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has ever prevailed in the United States, except in some isolated cases, and it would require a unanimity of decision, amounting to an entire removal of the old land-marks, to justify the recasting of constitutional principles which underlie our whole system. In addition to the cases cited on the hearing, the case of State v. Pritchard 36 N. J. Law 101 contains an instructive discussion of this subject. The decision in Collins v. Tracy 36 Tex. 546, also appears at variance with what counsel for relator seemed to regard as the law of that state.

In any point of view, and whether the Governor is or is not vested with judicial powers of trial as well as removal, there is no rule which will sustain his present action as conforming to legal principles.

In my opinion judgment should go for respondent.

53 421

99 585

EDWARD SWEENEY V. BENJAMIN NEELY.

Partnership accounting-Interest.

1. On appeal from a decree for an accounting the appellant's objections only will be considered.

2. Any reasonable expense incurred by either member of a firm, with or without the consent of the rest, in the legitimate prosecution of the partnership business, and for the benefit of the parties, should be allowed upon a partnership accounting. So held of the expense of exploring premises leased to the firm for mining.

3. Interest does not run on an unsettled or unliquidated account unless there is an express or clearly implied agreement that it shall do so.

4. Interest is not allowed in a partnership accounting upon moneys owing between the firm and either of the partners, or between each other, in partnership transactions before dissolution, unless by virtue of some understanding or usage, or some equity implying an agreement to pay it.

Appeal from Marquette. (Grant, J.) Feb. 5-April 23.

ACCOUNTING. Complainant appeals. Decree modified.

Ball & Hanscom and C. P. Black, for complainant, cited as to allowance of interest: Gyger's Appeal 62 Penn. St. 73; Buckingham v. Ludlum 29 N. J. Eq. 345: Derby v. Gage 38 Ill. 27; Scroggs v. Cunningham 81 Ill. 110; 2 Lindl. Part. 788-9.

F. O. Clark for defendant. Partners are agents for doing firm business, and if they incur expense therein are entitled to be allowed it upon an accounting: Burgan v. Lyell 2 Mich. 102; Moran v. Palmer 13 Mich. 367; Hotchin v. Kent 8 Mich. 526; interest is not allowable on a claim by a partner until balances are ascertained and settled as between them and the firm dissolved; Pars. Partnership (3d ed.) 229, 786: Lee v. Lashbrooke 8 Dana 214; Moon v. Story id. 233; Day v. Lockwood 24 Conn. 185; Desha & Sheppard v. Smith 20 Ala. 747; Whitcomb v. Converse 119 Mass. 38; Dinham v. Bradford L. R. 5 Ch. App. 519; Gilman v. Vaughan 44 Wis. 646.

SHERWOOD, J. Bill for dissolving partnership and for an accounting. The parties were partners engaged for a time. in exploring for and mining ore upon leased land in which they had the exclusive right for fifteen years. They entered upon said land, known as Hematite mine, and carried on their mining business from May 1, 1879, until June, 1880, during which period they mined and shipped away large quantities of ore. Complainant claims that subsequently they sold the mine. Defendant, however, denies this sale was made before suit brought. The partnership was to continue during the pleasure of the parties, and the profits to be shared equally between them. The defendant was to keep the accounts, and draw checks and drafts to pay the laborers. He kept no firm books showing the amount of the business done, but kept the accounts in his private books. He received the moneys and conducted the financial business of the company. These facts appear in the pleadings and by the proofs.

The complainant insists defendant has failed to make entries of all transactions on his books, and has mingled the accounts of the partnership transactions with his private

accounts, and converted some of the funds to his own use. This, defendant denies. Both parties filed accounts of the partnership business. The matter was referred to a commissioner, who reported a statement of account which showed a balance due the complainant of $984.22. The report was excepted to by both parties, the exceptions specifying the items each claimed should be allowed and disallowed. The circuit judge modified the findings of the commissioner and rendered a decree in favor of the complainant for the sum of $1240. The defendant appeals to this Court. The complainant did not appeal, and therefore only the defendant's objection can be considered.

