been bound to give it full credit, or that defendant might not have contradicted it. There were circumstances sworn to by plaintiff which threw doubt upon it. He had, as he swears, been doing business for himself, buying and selling buggies and horses, and giving his notes, for three years, which, if his statement of his age was true, must have made him a business man when he was a boy of between seventeen and eighteen. It is possible for boys to obtain credit as such, no doubt, but it is not so common that they can usually do so without either appearing to be men, or else keeping up such business conduct as would not have given rise to this litigation. The fact of age would have been open to dispute. If such an error had been committed in a circuit court, the only result would have been a new trial, when all these matters could be litigated. But when a justice's judgment is reversed on certiorari the whole case falls, whereas on appeal the appealing party will prevail at the circuit on a trial of the facts if he makes out his case, but the adverse party also has a fair chance to meet that case. It is not the proper office of a certiorari to reverse proceedings on defects which are not calculated to reach the substance of the controversy. The statute contemplates that on a certiorari from a justice the appellate court may do substantial justice on the whole merits. But this is impossible where the reversal is for the exclusion of testimony which is not of a conclusive character. And it may easily happen that a reversal in such a case may be had, to a destruction of justice, by loss of remedies, or other circumstances of prejudice. While there may not be an absence of jurisdiction to issue a writ in such cases, it is usually a bad practice, and should not be encouraged unless circumstances are exceptional. The conditions of appeal are as readily performed as those of certiorari and the remedy is far more appropriate. In the present case, whatever may be plaintiff's rights, if he really was a minor, there is nothing on the record to indicate that he could insist on them honorably. The case does not appeal to indulgence. We think the writ was improvidently granted. The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and the certiorari dismissed. The other Justices concurred. MEYER SANDLER V. TIMOTHY BRESNAHAM. Replevin-Completed sale―Harmless error as to date. 1. The error of charging, in a replevin suit, that if plaintiff had bought the chattels on a certain day, they belonged to him from that date, was harmless in a case where plaintiff recovered, if the plaintiff's title, though not perfected then, was complete before defendant had seized the chattels, 2. One can bring replevin for goods sold to him, if they have been identified, even though he has not yet received and weighed them, nor agreed upon or ascertained their quantity. 3. Where the record does not show how a jury made up its award of damages, but the evidence would warrant the award as made, it will not be presumed that the jury included any improper items. Error to Muskegon. (Russell, J.) April 24.-April 30. REPLEVIN. Defendant brings error. Affirmed. Smith, Nims, Hoyt & Erwin for appellant. Frank G. Holmes for appellee. COOLEY, C. J. Action of replevin for a quantity of scrapiron. The plaintiff resides in Grand Rapids, and claims title to the iron through a purchase made from one Snher, on January 6, 1883. It appears incidentally in the case that defendant, when the property was taken from him on the writ in this case, was holding the property under a writ of attachment against Snher, which was levied January 10, 1883. 53 567 91 579 53 567 94 130 The defendant, however, did not justify under the attachment, and he seems not to have pleaded in the case. The plaintiff had never had possession of the iron, and to show his right to maintain the suit it became necessary for him to prove the purchase from Snher. His evidence was that on January 6, 1883, he had a conversation with Snher in which he agreed with him upon the purchase of a car-load of scrap-iron at Muskegon, to be sent to him by rail, and the freight to be paid by Snher. The price was agreed upon, and seven dollars and a half was paid upon it by plaintiff. Snher had at the time a car partly loaded at Muskegon, and was negotiating for the purchase of more from Ryerson, Hills & Co. He finished that negotiation January 9, 1883, and on that day completed the loading of the car from the amount purchased, and drew upon the plaintiff in favor of Ryerson, Hills & Co. for $35 in payment. He also put into the car some kerosene barrels which he intended for the plaintiff, but which it does not appear that the plaintiff had bought, or otherwise acquired a title to. The draft to Ryerson, Hills & Co., plaintiff, by telephone, promised them to accept at the time they took it. The court charged the jury that if they should find from the evidence that the plaintiff bought the iron of Snher on January 6th, then it belonged to the plaintiff from and after that day. The evidence did not tend to show a purchase on January 6th. A part of the iron Snher did not own and could not have sold on that day; and the negotiation between the plaintiff