There are other authorities in there that speak to particular questions, particular obligations which the United States may have under the IEP for which implementing legislation is needed. Much of what is there could be done at the moment pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act and the Defense Production Act. That is true.

Mr. CONANT. Mr. Chairman, I stand to be corrected, but I have the impression also, Mr. Bell, that one of the key provisions of the IEP agreement is to be able to respond not only when an emergency occurs, but in anticipation of an emergency. With the prospect of action being taken by a significant number of oil producing states, yet prior to the actual imposition of an embargo, it is an important aspect in the legislation we are now considering that the United States would be able to make the necessary commitments-legal and administrative— beforehand.

Mr. BELL. There is also authority that deals with exports and a number of other subjects that are specifically dealt with, and I would be glad to

Mr. DIGGS. Would you submit a fuller answer to the subcommittee after researching that matter?

Mr. BELL. Surely.

[The reply of the FEA follows:]

Question 1. What authorities does Title 13 of H.R. 2650 grant to the President which he does not already have under existing law?

Answer. Initially it should be noted that Title 13 is designed to give the President long-term (10 years) authority to take action in energy supply emergency situations. While some of the authorities contained in Title 13 already exist in present law, none of the current authorities is long-term in nature and, for the most part, they are insufficient for the purpose of adequately implementing the International Energy Program. The following is a selected list of the specific authorities contained in Title 13 and an analysis of existing statutory provisions in those areas:

1. CONTROL OVER STOCKS

Section 1304 of Title 13 would authorize the President to order private parties to maintain minimum inventories of petroleum in excess of normal business or operating requirements. This authority is necessary in order to insure that the provisions of the International Energy Program regarding minimum inventory levels can be fulfilled as well as to provide a clear basis for inventory controls should domestic allocation be necessary. With respect to existing law, no comparable authority exists, although limited inventory controls are permissible in the context of insuring the viability of the allocation program under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.

2. FEDERAL ACTIONS TO INCREASE DOMESTIC PETROLEUM SUPPLIES Section 1305 contains authority to take various actions to supplement domestic energy supplies. This authority does not exist under present law.

3. ALLOCATION AND RATIONING

Section 1306 provides authority to establish an allocation system, including price controls. and to promulgate regulations for the rationing of fuels. Although the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act currently provides for allocation and price control authority. this authority is scheduled to expire on August 31, 1975, and, since it mandates allocation and price controls, is not appropriate as a standby authority in any event.

4. ENERGY CONSERVATION PLANS

Section 1307 authorizes the President to promulgate energy conservation plans in times of oil supply emergencies. No such authority exists under present law.

5. MATERIALS ALLOCATION

Section 1308 provides authority for the allocation of energy materials and facilities and for priority of performance under contracts with respect to energy research, development and production. Although similar authority exists in the Defense Production Act, the authority in that act relates principally to national defense requirements and could not be utilized in the broader context of insuring an increase in domestic energy supplies. Thus, section 1308 contains authorities not available under existing law.

6. INTERNATIONAL OIL ALLOCATION

Section 1311 would authorize the President to require United States' companies to allocate oil internationally if ordered by the President. Although the Trading With the Enemy Act and the Defense Production Act contain some authority to control certain business activities outside the United States, it is unclear whether such authority could be used to mandate the international allocation of oil. It is imperative that a clear and unambiguous authority exist so that the United States can be in a position to fulfill its obligations under the International Energy Program.

7. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS

Sections 1312 and 1313 relate mainly to voluntary agreements and antitrust immunity and are similar to authorities already existing under the Defense Production Act. Since that Act is scheduled to expire at the end of June this year, independent long-term authority with respect to this issue is appropriate.

8. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Section 1315 would allow the executive branch to provide information and data to other countries in accordance with the requirements of the international energy program. Without the authority of section 1315, United States' authority to provide unaggregated data in the limited circumstances where it is required by the IEP is limited.

9. EXPORTS

Section 1316 provides authority to restrict exports of energy related items. The Export Administration Act of 1969 authorizes export controls where there has been an excessive drain of scarce resources which causes a serious inflationary impact. The test for imposition of controls under section 1313 is different than that under the Export Administration Act in that, once the requisite finding was made that an energy supply shortfall existed or was impending, the President would have discretion to impose controls on exports. Under the Export Administration Act, however, it could be argued that such controls could not be imposed unless there were an actual shortage of the commodity itself, which might not be the case in the initial stages of a supply cutoff or embargo.

Question 2. What authorities does the administration propose with respect to establishment of a floor price for imported oil?

Answer. Title 13 of the proposed Energy Independence Act does not contain any authority with respect to establishment of a floor price for oil. Title 9 of the bill, the "Energy Development Security Act of 1975" specifically deals with the question of a floor price. The purpose of title 9 is to authorize and direct the President to adopt appropriate measures to prevent the prices of imported petroleum as marketed domestically from falling to such levels that continued importation and sale at such price levels would substantially deter the development and exploitation of domestic petroleum resources, or would threaten to cause a substantial increase in petroleum consumption. Title 9 would authorize the imposition of import restrictions including tariffs, quotas, and variable fees to accomplish the purpose of the title.

