Mr. Moss. The Chair would state at this point that until there is a substantive issue being voted on on the Floor, the Chair does not anticipate that will be the case for some considerable period of time. It intends to continue in order that the witnesses will be heard and that the testimony will be in the record.

Mr. LUKEN. But those of us who have to worry about our batting averages in the home district, may have to leave.

Mr. Moss. Dr. Fuzak.

TESTIMONY BY JOHN A. FUZAK, PH. D., FORMER PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION

Dr. FUZAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a statement. I do not intend to read it.

Mr. Moss. Without objection, your statement, in its entirety, will be placed in the record following your summation [see p. 479].

Dr. FUZAK. I will work from the statement, but I have some additional comments to some of the elements of that statement.

I do not know whether it is necessary to indicate my background. I have had a long interest in intercollegiate athletics, having been a participant in football, basketball, and baseball at the University of Illinois.

I have served in a variety of administrative and professorial positions at Michigan State University and prior to that at the University of Illinois.

In addition, I have, since 1959, been chairman of the athletic council at Michigan State University which is the policy body with direct delegation from the board of trustees to establish policy for intercollegiate athletics at our university.

I have served in the NCAA and I have chaired committees, including the Committee on Academic Testing and Requirements and the Long Range Planning Committee.

I have been very active in the NCAA Council, having served as vice president of district four, and then most recently as president. As it might be assumed from that experience, I am very supportive of the NCAA. I think it is truly an outstanding organization. It probably, in my view, is more democratic in its approach than any professional organization with which I have been associated and I have had officer roles in several national professional organizations. There are a good number of myths about the NCAA. I think Mr. Byers has been a most outstanding leader in intercollegiate athletics. Now he may very well be a demanding boss toward his staff members, but the notion that he establishes policy and all the procedures is an erroneous one. Policy is not established that way.

The officers are directly and constantly involved. Most matters are voted in convention after careful circulation and often after round tables and a lot of consideration. So who makes the policies and how, I think, is an important question that I think the committee should not overlook. It is not done the way some people think. On the other hand, I believe the infractions committee has operated almost as an entity unto itself. That does not mean that its

actions and procedures have not been reviewed and have not been established by convention, by the actions of a majority of that body.

It is difficult to maintain some kind of appropriate prospective in relation to the infractions committee and in reference to the investigative staff. Yet, I think it is important to realize, and for the committee to realize, that the majority of the members are rather well satisfied with the present procedures.

I believe that part of that satisfaction, though, comes from lack of experience with the procedure itself. They have not-as some of the institutions which have been before the infractions committeesuffered through the entire process.

I would like to say that I am firmly opposed to Government intrusion into intercollegiate athletics. Maybe intrusion is not the right word, but I think it would be a serious mistake for the Government to become directly involved in intercollegiate athletics.

It is a very complex matter, and when intrusion occurred it would require assumption of responsibility for regulation and control. I think it would result in à bureaucracy that would probably be a rather elaborate one.

While I am at it, I would like to comment about the NCAA manual. As a matter of fact, most of the material that is in it relates to procedures and committees and principles and that kind of thing.

In terms of what might be regarded as regulations that deal with athletic eligibility, or those matters which result in violations involving the infractions committee they are contained within about 20 or 30 pages of the manual.

I am always a little amused when I hear about the elaborate book and its complexity. The people who made it are people like myself, mostly. We share the blame for it. People who have an interest in athletics and are primarly educators and are not directly involved in athletics.

Yet, most of the things that are in the regulations came about because of abuses, and sometimes very serious abuses.

What I have said does not mean that I am not critical, because I am critical of some of the procedures, policies, and approaches in the infractions process.

Again, I think in looking at this, it is too easy to reflect negatively upon the total NCAA, which has been such an effective organization. Without it, there would be chaos in intercollegiate athletics.

This does not mean that some of its practices and procedures, in my view-and I am speaking through experience as an individualare appropriate. You might ask: "Why did you not speak up about this when you were President?"

During my presidency I was in a very delicate position. My institution was under official investigation. The process was underway. It was a very awkward and embarrassing position for me, and one in which I could not speak up.

Prior to that time I had expressed some reservations about the procedure in the NCAA Council. I was not able to persuade a ma

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There was another NCAA regulation in force at the time which provided that any individual who has agreed to accept a promise of money for athletic participation would also be ineligible.

Reed and his parents were totally unaware of these regulations. They were quite stunned. After reflecting on the matter briefly, Reed and his parents decided the only proper thing to do would be to advise the University of Minnesota officials. Reed and his parents told me that very few people knew that he had signed these agreements, but he felt that the proper way to handle this matter, the honest and forthright way to handle the matter, would be to advise the university officials of the existence of these agreements because his eligibility could be affected. He didn't want any personal embarrassment nor did he want the university embarrassed.

When the university was advised in early April of 1974, university representatives indicated to Reed that the financial aid which was to be forthcoming to Reed could not be forthcoming unless his problem of eligibility was cleared up. The university on April 12 sent a letter to both the Big Ten Conference and the NCAA. It was a relatively simple letter with a relatively simple question: Is Reed Larson under the facts and circumstances which exist ineligible for collegiate athletics?

The letter which was sent to both the Big Ten and the NCAA contained the pertinent facts which I have just recited to you.

On June 6 of 1974, Wayne Duke, the Big Ten Commissioner, wrote to the university approving Larson's eligibility and indicating that the reason his eligibility was approved was that the contracts were signed when Reed Larson was under the age of 18, he was a minor, and he had received no benefits for these contracts. This, of course, was our position and the position of the university.

