Anderson v. Hernandez. she knew that both Melhado and Waddell were personal friends of the trustee. That the property when sold at public sale was subject to an outstanding lease that was clearly calculated to lessen the price for which it could be so sold. And that such lease was promptly canceled in order to make a sale to her, and that the property was really worth rather more than the sum she was giving for it. Now, concede that she did not know that Melhado was the attorney for trustee or beneficiaries, or that he and the trustee had agreed before the public sale that the property should, if possible, be bid off by a friend of theirs at a low bargain and re-sold at an advanced price for their mutual benefit, and that Melhado acquired his title only in pursuance of and for the purpose of carrying out such plan. Nevertheless, the facts of which she did have knowledge suggest such a scheme. A trustee does not ordinarily allow his friend to bid off trust property at $7,500 less than its value, and wait for the first payment until he can advertise and negotiate a re-sale at an advance price. The sale to Waddell, and the conveyance subsequently to Melhado simultaneously with his conveyance to her, could not have appeared to Mrs. Blood and her agents as a ordinary business transaction, and certainly not one in which a trustee, acting in good faith, would be likely to join. It certainly suggests the query: For what reason does the trustee force upon the market, at public sale, this property, upon which there is an outstanding lease for three years? And why does he allow those interested in the lease to bid it in at so inadequate a price? And why, instead of compelling them to perform their contract and close the bargain by December 30th, as under his bid Waddell was obliged to do, does he wait for him to make a re-sale at an advanced price? What are the necessities that require the trustee to sell the trust property in such a manner and at such a sacrifice? She made no inquiry whatever, but took the title Matter of McKenna. offered her, and under such circumstances, in my judgment, she does not stand in the position of a purchaser in good faith. The title in her is, therefore, subject to the right of the beneficiaries to have it adjudged void as against them, and as the defendant, Mrs. Koss, is but a mere donee of Mrs. Blood, the title in her is also subject to the same equity (Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40). These considerations force me to the conclusion that the relief asked for by the plaintiff in this action should be granted. MATTER OF MCKENNA. N. Y. Court of Common Pleas, Special Term; May, 1894. 1. Motions and orders.] A motion to set aside an order admitting a person to citizenship does not fall within the provisions of Code Civ. Pro., §§ 1282, et seq., limiting the time within which a motion may be made to set aside a final judgment for irregularity. 2. The same.] Seventeen years' delay before moving to set aside an order of naturalization for fraud,—in absence of anything to show that the fraud was not discovered, or to excuse the delay,— is fatal to such motion; especially as Code Civ. Pro., § 388, limiting the time for the commencement of an action, not otherwise specially provided for, to ten years, applies to a motion. 3. Naturalization.] The civil authorities, and not a private individual, should institute a proceeding to set aside naturalization. 4. Motions and orders.] Where a brother and sister in support of their action of ejectment against those claiming under a deceased brother, moved to set aside the latter's naturalization,held, that as Code Civ. Pro., § 829 (providing that a party or a person interested in the event shall not be examined as a witness in his own behalf as to a personal communication or transaction with a deceased person), did not apply to matter contained in affidavits submitted on a motion, and it appeared that such section might be successfully interposed to defeat an action to set aside the order attacked, the motion should be denied, and the parties relegated to a proper action where the question could be determined on competent evidence. Matter of McKenna. Motion by Ann McCarran and Francis McKenna to vacate an order admitting Patrick McKenna to be a citizen of the United States. George Bliss, for the motion. Charles W. Dayton and C. C. Clarke, opposed. GIEGERICH, J.