and Snher did not contemplate the transfer of title to any particular lot of iron then designated, but to a car-load of iron to be afterwards made up. But when the car-load was actually made up on the 9th, and a draft made and delivered to a third party and accepted for the purchase price, or a part of it, the plaintiff became entitled to the iron thus set apart for him; and as this was before the attachment was levied, it is immaterial that it was on a day subsequent to the day mentioned by the judge in his charge. The error was quite harmless. The property being identified, it was imma terial that it had not yet been received and weighed by the plaintiff, and the quantity agreed upon or ascertained. Adams Mining Co. v. Senter 26 Mich. 73; Lingham v. Eggleston 27 Mich. 324; Hatch v. Fowler 28 Mich. 205; Hahn v. Fredericks 30 Mich. 223; Wilkinson v. Holiday 33 Mich. 386; Grant v. Merchants' etc. Bank 35 Mich. 515; Scotten v. Sutter 37 Mich. 526; Brewer v. Salt Ass'n 47 Mich. 526. On this writ no question is made concerning the kerosene barrels, but it is complained that [the jury] gave damages which included some part of the costs which the defendant had been obliged to pay in this suit. The record, however, does not show how the jury made up their award of damages, and it was possible for them, on the evidence, to give what they did without including any improper items. The judgment must be affirmed. The other Justices concurred. 53 569 56 146 57 317 53 52 69 66 185 THOMAS J. SHERIDAN ET AL. V. EDMUND S. BRIGGS. Affidavit for capias ad respondendum. 1. An affidavit for a capias ad respondendum, or for any writ that will deprive one of his liberty, must set forth in detail the facts and circumstances on which it rests, and not merely inferences and conclusions from such facts; and the facts must be within deponent's personal knowledge. 2. An affidavit to hold to bail must be of the same legal quality, as evidence, as would be required at the trial to establish the facts relied on as the ground of arrest. 3. Statements in an affidavit for a capias ad respondendum that defendant, when he made certain representations as to his financial condition was not worth enough to pay his debts and was insolvent and held his property subject to mortgages which, as deponent believed, would be the full value of his property, are too indefinite to amount to legal proof. Error to Kalamazoo. (Mills, J.) April 24.-April 30. CASE. Plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed. Harvey Joslin for appellants, as to the sufficiency of the allegations in the affidavit for a capias, cited 2 Whart. Cr. L. § 2118; 2 Bish. Cr. L. § 404; People v. Haynes 11 Wend. 557; Thomas v. People 34 N. Y. 351; Com. v. Davidson 1 Cush. 33; Com. v. Drew 19 Pick. 184; People v. Clark 10 Mich. 310; People v. Winslow 39 Mich. 505; Higler v. People 44 Mich. 299. Howard & Roos for appellee cited Proctor v. Prout 17 Mich. 473; Enders v. People 20 Mich. 240; Hackett v. Wayne Circuit Judge 36 Mich. 334; Com. v. Strain 10 Met. 521. CHAMPLIN, J. The writ of error in this case brings up for review an order made by the circuit court for the county of Kalamazoo, quashing a writ of capias ad respondendum which had been issued in the cause, and upon which the defendant had been arrested and held to bail, for the reason that the affidavit upon which the order to hold to bail was based was insufficient to authorize defendant's arrest. The affidavit appears in the margin.' 1 State of Michigan, County of Kent-ss: Thomas J. Sheridan, of the township of Nelson, county of Kent, and State of Michigan, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a member of the firm of T. J. Sheridan & Co.; that said firm is composed of himself and Caroline A. Sheridan, and that said firm is now, and for four years prior to this date has been, doing business and still is doing business in said Kent county, under the firm name and style of T. J. Sheridan & Co.; that he makes this affidavit as well in behalf of said Caroline A. Sheridan as of this deponent. and that he is personally acquainted with and cognizant of the facts stated and set forth in this affidavit. And this deponent further says that said firm is about to commence an action of trespass on the case in the circuit court for the county of Kalamazoo, in said State, against Edmund S. Briggs, of said county, for fraud committed by him as hereinafter set forth. And this deponent further says that heretofore, to wit, on or about the 20th day of April, A. D. 1883, in the township of Nelson, in said county of Kent, the said Edmund S. Briggs, of said county of Kalamazoo, and State of Michigan, with intent to cheat and defraud the said Thomas J. Sheridan and Caroline A. Sheridan, co-partners as aforesaid, and to obtain fraudulently from them a large quantity of shingles, to wit, eighty thousand shingles, did then and there falsely represent and pretend to said T. J. Sheridan & Co. that he, the said Briggs, was worth from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand dollars in property, which was then free and clear of incumbrances; that he was then the owner of a grist-mill and planing-mill, situated at Vicksburg, in said county of Kal |