of the law, has no degrees. People v. Reyes 5 Cal. 347. It is the evident intent of the law to secure a jury that shall come to the consideration of the case unaffected by any previous judgment, opinion or bias with respect either to the parties or subject-matter in controversy, and it is important to the rights of parties that they may be permitted inquiries which may be the means of discovering facts which will justify the exclusion of a juror. The success of a challenge depends upon eliciting such information from the juror himself, as well as from other sources, as to his state or condition of mind, as will enable a judgment to be formed by the court as to his competency. For this purpose the law subjects the juror to an examination on oath, when questions are put to test his competency. If the juror had been permitted to answer the question, and he had replied that he would, in the case put, lean in favor of the plaintiff or against the defendant, can it be doubted that he could have been challenged for cause? He would have shown himself to have been disqualified, and no statement from him that he could render an impartial verdict would have removed the disqualification. "Nor can it be said that instructions from the court would correct the bias of jurors who swear that they incline in favor of one of the litigants." Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Adler 56 Ill. 344. A party has a right to a certain number of peremptory challenges, and in order to exercise this right understandingly it is proper for him to ascertain as nearly as practicable the disposition of the juror toward him, and toward the subject-matter in controversy; and any inquiry within reasonable limits which tends to bring to light any bias or prejudice entertained by a juror is proper. The questions propounded were proper, and the court erred in not permitting the juror to answer. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Buttolf 66 Ill. 347.

It is assigned as error that the court, against defendant's objections, admitted evidence tending to show the house was on land deeded to the plaintiffs, for the reason that their title to the property is averred to be by will, and proof of title by

deed does not tend to support the declaration. There are two counts in the declaration. The first does not aver the source of title of the plaintiffs, but alleges that they were the absolute owners of the premises destroyed; and the second count alleges that they are the absolute owners, and that they derived their title through the last will of their father. We do not think the objection well taken. The deed was admissible under the first count. Had both counts alleged the derivation of their title by will, it would not have been error to admit proof of title by deed. The fact of ownership was the material question. Any competent evidence to prove their ownership was admissible; and if the declaration set out their source of title with unnecessary particularity, it was amendable on the trial, or even after verdict.

The same remarks apply to the objection that the application stated that the title of the insured was by will, when the proof was that it was by deed.

The court committed no error in not permitting the wit ness Wrege to be asked what Mrs. Monaghan's mother said to one of the plaintiffs in the barn, while the witness was searching for articles concealed therein. The witness had been permitted to state what the plaintiff said on that occa sion, and the record does not disclose how it could be material to show what Mrs. Monaghan's mother said.

Mrs. Monaghan had sworn in her affidavit to the destruction of the sewing-machine by the fire, and defendant proved by a witness, who was a neighbor of Mrs. Monaghan, that she was at the fire and saw the sewing-machine standing on the ground near where the fire was burning, and the next morning Mrs. Monaghan's hired man brought the sewingmachine to witness' house and left it there, and she was asked: "What did he say when he brought it there?" Counsel for plaintiffs objected to it as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The record proceeds:

By the Court. It would not be proper if she were on trial for arson.

Defendant's Counsel. She is not on trial for arson.

The Court. The course of testimony is the same.

Defendant's Counsel. I propose to show what the hired. man said when he brought the sewing-machine to the house. The court refused to allow the question to be put or answered.

To the remarks of the court above stated, and to the ruling of the court, defendant duly excepted. The examination of the witness then proceeded, and the following occurred: Question. After the machine came to your house did you see Mrs. Monaghan?

Answer. I don't remember seeing her.

Q. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection. Did you have any conversation with her after the fire, in which she told you not to say anything about the machine being at your mother's?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have any such conversation with any one? (Objected to as incompetent and immaterial by plaintiff's connsel.)

By the Court. The plea charges her with the burning, as I understand it. The proof is the same as if an information was filed against her for burning it down. In that case the statements inade by any other persons are not evidence. Defendant's Counsel. If they were her agents?

