W. E. & J. II. Winton for appellee. One who has conveyed land when an infant, may avoid his grant by the same solemnity with which he made it-as, if it were a feoffment with livery, by a subsequent feoffment and livery;_ if a bargain and sale, by a subsequent bargain and sale: Jackson v. Burchin 14 Johns. 124; Jackson v. Carpenter 11 Johns. 539; conveyance of land made by an infant may be avoided by him after attaining his majority, by entry, ejectment, by another absolute conveyance of the same land to a third party, or by any act manifesting his intention to avoid it: Irvine v. Irvine 9 Wall. 617; Dixon v. Merritt 21 Minn. 196; Hastings v. Dollarhide 24 Cal. 195; Scott v. Buchanan 11 Humph. 468; Norcum v. Sheahan 21 Mo. 25; Scranton v. Stewart 52 Ind. 69.

SHERWOOD, J. Ejectment to recover forty acres of land lying in the county of Gratiot. Plea, general issue, with claim for improvements, and with request that value of · premises be found without the improvements, and whether the premises had been peacefully occupied by defendant and his grantors, and if so, how long; and the increased value of the premises by reason of the improvement.

The defendant claims to derive title to the land under and by virtue of a deed obtained from Mary McCartney while an infant under the age of sixteen years.

The cause was tried by Hon. Henry Hart, circuit judge, without a jury, who, at the request of counsel for defendant, made special findings of the facts and the law. The plaintiff had judgment for the premises, and the defendant was allowed twenty-five dollars for his improvements. The case now comes before us on error upon the findings of the circuit judge.

From such findings it appears that the land in question was entered by Richard M. Daniels, and by regular transfer, shown by proper conveyances, the title was conveyed to the minor, Mary McCartney, March 9, 1876. She then conveyed to Chapman; Chapman to Bull; Bull to Corey; and Corey to Bennett, the defendant. Mary McCartney became of age. in November, 1881, and on the 17th day of May following she conveyed the premises to the plaintiff's grantor. It further

appears that the land has been continuously occupied by the defendant and his grantors since 1854; that Miss McCartney at, and for several years immediately prior to, the defendant's purchase, resided out of the county and had not seen. the lands for three or four years; that no possession of the premises was ever demanded or notice to quit given before suit brought; that Mrs. Taft (Miss McCartney's name after marriage) never gave any notice or did anything to revoke her first deed, except the making of the conveyance to plaintiff's grantors; that the defendant has peaceably occupied and possessed the premises in question as a part of his farm from the time of his purchase until the commencement of this suit; and that the improvements he has made increased the value of the land twenty-five dollars.

Upon these facts the circuit judge held as matter of law that the giving and recording of the deed to plaintiff's grantors after Mrs. Taft became of age, at the time she did. it, was a good revocation of her first deed, and without other or further act or acts entitled the plaintiff to bring this suit against her first grantee in possession, and that defendant could recover the twenty-five dollars for improvements. We think the finding was correct, and we see no error in the record as presented.

The deed of an infant is voidable, and must be avoided. before the action will lie; but when properly avoided no other thing is necessary to be done before bringing suit. The necessity for the infant to make entry before giving the deed of avoidance, or before bringing suit, does not exist in this State. Title by descent, and our mode of transferring title by deed, are regulated by statute. The old commonlaw doctrine of feoffment with livery of seizin does not constitute any part of our law of conveyancing. Our registry laws supply their place, and furnish the notoriety of transfer intended to be given by that ancient mode of passing title; and the making and recording of the second deed in this case was entirely sufficient. How. St. ch. 216; 5652, 5657; 1 Pars. Cont. (3d ed.) pp. 373, 374; Eagle Fire Co. v. Lent 6 Paige 635; Cresinger v. Welch 15

53 MICH-2

Ohio 192; Jackson v. Carpenter 11 Johns. 539; Jackson v. Burchin 14 Johns. 124; Hoyle v. Stowe 2 Dev. & B. Law 320; Tucker v. Moreland 10 Pet. 58; Bingham on Infancy 60; Dixon v. Merritt 21 Miun. 196; McGan v. Marshall 7 Humph. 121; Peterson v. Laik 24 Mo. 541; Drake v. Ramsay 5 Ohio 252; Hastings v. Dollarhide 24 Cal. 195; Pitcher v. Laycock 7 Ind. 398; Laws 1881 p. 385; Crane v. Reeder 21 Mich. 82; Prout v. Wiley 28 Mich. 164.