-This is a motion to set aside an order made by this court, of date October, 25, 1866, whereby one Patrick McKenna was admitted to citizenship of the United States. The application is based upon allegations that misrepresentations were made by the applicant, in the course of the proceeding wherein such order was granted, relating to the period of his residence in this country prior to the date when his majority was attained. The motion is made by Ann McCarran, a sister, and joined in by Francis McKenna, a nephew of said Patrick McKenna, and appears to be made in support of ejectment suits brought in the Supreme Court by the said Ann McCarran against certain parties claiming through said Patrick McKenna, who died on April 22, 1891, intestate; the order in question, unless vacated, being expected to materially affect the successful prosecution of such suits. As to limitations, this motion does not fall within the provisions of § 1282. et seq., of the Code, relative to the setting aside of a judgment for irregularity, in view of the nature of the proceeding attacked (Re City of Buffalo, 78 N. Y. 362, 363); but, apart from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the application, if based upon an alleged irregularity merely, would come too late at this time (Jackson v. Robins, 16 Johns. 537, 571; Thompson v. Skinner, 7 Id. 556; Soulden v. Cook, 4 Wend. 217). It is contended, however, that the motion, being based upon alleged fraud in obtaining the order which is sought to be set aside, is barred by no limitation; but this contention is founded solely upon certain authorities holding that such a proceeding does not fall within the limitation VOL. XXXI.—27 Matter of McKenna. prescribed in the case where irregularity or error of fact is assigned. These authorities do not warrant the assumption that no limitation (running from the date when the facts were discovered) may operate upon a motion of this character, especially in view of § 388 of the Code, which applies as a rule to equitable actions (Butler . Johnson, 111 N. Y. 204), a motion being governed by the rules of limitation applicable to actions (Depew v. Dewey, 2 T. & C. 515; aff'd 56 N. Y. 657). Whatever express statutory limitation may here apply, however, it is not necessary to determine, for the neglect of the parties to make this motion during the great period which has elapsed is fatal to the application (Corwithe v Griffing, 21 Barb. 9, 14; Strong v. Strong, 3 Redf. 477. 485 486 and citations; In re Salisbury's Estate, 6 N. Y. Supp. 932, 934). No explanation is here offered for the negligence of the moving parties in this regard, the affidavits submitted tending to show that the facts constituting the alleged fraud were known to the affiants from the commencement of the period in question. It is well settled that an order admitting an alien to citizenship, which contains the necessary recitals, is conclusive as to the existence of facts upon which it depends for validity when attacked collaterally (Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Peters [US] 393, 405; McCarthy v. Marsh, 5 N. Y. 263; Ritchie v. Putnam, 13 Wend. 524); but authorities dealing with such a case in the aspect of a direct attack are not abundant. The case of Commonwealth . Paper (1 Brewster, 263, Penn.), and the Matter of Shaw (2 Penn. Dist. Rep. 250), however, are in point, and I am well content to follow them in the absence of any contrary ruling by the courts of this State so far as research discloses. These cases hold that the civil authorities, and not a private individual, should institute a proceeding of this character, and, to my mind, the reasoning is founded. upon sound principles. Moreover, in view of the grave importance which People v. Lungite. attaches to the question now considered, by reason of the property rights involved, the parties to be affected should certainly have recourse to the protection afforded by the settled rules of evidence when litigating this matter, and I am by no means satisfied that the provisions of § 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not oppose the successful prosecution of an action to set aside the order here attacked. This section is not in terms applicable to matter contained in affidavits submitted upon a motion, and, in my opinion, justice would require that the parties be relegated to a proper action where the question can be determined upon whatever competent evidence may be adduced. Motion denied, with $10 costs. PEOPLE v. LUNGITE. N. Y. Court of Genera Sessions; June, 1894. Exceptions; in criminal cases.] Where one convicted of a crime shows no reasonable excuse for not having presented a bill of exceptions upon the trial, or within five days thereafter, or for not having the time enlarged by consent or by the judge who presided at the trial, as provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure, §§ 456, et seq., a motion will not be granted after the time has expired, allowing further time to serve exceptions. Motion by one who had been convicted of the crime of receiving stolen goods, for an order granting him ten days from the entry of such order in which to serve his proposed bill of exceptions, and for such further relief as to the court may seem just. The opinion fully states the facts. SMYTH, Recorder.- The defendant was convicted of the crime of criminally receiving stolen property on March |