Mr. SHAYS. We have and we are grateful to have our first panel, Mr. Luis Reyes, executive director of operations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Mr. Roy P. Zimmerman, director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incidence Response, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. What we are going to do is we are going to have them make their statements. We will go through a 5-minute round of questioning. We are then going to have the GAO make their statement, ask them questions and then do a second round to our first panel separately afterwards. We appreciate our first panel being willing to do it. It's to everyone's advantage to have that kind of dialog, and that makes me feel good that you recognize that and I appreciate it. So with that, we would ask you to stand and swear you in as we swear all our witnesses. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our witnesses are responding in the affirmative. Is there anyone I should have asked in your staff that may need to respond? If so, it may make sense for me to swear them in. Mr. REYES. No, Roy and myself are the ones doing the testimony. Mr. SHAYS. OK. That's fine. That's great. With that, Mr. Reyes, you have the floor and am happy to have with your statement. STATEMENTS OF LUIS REYES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY ROY P. ZIMMERMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENCE RESPONSE, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mr. REYES. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is indeed a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss some of the efforts by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mr. SHAYS. I am going to have you move that mic a little more in direct line with you. Mr. REYES. OK. Is that any better? Mr. SHAYS. Yes. Just turn it this way. Thank you. Mr. REYES. To the efforts by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its licensees with respect to security at nuclear power plants. The NRC has greatly enhanced requirements of licensees at nuclear power plants and conducted vulnerability assessments and identified mitigation strategies in order to improve security and evaluate potential threats. Nuclear power plants have maintained a strong safety and security measures and were designed to withstand catastrophic events including fire, flood, earthquakes and tornados. Security at nuclear facilities across the country has long been the subject of NRC regulatory oversight, dating back to the 1970's. And nuclear power plants have been required to implement security problems that are capable of defending against violent assault by well-armed, well-trained adversaries. Nuclear power facilities have likely been among the best protected commercial facilities in the Nation prior to September 11, 2001 and remain so today. However, the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States brought to light a new and more immediate threat to our country. To cope with these changes in the threat environment, the NRC undertook a reassessment of its safeguards and security programs to identify from actions, and long-term enhancements that will raise the level of security at the nuclear facilities across the country. Since the terrorist attacks, the NRC has ordered as licensee to take specific actions to security at their facilities and to amend the protection of the nuclear materials they possess. We believe that this comprehensive act also effectively addressed major congressional concerns about the adequacy of security in the new threat environment. We recognize though that security would be further enhanced in the five legislative proposals that the Commission has submitted to Congress which are appended to our testimony are promptly enacted. My full statement submitted for the record provides a summary of the numerous post-September 11 actions and enhancement to raise the level of security at nuclear facilities. This includes a series of orders through all nuclear power licensees beginning in February 2002 to formally incorporate specific compensatory measures into the search safeguards and security programs. This enhancement of security included increased security patrols, augmented security forces, additional security posts, increased vehicle span of distances and improved coordination with law enforcement. In the months since those orders were issued, there has been coordination with the regulated industry and representatives of the Federal, State and local government agencies that would be called upon to support the licensees response to a potential terrorist attack. Also, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NRC began a reassessment of the design basis threat [DBT]. As a result, the threat characteristic set forth in NRC regulations were supplemented by orders issued to power reactors and to certain field cycle facilities. The NRC's currently reviewing licensee revised security plants for nuclear power plants and certain nuclear fuel facilities. Nearly 2,000 plants in all, and expects that all the plants will be reviewed, revised as appropriate and approved, and with few exceptions implemented by October 29, 2004 deadline imposed by the Commission's April 29, 2003 orders. Additionally, the NRC has completed an extensive set of vulnerability assessments and identified mitigation strategies for NRC license activities involving radioactive materials and nuclear facilities. These efforts have continued to affirm the robustness of the effectiveness of these facilities, the effectiveness of redundant systems and defense of design principles and the value of effective programs for operator training and emergency preparedness. We have continued to improve our security performance evaluation program, that is our force-on-force evaluations. In February 2004 the NRC began a transition force-on-force program incorporating lessons learned during the pilot. The transition program uses the characteristics of the DBT as enhanced as sup plemented by our orders to prepare for resumption of the full security performance assessment program in November 2004. In conclusion, my full statement also includes prescriptions of NRC's revised base line inspection program, the status of security plan reviews, emergency preparedness and sharing of information with our stakeholders. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. And I look forward to answering any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes follows:] STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING HOMELAND SECURITY: MONITORING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY SUBMITTED BY LUIS A. REYES EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS Submitted: September 14, 2004 2 Introduction Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss some of the efforts by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its licensees with respect to security at nuclear power plants. Overview The NRC's mission is to regulate nuclear reactors, materials and waste facilities in a manner that protects the health and safety of the public, promotes the common defense and security, and protects the environment. Nuclear power plants have maintained strong safety and security measures, and were designed to withstand catastrophic events including fire, flood, earthquakes, and tornadoes. These plants were also designed using a defense-in-depth strategy, with redundant safety systems and are operated and protected by highly trained staff. Multiple barriers protect the reactor and prevent or mitigate off-site releases of radioactive materials. Design features of the reactor facilities provide substantial protection against a malevolent attack. Security at nuclear facilities across the country has long been the subject of NRC regulatory oversight, dating back to the 1970's, and nuclear power plants have been required to implement security programs that are capable of defending against violent assaults by wellarmed, well-trained adversaries. With sophisticated surveillance equipment, stringent access controls, physical barriers, professional security forces, and well qualified armed response forces and partnership with the local law enforcement agencies (LLEA), the nuclear power |