but was not acted upon by the Senate. On January 4, 1854, Douglas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, reported from that committee a new bill, accompanied by an explanatory report. The bill contained the provisions usually embodied in bills for Territorial organization, and in addition prescribed that the Territory or any portion thereof, when admitted as a State or States, "shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission." The report, however, went further and maintained that the compromise measures of 1850 had established principles which should govern all future legislation on similar subjects, and in particular had established the principle that "all questions pertaining to slavery in the Territories, and the new States to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the decision of the people residing therein, by their appropriate representatives, to be chosen by them for that purpose." This, the so-called principle of 'popular sovereignty,' would, if strictly applied, obviously have nullified the essential part of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (q.v.), which directly prohibited slavery north of the latitude of 36° 30'. On January 23d Douglas introduced a new bill, embodying an amendment which had been proposed by Senator Dixon of Kentucky on the 16th. This new bill provided that the Territory was to be divided into two parts to be called Kansas and Nebraska, and stated specifically that the slavery restriction of the Missouri Compromise, "being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void, it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." The bill occasioned a prolonged and acrimonious debate, centring upon the abro: gation of the slavery restriction of the Missouri Compromise, but finally passed the Senate on March 4th by a vote of 37 to 14, despite the vigorous opposition of such men as Sumner, Chase, Everett, Wade, Bell, and Seward. After a long debate the bill, slightly amended, passed the House, on May 8th, by a vote of 113 to 100. The Senate agreed to the House amendments on May 26th, and the bill became a law, by President Pierce's signature, on May 30th. The combined Territories, thus organized, comprised a region which now constitutes Kansas, Nebraska, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and part of Colorado-a total area of nearly 500,000 square miles.

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill is chiefly significant in American history from its having caused a renewal of the contest between the North and the South over the slavery question, which had been regarded as settled, for many years at least, by the compromise measures of 1820 and 1850. It stirred the passions of the people of both sections, gave rise to bitter and protracted controversies both in and out of Congress, and doubtless considerably hastened a resort to arms. The historian Rhodes has given the following estimate of the results of the passage of the bill: "It is safe to say that in the scope and consequences

of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it was the most momentous measure that passed Congress from the day that the Senators and Representatives first met to the outbreak of the Civil War. It sealed the doom of the Whig Party; it caused the formation of the Republican Party on the principle of no extension of slavery; it roused Lincoln and gave a bent to his great political ambition. It made the Fugitive Slave Law a dead letter at the North; it caused the Germans to become Republicans; it lost the Democrats their hold on New England; it made the Northwest Republican; it led to the downfall of the Democratic Party." Consult: Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 (New York, 1893—); Von Holst, Constitutional and Political History of the United States, vol. iv. (last ed., Chicago, 1899); and Burgess, The Middle Period 1817-1858 (New York, 1897), in the "American History Series." The text of the bill may be found in the United States Statutes at Large, vol. x.

KANSAS RIVER. A river of Kansas, formed near Junction City by the junction of the Republican and Smoky Hill rivers (Map: Kansas, F 2). It flows east 250 miles and enters the Missouri River at Kansas City. The Little Blue River enters it from the north. Topeka, the capital of the State, is situated on its banks.

KANSAS STATE AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE. A coeducational institution of learning established in 1863 at Manhattan, Kan., by the endowment of Bluemont College, which was presented to the State. The college owns 323 acres of land, valued at $39,700, and leases 221 acres in addition, the greater part of these grounds being used for experimental work. The courses embrace English, general and domestic science, mechanical and electrical engineering, and agriculture, leading to the degree of bachelor of science, a preparatory department, a musical department, and apprentice courses, designed for those who wish to learn a trade. No classical course is given. The faculty publishes a weekly, the Industrialist, devoted to college interests. In 1902 the instructors and assistants numbered 59, and the attendance was 1396, including 298 preparatory students. The endowment was $491,181, the income $80,270, the value of the grounds and buildings $340.000, and the total value of the college property $552,165. The library contained 24,525 volumes.

KAN-SU, kän'soo'. The most westerly of the northern tier of Chinese provinces. It lies west of Shen-si (q.v.), of which it originally formed a part, and is bounded on the north by the territory Ordos Mongols, and the desert of Gobi, on the south by Sze-chuen, and on the southwest by Koko-nor (Map: China, B 5). From the time of K'ien-lung (1757) until the Mohammedan Rebellion of 1865, its jurisdiction extended westward as far as Ili, and included the T'ien-shan Pe-lu, a distance of about 2200 miles from Lanchow-fu, the capital of the province. Since the suppression of the rebellion all this Central Asian territory has been formed into a new dominion known as Sin-kiang or the 'New Frontier,' and this new province forms the western boundary of Kan-su. Its area is estimated to be 125.400 square miles, and its population about 10.000,000. It is in the main mountainous, but a few fertile valleys are found where good crops are

raised. From Lan-chow-fu westward level ground begins, and the narrow belt which forms the departments of Kan-chow-fu and Su-chow-fu is very fertile and produces much grain. In the 18 miles from Su-chow to the fortified gate of the Great Wall, called Kia-yü Kwan (ten miles beyond which the wall comes to an end), agriculture becomes less general. Tobacco is the finest product of the province, which, however, is rich in minerals, and rivals Shan-si in both the richness and the extent of its coal-fields. It takes from the eastern provinces cotton and wheat, and sends back tobacco (its own product), medicines, furs, skins, wool, felt, cattle, sheep, and mules, mostly the product of Koko-nor and the Mongol territory. The name is made up of the first syllables of the names Kan-chow and Su-chow, already mentioned. With Shen-si it forms the Governor-Generalship of Shen-Kan, the Governor-General residing in Lan-chow-fu, the capital.