The Court. That must first be shown.

Defendant's Counsel. I think we have shown it.

By the Court. The court holds that there is not sufficient testimony to show that the hired man was the agent of Kate Monaghan at the time of the fire; therefore the statements are immaterial.

To which ruling, and to the remarks of the court, defendant, by its counsel, did then and there except.

At this stage of the case the defendant had introduced evidence tending to prove that the fire was first reported to defendant's agent by the hired man; that Mrs. Monaghan told the agent that the hired man first discovered the fire; that of the contents of the house all that was saved was a cooking stove, clock, some chairs and a trunk with some clothing in it; that a sewing machine that cost $55 was burned, and all the other articles insured, with the above exceptions; that afterwards she and the hired man made affidavits that

all that was saved from the fire was 1 cook stove, 1 sittingroom stove, 6 wood-seat chairs, 1 clock, 1 lantern, and a few articles of children's clothing worth not to exceed one dollar, and that articles were destroyed which cost $860.75, including the sewing machine, carpets, etc. Defendant had also given. evidence tending to prove that after Mrs. Monaghan and the hired man had sworn to the affidavits, Mr. Kinney made an appointment with her to meet her later in the day, and that he, with one Wrege, a deputy sheriff, then went to the premises for the purpose of searching for articles claimed to have been lost; that Mr. Kinney and Wrege found concealed in a barrel of oats a carpet; under the straw in the bay of the barn they found a bureau with the drawers locked full of linen and clothing; in a barrel covered up with straw they found a feather bed, and in a box under the straw they found a quantity of Mrs. Monaghan's clothing and other articles; that they also found covered up with straw, a table, bedstead and other articles; that in an out-door cellar they found a part of the doors and windows of the house that had no appearance of having been burned, and a large number of other articles; that they made a list of all the articles found.

The witness should have been permitted to state what the hired man said when he left the machine. It accompanied and was part of the act of the man in leaving the machine, and was relevant upon the question of false swearing by the hired man. The other question, as to her having had a conversation with any one, was preliminary in character, but, without some proposition showing the materiality of the proposed proof, was rightly excluded.

We do not think that the remarks of the court relative to the course of the proof being the same as if Mrs. Monaghan was on trial for arson, are subject to the exception taken by defendant. The court evidently did not refer to the amount of proof required to sustain the plea, but that it was substantially the same line of proof required as if she was being tried on the charge of arson. If an inference could be drawn from the language used that might, perhaps, have led

the jury to infer that the defendant was required to have produced the same conclusive evidence of guilt that would be essential if Mrs. Monaghan had been on trial for arson, the exception would have been well taken. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Gargett 42 Mich. 292. But this is not the import of the language used and no inference can be drawn from it that the defendant was required to produce evidence of her guilt which should convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant also gave evidence tending to prove that Mrs. Monaghan caused the most of the furniture and other articles in the house to be removed therefrom and concealed in the barn and elsewhere, before the fire; that part of the doors and windows belonging to the house were taken off the house and concealed before the fire; and gave evidence tending to prove that the affidavits Mrs. Monaghan and hired man made were false, known to be so by them, and that they were made to defraud the defendant; and that the house was purposely burned by Mrs. Monaghan and the hired man, Rory, to defraud the defendant.

Defendant further gave evidence tending to prove that after its agents had found the property concealed, as before stated, Mr. Kinney told Mrs. Monaghan of what they had found; charged her with burning the house; that she admitted it; that she was then told the company would not pay her anything, and asked to sign a release, which she did, (said release was received in evidence,) and she was told to bring her policy to the office and surrender it; that subsequently she had her hired man come to the defendant's office in East Saginaw and deliver the policy to Mr. Kinney. Defendant further gave evidence tending to prove that Mrs. Monaghan told Kinney that she was guardian for the children.

It was conceded by plaintiff's counsel that the sewing machine the hired man took to Mrs. Hemmeter's after the fire was the same sewing machine named in the affidavit of Mrs. Monaghan.