Mr. CONANT. We also gave you a copy of the IEP agreement itself, Mr. Chairman. It is not always readily available.

Mr. DIGGS. How lengthy is that agreement?

Mr. CONANT. Oh, it is about 20 pages, I would guess.

Mr. DIGGS. We might include it in the record.

Why has the administration not sought authority to fulfill terms of the agreement on an international energy program by submitting this matter as a treaty, subject to ratification, of course, by the Senate? In the absence of a treaty ratification process, isn't the implication of any congressional approval of title 13, that U.S. participation in the agreement on such a program is, in effect, being ratified outside the formal process of treaty ratification?

Mr. CONANT. Mr. Chairman, I should defer to legal advice from the State Department in answering that. Of course, I could give you my own personal impression of a couple of aspects of this. One is the appalling complexity of the legislative and constitutional processes among the other member states.

There is a need for urgency required on the part of all member states which are seeking ways of taking early action. At the same time we fully realize that, in our case as in the others, for the implementation of this we would have to come back to the Congress.

Mr. DIGGS. We will leave the record open for a fuller reply from your agency on that.

[The information requested follows:]

AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, NOT A TREATY

The choice between the two alternative legal vehicles was influenced by what our partners could do. Some of the original members of the negotiating group informed us that ratification of a treaty would require up to four years-clearly too long in an emergency when there is a high premium on immediate action. With the group opting for what in our practice is termed an executive agreement, it seemed to us inappropriate to present the agreement as a treaty.

More than this, we felt that we were and are on sound constitutional ground in agreeing to conclude an executive agreement rather than a treaty for two reasons: First, much of the Agreement on an International Energy Program is authorized by legislation currently in force. Second, we have had and have every intention of seeking the fullest concurrence of the Congress by the means of the adoption of implementing authority, as we now do in the legislation on whose behalf we are testifying today.

Mr. DIGGS. What has been the reaction within the executive branch by your Agency to the Attorney General's opinion on the 28th of March regarding the Presidential request to allow certain U.S. oil companies to consult and cooperate with the Agency with a waiver of antitrust laws? 7

Mr. BELL. The Attorney General's approval there was of the joint agreement which we initiated pursuant to section 708 in order to provide antitrust protection for companies which were involved in the initial planning of measures which might be undertaken in an emergency. We actively sought his approval of that agreement and were gratified to have that approval.

Subsequent to the approval the Industry Advisory Board of the IEA-this is an industry advisory group to the International Energy Agency has met in Paris in its first meeting and it has established a set of three subcommittees to deal with various charges that have been given to it by the IEA, so that there is now active planning within the terms of the voluntary agreement approved by the Attorney General by the various companies involved in international operations.

• See appendix at p. 81.

7 See the opinion in the appendix at p. 57.

Mr. DIGGS. Well, as you know, counsel, this opinion provided approval with respect to parent companies.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Mr. DIGGS. But only provided approval for their designated affiliates for 30 days from March 28, the date of the letter.

Mr. BELL. That is correct.

Mr. DIGGS. And during that period, which has now expired, FEA was directed, after reinvestigation of each such designated affiliate, to furnish the Attorney General with the following information regarding each affiliate: (1) the written assurance that to the best of their information and belief there are substantial grounds to believe that the affiliates' participation is reasonably necessary to operations under the agreement as presently foreseen, and (2) information on ownership or control of the affiliate by the parent company.

Our questions are, what are the status and the results of your reinvestigation? Has the Attorney General yet advised which affiliates he is going to approve? If so, we would like to see that list for the record.

Mr. BELL. Surely.s

Mr. DIGGS. And if not, when can his opinion be expected?

Mr. BELL. May I set out the steps that FEA has taken to carry out those conditions?

Mr. DIGGS. Go ahead.

Mr. BELL. Pursuant to those statements we asked each company which had designated affiliates to provide us with additional information so that we could make further judgments concerning the nature of the particular affiliates' activities, how it might be related to IEP activity and the nature of the ownership interest by the parent company. We also went further than the Attorney General's list to ask the companies not include as designated affiliates, any companies which were solely engaged in domestic activity, to make it clear that the voluntary agreement was not intended to cover activity within the United States.

As a result of that letter a number of companies have replied back to us providing the required information which we have examined. In some cases they have not asked to have approved the full list of affiliates which they originally gave to the Attorney General. In other cases they have asked to have additional affiliates designated. For those companies which have replied to us and which we have been able to examine, we are forwarding to the Attorney General the information which he has requested and our own findings with regard to this.

We will be glad to supply for the record our letters and the information to the Attorney General. I would note that where additional affiliates have been designated, we are going through the full statutory process with notice to the Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney General as we did the original approvals.

Mr. DIGGS. We will leave the record open at this point for that purpose. I might note that we would hope to publish the proceedings of this hearing and any related hearings within a 2-week period. So we wish you would move expeditiously to provide that information.

The response to this question appears in the appendix at p. 100.

We would also like to have you submit for the record the following information: (1) Data on U.S. oil imports to date by country and by type; that is, its crude or refined petroleum. Also, provide the totals for the past 5 years; and (2) oil imports of EEC countries to date by country and type for the past 5 years.

[The tables supplied by the FEA follow:]