KANT, känt, IMMANUEL (1724-1804). One of the greatest and most influential German metaphysicians. He was the son of a saddler, of Scotch descent, and was born at Königsberg, April 22, 1724. He studied philosophy, mathematics, physics, theology, and other subjects, at the university of his native town, and, after spending nine years as a private tutor in several families, took his degree at Königsberg in 1755, and began to deliver lectures as privatdocent, on logic, metaphysics, physics, politics, and mathematics; later he added courses on physical geography, anthropology, natural theology, and pedagogy, and one year he lectured on miner alogy. In 1762 he was offered the chair of poetry at Königsberg, but, though in some need of the salary, he wisely declined because he was not fitted for the place. The next year he obtained a position of assistant librarian on a salary of 62 thalers; and, though he had now become well known and greatly esteemed for his scholarship, he did not obtain a professorship until 1770, when he was appointed to the chair of logic and metaphysics, as an inducement to keep him in Königsberg, now that he had received calls to Erlangen and Jena. In 1778 he had a call to Halle, which he declined, to remain at Königsberg till his death, February 12, 1804. Kant's private life was uneventful. He was a bachelor and never traveled. He was a man of unimpeachable veracity and honor, austere in his principles of morality, though kindly and courteous in manner, a bold and fearless advocate of political liberty, and a firm believer in human progress. He sympathized with the American Colonies in their struggle against England, and with the French people in their revolt against monarchical abuses. As a lecturer he was popular. Herder says that his lectures were characterized by deep thought, wit, and humor. They were said to have been much more dogmatic in tone than his writings, and to have had moral and religious edification in mind as well as the imparting of information. In philosophy he developed slowly. His views did not seem to take anything like final form till he wrote his greatest work, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, which was first published in 1781. By this time he had effected in philosophy what he called a Copernican revolution. "Our suggestion," he writes, "is similar to that of Copernicus in astronomy, who, finding it impossible to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposi

tion that they turned round the spectator, tried whether he might not succeed better by supposing the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. Let us make a similar experiment in metaphysics with perception. If it were really necessary for our perception to conform to the nature of objects, I do not see how we could know anything of it a priori; but if the sensible object must conform to the constitution of our faculty of perception, I see no difficulty in the matter. Perception, however, can become knowl edge only if it is related in some way to the object which it determines. Now here again I may suppose, either that the conceptions through which I effect that determination conform to objects, or that objects, in other words the experience in which alone objects are known, conform to conceptions. In the former case I fall into the same perplexity as before, and fail to explain how such conceptions can be known a priori. In the latter case the outlook is more hopeful. For experience is itself a mode of knowledge which implies intelligence, and intelligence has a rule of its own, which must be an a priori condition of all knowledge of objects presented to it. To this rule, as expressed in a priori conceptions, all objects of experience must necessarily conform, and with it they must agree." (Preface, tr. by Watson.) This passage shows that Kant started with the assumption that there is a priori synthetic knowledge, i.e. as he defined it, knowledge of universal and necessary truths. (See ANALYTIC JUDGMENT, and A PRIORI.) His mathematical training had taught him to regard the truths of mathematics as universal and necessary; while Hume had convinced him that any merely dogmatic assumption of universality and necessity was unwarranted. His problem now was how to escape dogmatism and yet justify the making of universal synthetic propositions, such as that two and two make four. This problem he solved to his satisfaction by making the world of experience in part a product of the intelligence that perception, that is, the frameworks within one passes judgments. Space and time are 'forms of of which, at least, objects must be arranged before they can be perceived. They are 'conditions of not be unless they were imposed upon phenomena the possibility of phenomena.' This they could by the percipient agent. But not only must objects be perceived, in order to be known; they must be conceived also. This act of conception is warranted only if objects, before being presented intelligence that in judgment unconditionally in experience, are worked into order by the same predicates this order of them. The forms of perception are space and time; the order produced by intellectual spontaneity is constituted by four great principles of synthesis-quantity, quality, relation, and modality-and each of these appears

in threefold form. Hence we have twelve 'categories' or 'pure conceptions of the understanding' viz.: (1) Unity, (2) plurality, and (3) totality; (4) reality, (5) negation, and (6) limitation: (7) inherence and subsistence; (8) causality and dependence; and (9) community, (10) possibility and impossibility, (11) existence and nonexistence, and (12) necessity and contingency. These categories are discovered by examination of the 'functions of unity in judgment,' i.e. by examination of the different ways in which the mind, in judging, predicates unity or order of the world of experience. Now the fundamental con

