is rendered shall make an order canceling such certificate of citizenship,.and shall send a certified copy of such order to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization; and in case such certificate was not originally issued by the court making such order it shall direct the clerk of the court to transmit a copy of such order and judgment to the court out of which such certificate of citizenship shall have been originally issued. And it shall thereupon be the duty of the clerk of the court receiving such certified copy of the order and judgment of the court to enter the same of record and to cancel such original certificate of citizenship upon the records and to notify the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization of such cancellation.

"The provisions of this section shall apply not only to certificates of citizenship issued under the provisions of this act, but to all certificates of citizenship which may have been issued heretofore by any court exercising jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings under prior laws."

One of the questions arising under this section is, whether the second paragraph, dealing with the evidential effect of taking up a permanent residence in a foreign country within five years after securing a certificate of citizenship, is confined to certificates issued under the act of 1906, or applies also to those issued under prior laws, as was Luria's. If that paragraph were alone examined, the answer undoubtedly would be that only certificates under the act of 1906 are included. But the last paragraph also must be considered. It expressly declares that "the provisions of this section" shall apply, not only to certificates issued under the act of 1906, but also to all certificates theretofore issued under prior laws. The words "the provisions of this section" naturally mean every part of it, one paragraph as much as another, and that meaning cannot well be rejected without leaving it uncertain as to what those words embrace.

But it is said that it was not essential to naturalization under prior laws, Rev. Stat. §§ 2165-2170, that the applicant should intend thereafter to reside in the United States; that, if he otherwise met the statutory requirements, it was no objection that he intended presently to take up a permanent residence in a foreign country; that the act of 1906, differing from prior laws, requires the applicant to declare "that it is his intention to reside permanently within the United States"; and therefore that Congress, when enacting the second paragraph of section 15, must have intended that it should apply to certificates issued under that act and not to those issued under prior laws. It is true that section 4 of the act of 1906 exacts from the applicant a declaration of, his intention to reside in the United States, and it is also true that the prior laws did not expressly call for such a declaration. But we think it is not true that under the prior laws it was immaterial whether the applicant intended to reside in this country or presently to take up a permanent residence in a foreign country. On the contrary, by necessary implication, as we think, the prior laws.

conferred the right to naturalization upon such aliens only as contemplated the continuance of a residence already established in the United States.

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 165, 22 L. Ed. 627; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 101, 5 Sup. Ct. 41, 28 L. Ed. 643; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827, 6 L. Ed. 204. Turning to the naturalization laws preceding the act of 1906, being those under which Luria obtained his certificate, we find that they required, first, that the alien, after coming to this country, should declare on oath, before a court or its clerk, that it was bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign. sovereignty; second, that at least two years should elapse between the making of that declaration and his application for admission to citizenship; third, that as a condition to his admission the court should be satisfied, through the testimony of citizens, that he had resided within the United States five years at least, and that during that time he had behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; and, fourth, that at the time of his admission he should declare on oath that he would support the Constitution of the United States and that he absolutely and entirely renounced and abjured all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign sovereignty. These requirements plainly contemplated that the applicant, if admitted, should be a citizen in fact as well as in name— that he should assume and bear the obligations and duties of that status as well as enjoy its rights and privileges. In other words, it was contemplated that his admission should be mutually beneficial to the Government and himself, the proof in respect of his established residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution being exacted because of what they promised for the future, rather than for what they told of the past.

By the clearest implication those laws show that it was not intended that naturalization could be secured thereunder by an alien whose purpose was to escape the duties of his native allegiance without taking upon himself those of citizenship here, or by one whose purpose was to reside permanently in a foreign country and to use his naturalization as a shield against the imposition of duties there, while by his absence he was avoiding his duties here. Naturalization secured with such a purpose was wanting in one of its most essential elements -good faith on the part of the applicant. It involved a wrongful use of a beneficent law. True, it was not expressly forbidden; neither

was it authorized. But, being contrary to the plain implication of the statute, it was unlawful, for what is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as what is expressed. United States v. Babbit, 1 Black, 55, 61, 17 L. Ed. 94; McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651, 672, 18 Sup. Ct. 242, 42 L. Ed. 614; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 451, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, 50 L. Ed. 261, 4 Ann. Cas. 737.

Perceiving nothing in the prior laws which shows that Congress could not have intended that the last paragraph of section 15 of the act of 1906 should be taken according to the natural meaning and import of its words, we think, as before indicated, that it must be regarded as extending the preceding paragraphs of that section to all certificates of naturalization, whether secured theretofore under prior laws or thereafter under that act.