A very careful examination of the testimony appears to have been given by the commissioner before whom it was taken, as well as by the circuit judge whose decree is appealed from. The complainant's account consists of 114 credit and two debit items, and that of the defendant of four credit and 142 debit items. The commissioner disallowed, in whole or in part, twelve debit items of the complainant, and his claim for interest. The defendant's exceptions extend to three items in his account which were presented, besides the interest claimed; also to the allowance of eighteen items, in whole or in part, of the complainant's account presented.

We have examined the testimony bearing upon each of these items, and the briefs of counsel relating thereto, and find no occasion for disturbing the decree of the circuit judge as to any items, except those relating to the $52 for exploring on the leased property disallowed, and the item of interest on amount due complainant, being $196. A part of the business of the parties was exploring the territory leased, and at the time the expenses claimed were incurred the partnership had not been dissolved, and until that time it was entirely proper for either party, with or without the consent of the other, to expend any reasonable amount which he might deem proper in the legitimate prosecution of the copartnership business, and this item seems to have been reasonable in amount. There is no pretense that what was done was not within the scope of the ordinary business of the firm;

neither was it without benefit to the parties. We think the evidence shows it helped to sell the firm's interest in the property.

Interest can never be allowed on an unsettled or an unliquidated account without an agreement, express or clearly implied, and the case must be a very strong one when it is between partners to warrant its allowance without express agreement to that effect. We have been unable to find any understanding or agreement, either express or implied, by which either party was to be allowed interest for moneys owing to the firm from either, or from the firm to either, or from one to the other, in the conduct and management of the copartnership business, before dissolution and final settlement; and in that case, until that time, neither is chargeable with interest on money he owes to the other or to the firm, arising out of the business transactions of the company. (No usage is shown between these parties upon the subject of interest.) Colly. Partn. §§ 337, 338; Pars. Partn. (3d ed.) 229, note f; Lindl. Partn. 786, and notes; Dexter v. Arnold 3 Mason 284, 289; Gilman v. Vaughan 44 Wis. 646; Day v. Lockwood 24 Conn. 185. We do not mean to be understood that there may not be equities existing between the partners and equitable circumstances existing before final settlement which would raise an implied agreement to pay interest (Beacham v. Eckford 2 Sandf. Ch. 116); but we do not find them upon the record in this case.

There must be deducted from the decree these two items, amounting to the sum of $248, and, with this modification made, the decree of the circuit court will stand affirmed, with costs to defendant.

The other Justices concurred.

CHESTER H. GRAVES ET AL. V. BENJAMIN S. WRIGHT.

Conclusiveness of discharge in bankruptcy.

A discharge in bankruptcy is a complete defense to an action in some other court upon a claim which the bankrupt omitted by mistake from his schedule of debts.

Error to the Superior Court of Detroit. (Chipınan, J.) April 9.-April 23.

ASSUMPSIT. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

Barbour & Rexford for appellant. Proceedings in bankruptcy are in the nature of proceedings in rem and the public notice required having been given, creditors must be treated as having notice of the proceedings: Shawhan v. Wherritt 7 How. 643; Eberhardt v. Wood 6 Lea 467; a discharge in bankruptcy, even when a creditor's name has been fraudulently omitted from the schedules, cannot be impeached in any other court than that by which it was granted: Ocean Nat. Bk. v. Olcott 46 N. Y. 12; Poillon v. Lawrence 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 385; Black v. Blazo 117 Mass. 17; Milhous v. Aicardi 51 Ala. 594; Thurmond v. Andrews 10 Bush 400; Corey v. Ripley 57 Me. 69; Bump's Bankr. (1877) 735-6, 759; the claim of a creditor is barred by a discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy, although his name was not placed in the schedule, nor any notice given. to him personally or by mail, the notice by publication having been given according to the bankrupt law: Heard v. Arnold 56 Ga. 570; Platt v. Parker 6 Thomp. & C. 377: 4 Hun 135; Jones v. Knox 51 Ala. 367; Symonds v. Barnes 6 B. R. 377; Blum v. Ricks 39 Tex. 112.

Julian G. Dickinson for appellee. The creditors of an insolvent, who are the defendants in his petition to be adjudged a bankrupt, should have their day in court: In re Adams 2 B. R. 272; In re Farrell 5 B. R. 125; and should not be deprived of it by either the fraud or the mistake of the petitioner: Morse v. Presby 25 N. H. 299; Hill v. Robbins 22 Mich. 475; In re Tooker 14 B. R. 35; In re Rei

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