By contrast, and I think this is revealing, on June 21, 1974, Warren Brown, assistant executive director of the NCAA, wrote to the university advising that in Brown's opinion the NCAA rules that I have previously cited to you applied to Reed Larson and that, under these NCAA rules, the University of Minnesota-not the NCAA-had an obligation to apply the rules to Reed and to declare him ineligible, but that the university had the right to appeal this question to some type of NCAA body but the appeal would only be entertained when and if Reed Larson became a full-time student.

In other words, the NCAA had determined that Reed Larson was ineligible but, if Reed Larson wanted to finance his own education, after he became a full-time student the university could appeal this determination to the NCAA. That alternative was out of the question because neither Reed nor his family had the funds to finance the education.

It was also suggested that the University of Minnesota could give to Reed Larson one of its six valuable hockey scholarships for that year and then hope that the NCAA would declare him eligible. However, the university was not about to offer one of its six hockey scholarships to someone that the NCAA had already suggested was ineligible. The university stated to Reed Larson that if the NCAA

and the Big Ten both approved his eligibility, the scholarship would be forthcoming; if not, the scholarship would not be forthcoming. Therefore, the NCAA had avoided making a definitive decision on the Reed Larson eligibility question because of this technicality. Reed Larson couldn't enroll at the university because he did not have the funds. The university would not give him financial aid because it made no sense. The NCAA would not hear the appeal until he was enrolled full-time.

The new University of Minnesota faculty representative came in in August of 1974. At my urging, he again submitted a written plea to the NCAA which in substance provided, please tell us, is Reed Larson eligible or ineligible in view of the fact that he signed the agreements when he was under age.

On September 11, 1974, Mr. Brown responded in writing again. He stated that the NCAA had held some meetings on August 23 of 1974, and that the NCAA council had sustained Mr. Brown's previous interpretation that an appeal of Reed Larson's eligibility question could not be heard until he became a full-time student. However, the NCAA council did consider the information submitted by the university and "concluded that Mr. Larson was ineligible for intercollegiate hockey at the NCAA member institution under the provisions of the NCAA Constitution."

Therefore, on the one hand, the NCAA council apparently concluded that it could not hear the appeal until he became a full-time student but, on the other hand, had sustained Mr. Brown's interpretation that he would be ineligible.

The letter goes on to state:

This information clearly indicated that the young man by his own voluntary actions had definitely professionalized himself under the NCAA professional rulings noted. Accordingly, the council concluded that the young man would be ineligible upon his enrollment at the University of Minnesota.

Interestingly enough, in the letter Mr. Brown then noted that the university would not be precluded from awarding to Mr. Larson financial aid, would not be precluded from permitting Mr. Larson to practice hockey at the university, but he could not participate in any games, and suggested that the university should award to Mr. Larson one of those valuable six hockey scholarships and then, after Mr. Larson became a full-time student, appeal the question of his eligibility.

In other words, as I interpret it, the NCAA concluded that it would not hear the appeal regarding Larson's eligibility until he became a full-time student, but it had considered the information submitted by the university and found Larson to be ineligible. But once he became a full-time student, the university could "refile" his appeal and the university could always award him one of those six hockey scholarships and he could practice with the team.

Since the university's offer of financial aid was conditioned upon eligibility clearance from the Big Ten and the NCAA, Reed could not receive any financial aid. Reed and his family did not have the funds with which to become a full-time student. Therefore, it appeared that this was a man without a remedy.

The only alternative was to commence a lawsuit in the U.S. district court in Minneapolis, which we did, in behalf of Reed Larson. seeking a declaratory judgment that he be eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics, seeking an injunction restraining the NCAA from declaring him ineligible, and restraining the NCAA from imposing any sanctions on him or the University of Minnesota.

Basically, the allegation, without becoming involved in the legal jargon, was that the 14th amendment to the Constitution applied here and that these regulations as applied by the NCAA were a denial of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. In other words, we claimed that Larson had been deprived of his constitutional rights.

The matter came on for hearing in Minneapolis in mid-September 1974, before the Honorable Miles Lord, judge of the U.S. district court in Minneapolis. The NCAA was represented by local counsel and their national counsel. There was a full hearing submitted to the court at that time. It was very clear to me and everyone else present in that courtroom that the Federal judge was going to grant our request for a preliminary injunction. Before he did so, counsel for the NCAA asked for a recess.

At the recess the local counsel and the Kansas City counsel approached me with a proposal. It was conceded that the court was going to issue a preliminary injunction which would permit Reed Larson a few days later to enroll for fall courses. The NCAA wanted to save face. They didn't want "bad precedent" on the books. They proposed that the university give him financial aid not for the year, which is the usual practice, but just for the fall quarter. They promised within a short period of time the NCAA council would hear the appeal on eligibility. In fact, it was the promise that within 10 days after receipt of the appeal that it would be ruled upon. The implication was made very clear to me that the NCAA council would rule favorably, that they would rule in favor of Reed Larson.

In the interim it was agreed that the court could enter a temporary restraining order for the relief requested by us and that, if for some reason-although it certainly was not contemplated-the NCAA committee did not rule favorably, then Reed Larson and I could march back into that U.S. district courthouse before that same U.S. district court judge and collect our preliminary injunction.

The alternative to my acceptance of that proposel, according to counsel for the NCAA, was an appeal by them of the judge's order for a preliminary injunction, which could establish a cloud of uncertainty over Reed Larson's eligibility.

In view of the proposal made to me, I deemed it fair because it was our goal solely to obtain restoration of Reed Larson's eligibility. We were not concerned about whether the NCAA saved face or not. We were not out for any kind of legal victory. We merely wanted Reed Larson eligible to play hockey and attend school at the university. The NCAA seemed to be offering us that. We entered into a written agreement to that effect, which is in the record, I believe, or in the possession of Mr. Raabe. We accepted the proposal.