Several contentions questioning the constitutional validity of section 15 are advanced, but all, save the one next to be mentioned, are sufficiently answered by observing that the section makes no discrimination between the rights of naturalized and native citizens, and does not in anywise affect or disturb rights acquired through lawful naturalization, but only provides for the orderly cancellation, after full notice and hearing, of certificates of naturalization which have been procured fraudulently or illegally. It does not make any act fraudulent or illegal that was honest and legal when done, imposes no penalties, and at most provides for the annulment, by appropriate judicial proceedings, of merely colorable letters of citizenship, to which their possessors never were lawfully entitled. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct. 613, 56 L. Ed. 1066. See, also, Wallace v. Adams, 204 U. S. 415, 27 Sup. Ct. 363, 51 L. Ed. 547.

Objection is specially directed to the provision which declares that taking up a permanent residence in a foreign country within five years after the issuance of the certificate shall be considered prima facie evidence of a lack of intention to become a permanent citizen of the United States at the time of the application for citizenship, and that in the absence of countervailing evidence the same shall be sufficient to warrant the cancellation of the certificate as fraudulent. It will be observed that this provision prescribes a rule of evidence, not of substantive right. It goes no farther than to establish a rebuttable presumption which the possessor of the certificate is free to overcome. If, in truth, it was his intention at the time of his application to reside permanently in the United States, and his subsequent residence in a foreign country was prompted by considerations which were consistent with that intention, he is at liberty to show it. Not only so, but these are matters of which he possesses full, if not special, knowledge. The controlling rule respecting the power of the legislature in establishing such presumptions is comprehensively stated in Mobile, etc., Railroad Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42, 43, 31 Sup. Ct. 136, 137 (55 L. Ed. 78, 32 L. R. A. [N. S.] 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463), as follows.

"Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima. facie evidence of the main fact in issue, is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of government. Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods of proof in both civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding them are

numerous.

Nor is it a valid objection to such legislation that it is made applicable to existing causes of action, as is the case here, the true rule in that regard being well stated in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. 524, in these words:

"It must also be evident that a right to have one's controversies determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These rules pertain to the remedies which the State provides for its citizens; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter into and constitute part of any contract, nor can be regarded as being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to enforce. Like other rules affecting the remedy, they must therefore at all times be subject to modification and control by the legislature; and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those States in which retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as changed would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in legal controversies in the future; and it could not therefore be called retrospective even though some of the controversies upon which it may act were in progress before."

This court applied that rule in Webb v. Den, 17 How. 576, 578, 15 L. Ed. 35; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 590, 4 Sup. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204; and Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437, 32 Sup. Ct. 248, 56 L. Ed. 497.

That the taking up of a permanent residence in a foreign country shortly following naturalization has a bearing upon the purpose with which the latter was sought and affords some reason for presuming that there was an absence of intention at the time to reside permanently in the United States is not debatable. No doubt, the reason for the presumption lessens as the period of time between the two events is lengthened. But it is difficult to say at what point the reason so far disappears as to afford no reasonable basis for the presumption. Congress has indicated its opinion that the intervening period may be as much as five years without rendering the presumption baseless. That period seems long, and yet we are not prepared to pronounce it certainly excessive or unreasonable. But we are of opinion that as the intervening time approaches five years the presumption necessarily must weaken to such a degree as to require but slight countervailing evidence to overcome it. On the other hand, when the intervening time is so short as it is shown to have been in the present case, the presumption cannot be regarded as yielding to anything short of a

substantial and convincing explanation. So construed, we think the provision is not in excess of the power of Congress.

Finding no error in the record, the decree is

Affirmed.

SECTION 3.-EXPATRIATION

ACT OF VIRGINIA OF 1786 CONCERNING EXPATRIATION

V.

* And in order to preserve to the citizens of this commonwealth that natural right which all men have of relinquishing the society in which birth or accident may have thrown them, and of seeking subsistence and happiness elsewhere, and to declare explicitly what shall be deemed evidence of an intention in any citizen to exercise that right.

VI. Be it further enacted, That whensoever any citizen of this commonwealth shall, by deed in writing, under his hand and seal, executed in the presence of and subscribed by three witnesses, and by them, or two of them, proved in the general court or the court of the county wherein he resides, or by open verbal declaration made in either of the said courts, to be by them entered of record, declare that he relinquishes the character of a citizen, and shall depart out of this commonwealth, such person shall, from the time of his departure, be considered as having exercised his right of expatriation, and shall thenceforth be deemed no citizen. [An act to explain, amend, and reduce into one act, the several acts for the admission of emigrants to the rights of citizenship, and prohibiting the migration of certain persons to this commonwealth, October, 1786. 12 Hening, Virginia Statutes at Large, Chap. 10, pp. 261, 262, 263.] •

For the doctrine of expatriation, see John Bassett Moore's Principles of American Diplomacy, c. vii, 270-305 (1918). •

The original provisions concerning the right of expatriation were contained in "An act declaring who shall be deemed citizens of this commonwealth," passed in 1779. 10 Hening, Virginia Statutes at Large, Chap. 55, p. 129.

The text of the Act of 1786 differs in form, but not in substance, from that of 1779.

See Alsberry v. Hawkins, 9 Dana (Ky.) 177, 33 Am. Dec. 546 (1839), for the interpretation of this act.