degree of specificity that under normal circumstances should be avoided in legislation.

Finally, in this short list, and perhaps too obvious to mention, is thoroughgoing professionalism. And I define a professional as one who is primarily interested in what he or she can do for the job; not the reverse.

Now, the qualifications needed by the individual who the Congress expects to exercise overall supervision of the low intensity conflict activities of the DOD are quite another matter. There are no military units labeled or reserved for low intensity situations. There are no specific budget lines or program elements. Except for special operations forces, the military capabilities which could make useful contributions in such conflict situations are under the overall supervision of other Assistant Secretaries. And again, in contrast to special operations, low intensity conflict planning and execution are interagency by definition.

Certainly, there is much to be done within DOD to improve the understanding of the nature of that somewhat amorphous ill defined level of international conflict, and to hone capability to respond appropriately and rapidly to the exigencies thereof.

Yet it can be argued that brigading these two responsibilities in the charter of a single Assistant Secretary is not a particularly sound arrangement, the best intentions of the Congress notwithstanding.

And it is indeed likely that the resulting contentions and frustrations will dilute the Assistant Secretary's concentration on what is clearly his main responsibility, that of quarterbacking the revitalization of the Nation's special operations capabilities.

But the law is the law. And discharge of this other principal duty, that of overall supervision of low intensity activities, conflict activities of the DOD, adds appreciably to the qualifications needed by the incumbent.

I consider the following qualifications to be essential. First, consummate understanding of the doctrine, strategy, and operational methodology of Communist revolutionary warfare.

It is reasonably certain that the bulk of low-intensity conflicts of the future, no less than those of the past, will be Communist inspired, directed, and/or supported.

This understanding is distilled from intensive study, from firsthand observation abroad, or from the two combined.

Second, familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of other executive departments and agencies which can contribute to the U.S. response to low-intensity conflict situations. And I have enumerated those in my statement.

Third, some experience in one or more Third World nations, at a level of affording solid appreciation of the problems of cross-cultural communication; the opportunities for, and the difficulty, of, gearing U.S. assistance to host countries' programs; and the role of the U.S. chief of diplomatic mission in developing and coordinating responsive interagency support programs.

And finally, deeply held conviction that not only DOD but the Nation as a whole bstantially improve its ability to respond

to this order of challenges in the future, lest the correlation of forces progressively swing in favor of our adversaries.

With no assets but his powers of suasion, the Assistant Secretary must nonetheless be the unflagging exponent, the conscience if you will, of this whole area of activity, vis a vis not only his peers in DOD, but interagency circles as well.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might at this point had you finished? Or you have got some more?

General STILWELL. Only to state at the very end, a very important paragraph, I believe, Mr. Senator.

You may consider these qualifications to be extraordinarily stringent. Perhaps they are. But as in all things, it is important to have a mark on the wall to measure the extent of fallback to get on with the Nation's vital affairs.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, would you permit me one question? And then I must depart and then return?

Chairman NUNN. Certainly.

Senator WARNER. That sounds to me to be pretty close to the mark, those qualifications. But as I listen to our previous witness, and his thought that he knew of three persons that were eligible, another thought occurred to me. And you are uniquely, I think qualified to answer.

Viewing this position also as one who's got to get in and fight that turf battle and make certain that the four branches of service contribute the assets necessary to form the composite forces; and you know how hard that's going to be, putting that together, what are the pros and the cons for having one who was a recent commissioned senior officer in one branch, coming in and being able to effectively fight that turf war with the other services.

Do they come with a handicap or not? For example, Gen. Shy Meyer, a man for whom I have just unreserved respect, and a real fighter, who sat in that chair for 4 years.

What would be the reaction of the Navy and the Air Force and the Marine Corps to see a former chief of staff of the Army come in and begin to garner from their budgets and their force structure the necessary elements?

Is that a handicap or a plus? You were a former commissioned officer, yet you were able to go in and perform duties, as you well, know, in your area of expertise in international affairs, and as such, I do not think you were put in a confrontational status with the military departments.

General STILWELL. There have been precedents, Senator, for general officers, of any one of the services occupying the equivalent of Assistant Secretaryships.

Senator WARNER. Well, let us stop and think of those precedents. Can you enumerate one? I had one serve me, a general in the Marine Corps as Manpower and Reserve Affairs. But he had been out of the corps for some time.

Now, I am really trying to recollect, in the history of the Department of the Navy, I am hard put to bring another instance back. And I cannot recall one in the Department of the Air Force or the Army-

General STILWELL. You remember a remarkable individual named General Starbird?

Senator WARNER. Yes, General Starbird was a technician. General STILWELL. But he har. some very signficant programmatic responsibilities and budgets, sir, during the Vietnam war. Senator WARNER. Yes, he did. What was his position?

General STILWELL. In addition to having been the Director of the Defense Communications Agency, he was responsible for the entire project, the electronic fence, if you will, of sensors and the like, in the Laotian trail area.

Senator WARNER. That is correct. But it seems to me this is a very unique position. I will not dwell on it further. We are not here to determine whether or not another person should come in.

But you have enumerated, I think, excellent criteria, and perhaps the committee as it views this case should also think, are there not some other areas of that criteria that should be explored in terms of a former commissioned officer going in and entering into that turf warfare with the other military branches.

I will just leave it at that. I think unless you want to supplement something for the record at some point in time.

Senator COHEN. If I could just interject here, I would think that that is one reason why the charter of the Assistant Secretary is so critical in terms of defining exactly what his responsibilities are going to be, just to overcome that kind of opposition that is bound to come.

Senator WARNER. Well, how would you view, for example, a recently retired officer of one branch?

Senator COHEN. No differently than I would view Admiral Crowe as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under a strengthened JCS system.

I think I would view it the same way. Give him the powers, and he will have to overcome the obstacles.

Senator WARNER. I myself will have to think through the answer to my own question. But indeed, it does intrigue me.

Senator SYMMS. Would my colleague yield for a question?

Chairman NUNN. I would be glad to recognize the Senator. What I would like to do after this question, if I could, is hear from our other two witnesses. And then we will come back and begin our questions.

Senator SYMMS. General, I heard part of your testimony when I was in the other room listening on the squawk box. And I really appreciate your interest, and I have a very high respect for you, also, as I did for the previous witness.

But the thought just occurred to me that General Lee was viewed as an excellent troop leader and did a good job of commanding the army of Northern Virginia, would you agree?

General STILWELL. And more than that.

Senator SYMMS. But the fact is that General Lee

Chairman NUNN. We could take judicial notice of that. [Laughter.]

Senator SYMMS. But I might just say that General Lee was against the war. He was against secession. He had never commanded any troops in combat. He was an engineering officer when he took command of the army of Northern Virginia.