tention of Kant is that these categories must be principles employed in the construction of the world of experience if they are to be legitimately employed in the cognition of that world. This is the idealistic element in his system; the world we know is, in its form, a perceptual and intellectual creation, the work of the mind. He calls this idealism transcendental, i.e. it relates only to the conditions of the possibility of knowledge; it is not transcendent, i.e. it does not relate to any existences lying behind experience, and therefore beyond the reach of knowledge. And yet, though the system is transcendental idealism, it is an empirical realism, i.e. it maintains that the real world of experience is a world really constituted in accordance with principles which science discovers. Thus, time is empirically real because the world we know is really a time-world. But along with this empirical realism and transcendental idealism there goes hand in hand an agnosticism which denies the possibility of knowing anything whatever of another world of being -the world of things-in-themselves. These thingsin-themselves affect our sensibility and thus give rise to sensations, which fall into the forms of perception and are organized by the categories into the world of experience. But what these things-in-themselves are we can never know. If reason attempts to make any assertion with regard to them, it falls into hopeless inconsistencies and inextricable confusions, paralogisms, and antinomies. And yet reason is ever striving to go beyond experience. The world of experience is never complete; it is a progressus and a regressus ad infinitum. But reason craves completeness. It has ideas which find no embodiment in experience, because "they demand a certain completeness which is beyond the reach of all possible empirical knowledge." But neither may these ideas be thought to find embodiment in things-inthemselves, for in this case judgment would transcend its proper experiential limits. They are not empirically or transcendentally real; but neither are they transcendentally ideal, for they are not conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Thus excluded from all these classes, Kant finds a function for them as regulative principles for the conduct of the understanding in its search for knowledge, telling us not to be satisfied in our attempts to reduce experience to order unless we should complete the systematization. But complete it we never can. The ideas are warnings "not to regard any single determination relating to the existence of things as ultimate." But we may not substantiate the ideas by claiming that the completeness unattainable in experience is actual beyond experience. This would be transcendental subreption; and though natural and impossible to avoid, it may be understood to be fallacious when it is seen that thus a regulative principle is changed into a constitutive principle. There are three such ideas-that of 'the absolute or unconditioned unity of the thinking subject,' that of the absolute unity of the series of conditions of phenomena,' and that of the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought whatever.' These ideas, when substantiated and individualized, become the transcendental ideal, i.e. 'the idea of a totality of reality (omnitudo realitatis), an 'ens realissimum,' 'ens originarium,' 'ens summum,' 'ens entium,' all of which are epithets given by scholastic theology to God. "By such a use of the transcendental idea,

VOL. XI.-26.

however, theology oversteps limits set to it by its very nature." All traditional proofs for the being of God, which Kant reduces to threethe ontological, the cosmological and the physicotheological proofs (see GOD)-he criticises as fallacious: "The Supreme Being is for purely speculative reason a mere ideal, but still a perfectly faultless ideal, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. And if it should turn out that there is a moral theology, which is able to supply what is deficient in speculative theology, we should then find that transcendental theology is no longer problematic, but is indispensable in the determination of the conception of a Supreme Being" (Watson's trans.). In his ethical works, Kant does finally arrive at such a moral theology as the final postulate of morality.

His ethics is frequently called rigoristic, i.e. it refuses to recognize the moral value of natural inclinations. Nothing is good but the good will, and the good will is the will to do an act because it is in accordance with duty. "Duty is the obligation to act from reverence for law." The law is that "I must act in such a way that I can at the same time will that my maxim should become a universal law." The obligation to obey this law is unconditional. The moral imperative is cate. gorical. There are no ifs and buts in the case. It does not even depend upon the peculiar constitution of human nature. It is a necessary law for all rational beings, and as such a priori. "Its foundation is this, that rational nature exists as an end in itself." Man thus imposes upon himself the universal system of laws to which he is subject and "he is only under obligation to act in conformity with his own will." This constitutes the autonomy of the will. But this autonomy is not correctly conceived unless correlated with the conception of a 'kingdom of ends,' i.e. 'the systematic combination of different rational beings through the medium of common laws.' The autonomy of any will is thus not capricious, but rational; its rationality consists in its ordered and systematic connection with other autonomous wills. "Morality, then, consists in the relation of all action to the system of laws which alone makes possible a kingdom of ends." This whole conception of the categorical imperative is possible, says Kant, only if man's will is not a mere phenomenon conditioned by causal laws. Freedom is thus a postulate of the moral order. We do not know ourselves to be free; for knowledge is possible only within the limit of experience. But we must think ourselves as free. "In thinking itself into the intelligible world, practical reason does not transcend its proper limits, as it would do if it tried to know itself directly by means of perception. In so thinking itself, reason merely conceives of itself negatively as not belonging to the world of sense." "There is but a single point in which it is positive, namely, in the thought that freedom, though it is a negative determination, is yet bound up with a positive faculty, and, indeed, with a causality of reason which is called will."

This free causality of the will cannot be explained, for "we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the object of which can be presented in a possible experience." "While, therefore, it is true that we cannot comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative. it is also true that we can com