This record fails to show any equities existing which required action on the part of the minor after she arrived at age, or her grantee, to make notice necessary before bringing suit. We find nothing in the case showing the plaintiff in any way estopped from bringing his suit.

There is no statement or finding, or request to find, the value of the premises when purchased by defendant, or the price he paid for the same, if anything; but for the improvements made he is allowed twenty-five dollars.

There may be cases at law where the court, for the purpose of protecting the rights of innocent bona fide purchasers, will hold the infant estopped from bringing suit; and others, of extreme hardship to the innocent purchaser, where courts of equity will not allow his title to be disturbed, when the court can see that the interests of the minor have not been prejudiced. But the defense in this case rests upon no such state of facts or equities, and we think the finding of the circuit judge supports the judgment he rendered in the case, which must be

Affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.

HIRAM COE V. JAMES L. GREGORY.

Collateral questions.

In replevin for property duly seized by a village marshal in satisfaction of a municipal tax regularly assessed, the validity of the village organization and of the charter under which it has acted without question for a dozen years, cannot be considered.

Error to Barry. (Hooker, J.) Jan. 17--March 6.

REPLEVIN. Plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Huggett & Smith and Clement Smith for appellant.

Knappen & Van Arman and James A. Sweezey for appellee. If an incorporation act is unconstitutional, the fact cannot be collaterally set up: 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (3d ed.) $43; St. Louis v. Shields 62 Mo. 247; Cooley Const. Lim. 312; Geneva v. Cole 61 Ill. 397; and after a re-incorporation has been relied on for several years, it cannot be collaterally questioned in a suit to recover property seized for taxes: 1 Dill. on Mun. Corp. § 43; Cooley's Const. Lim. 311; People v. Maynard 15 Mich. 470; Clement v. Everest 29 Mich. 22; Stuart v. Kalamazoo 30 Mich. 70; Bird v. Perkins 33 Mich. 29; Hill v. Wright 49 Mich. 230.

SHERWOOD, J. This is an action of replevin, to recover for the value of property taken by the marshal of the village of Nashville, to satisfy a tax for the year 1882, levied upon the property of the plaintiff by virtue of a warrant issued by the authorities of the village in pursuance of Act No. 179, Laws 1873. No question arises upon the pleadings. The case is before us upon findings of fact and law solely.

The court finds the defendant was marshal at the time the suit was commenced, and as such was engaged in collecting the taxes for the village under his warrant, duly issued upon an assessment properly and regularly made, according to the provisions of the act above mentioned, for the collection of the tax assessed against the plaintiff, and upon which the

defendant seized and held the property at the time the writ was sued out against him in this suit; that the village of Nashville was incorporated in 1869; and that in March and April, 1879, the election of officers of said village took place, and the action contemplated in sections 14 to 21, inclusive [of ch. i] of Act No. 179, Laws 1873, for re-incorporation, was had, and the declaration of re-incorporation duly filed April 16, 1879, under the act; that ever since that time. all the functions of said village have been performed under the provisions of the last-named act; that the warrant was signed by the assessor and president of the village, and directed to the marshal thereof, dated November 29, 1882, and was otherwise in form as required by section 7 [of ch. xxvi] of said Act No. 179; that the assessment roll and warrant were apparently a compliance with the act; and that plaintiff refused to pay his tax when demanded by the collector before suit was brought.

The following are the findings of law upon the facts:

"1st. The action of the electors and officers of said village so had in March and April, 1879, had the effect of adoption by said electors and officers, under color of law, of a special charter containing the provisions of, and with the powers conferred or attempted to be conferred by, said Act No. 179 of the Laws of 1873."

"2d. Said act was not, so far as the re-incorporation of villages is concerned, repealed by implication by the General Village Act of 1875."

"3d. An inquiry into the validity of said Act No. 179 involves an inquiry into the validity of the re-incorporation of said village, and cannot be determined in this case."

"4th. Defendant did not unlawfully detain plaintiff's property described in the writ in this cause, and defendant had at the commencement of this action, and still has, by virtue of said levy, a lien upon said goods and chattels to the amount of $91.80, and he is entitled to judgment therefor, and for costs of this suit."

Judgment was accordingly entered for the defendant for the amount of the tax, with costs of the suit.

The plaintiff's counsel claims that the facts are insufficient to support the judgment; that the proceedings by which his