Wilmington MSO loads 37% of all Class "A" explosives By ENS Gregory A. Howard A normal working day at MSO Wilmington, North Carolina, revolves around oil pollution responses, hazardous chemical releases, pollution case file preparation, commercial vessel and waterfront facility inspections and a variety of other Coast Guard activities. The entire office operation, however, was altered in early August 1990. A well orchestrated blend of military and reserve personnel tackled a myriad of extra duties related to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, while at the same time conducting the MSO's very busy "normal" daily routine. From August 1990 to May 1991, MSO Wilmington Coast Guard men and women worked alongside Army, Navy and Marine Corps active, reserve and civilian personnel, monitoring the loading of 500,000 short tons of military vehicles, aircraft, troop support equipment and explosives. About 37 percent of all Class "A" explosives supporting Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were loaded by longshoremen and military personnel onto ships departing from three North Carolina ports under MSO Wilmington. They are the North Carolina state port in Wilmington, Morehead City, and the Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point in Southport, the largest military ocean terminal in the country. As loadout operations increased in other East Coast locations, Coast Guard reservists were reassigned to Newport News Marine Terminal, Newport News, Virginia; South Carolina State Port, Charleston; and Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, New Jersey. Security roles The shoreside and waterside security roles for MSO Wilmington consisted of patrols and vessel escorts. Coast Guard personnel conducted patrols on small craft ranging from 19-foot rigid Continued on page 40 Munitions are loaded aboard the Military Sealift Command ship, Cape Nome, at Sunny Point. Continued from page 39 hull inflatable boats to 110-foot patrol boats. Their efforts focused on maintaining security zones established to suppress any subversive threat during operations at the three ports. Cutters Gentian, Primrose and Blackberry laid and serviced aids to navigation marking a security zone at Sunny Point, which was dubbed the "line of death." Other important security duties included protecting key military flag and general officers overseeing operations under their control, conducting rescue crash patrols for more than 100 helicopter sorties and boarding vessels on Cape Fear River for law enforcement purposes. Needing outside support to maintain the necessary security, MSO Wilmington's commanding officer requested resources from other Coast Guard units, including the group at Fort Macon, Georgia. Consequently, the cutters Point Martin, Point Warde, Point Highland, Point Brown and Matinicus were assigned to North Carolina. Labor force The majority of Coast Guard personnel came from the select reserve. From August 12 to 30, 1990, 30 reservists were activated. That number grew to 140 by March 14, 1991. Added to the 32 men and women on active duty, MSO Wilmington multiplied by nearly six its peacetime contingent. While these figures are not staggering, consider the fact that they represent only seven percent of the total Coast Guard members assigned to Desert Storm operations, but that 37 percent of all Class "A" explosives shipped to the Persian Gulf were loaded in Wilmington's COTP zone. Work hours The security operations combined with loadouts and day-to-day safety duties required that MSO Wilmington personnel work aroundthe-clock. Subsequent fatigue, plus the heat of summer and cold winds of winter, hindered security patrols, law enforcement boardings and vessel inspections. Despite these difficult conditions, 500,000 work hours were completed without a lost-time accident. Port security officers confer with longshoreman regarding proper loading procedures for explosives. Reserve training Work hours dedicated to law enforcement training skyrocketed during the Gulf war. Active duty personnel, a training team from the Fifth District and a law enforcement detachment from Fort Macon combined to instruct more than 100 select reservists. Training included night fire and boarding officer exercises, self defense, weapons skills, anti-terrorism tactics and boating while intoxicated enforcement. This crucial training allowed reservists to fill security positions rapidly. Increased duties During the period of operations, the number of day-to-day marine safety tasks increased substantially. The primary reason for this was a rise in vessel activity. Normally, over the same period of time, only two or three facilities and about 25 vessels would have been inspected. However, there were 17 facility and 113 vessel inspections. During the same time, MSO personnel also responded to 116 reports of oil spills. This was over and above the 500,000 work hours devoted to the Persian Gulf operations. ENS Gregory A. Howard is an administrative officer with MSO Wilmington, North Carolina. Telephone: (919) 343-4881. OPERATION CLEAN UP By CDR Douglas A. Lentsch and LCDR James M. Obernesser Introduction In late January 1991, the coalition forces of Operation Desert Storm were firmly entrenched in Saudi Arabia, making plans to push into Kuwait to free that country from the invading Iraqi troops. Probably to slow or stop an amphibious landing of coalition forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Iraqi troops caused a series of major oil discharges from facilities and vessels in both Kuwait and Iraq. Estimates of the entire amount of oil discharged range from six to eight million barrels or approximately 30 times the size of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The main oil slick was probably between one-half to three million barrels. The emulsification process and the deposition of sand blown onto the slick increased the bulk of the oil, causing a portion of the slick to sink. Damage assessment is ongoing. It will take years before the total effects of the discharges are fully determined. The bulk of the oil discharged from the multiple sources merged and formed a massive slick that slowly worked its way down the coast of Saudi Arabia, nearly coating the coast from Khafji to Abu Ali Island. Continued on page 42 Continued from page 41 Request for assistance On January 24, the government of Saudi Arabia requested technical assistance from the United States ambassador. This request was due to the expertise of the United States gained in handling the Exxon Valdez spill and was consistent with the recently signed IMO International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990. (See page 48.) The Department of State referred the Saudi request to the National Response Team, which is responsible for developing and carrying out the National and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan in the United States. Response The Environmental Protection Agency and the Coast Guard, leaders of the response team, quickly identified other member agencies critical to the response. These agencies immediately assembled an assessment team capable of managing the environmental response issues that might have to be addressed. The amount of planning, assembly and briefing necessary to prepare the representatives to proceed into a combat zone for environmental concerns was monumental, yet the United States Interagency Assessment Team was en route to the Gulf on Coast Guard aircraft within 30 hours. This rapid departure was brought about by overcoming many logistical and administrative hurdles associated with travel to the Gulf, further complicated by the fact that it took place on a weekend, when support services are scarce. These coordinated activities demonstrated a spirit of teamwork developed during the extensive Exxon Valdez operations, and generated by the realization that rapid response is critical to minimizing environmental damage. The Marine Environmental Protection Division of the Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection combed the Coast Guard for pollution experts who could work cohesively with representatives of the Saudi Arabian government to make a positive impact on cleaning up the spill. Assessment team The initial United States Interagency Assessment Team consisted of pollution experts from the Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, United States Army Corps of Engineers and Coast Guard. The Department of Energy, the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, and the Spill Control Association of America later joined the effort. While deployed, the team was supported by its parent agencies and the National Response Team. For example, Coast Guard Marine Environmental Protection personnel established a 24-hour watch to support the team and act as a focal point for hundreds of offers of assistance to the Saudi Arabian government. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration set up a team within Coast Guard headquarters to address environmental issues and convert Persian Gulf currents, weather and overflight data into daily spill trajectories. Since the overall spill could have had a disastrous effect on the activities of coalition forces, the situation quickly gained extremely high level interest in the United States government. The White House designated the Coast Guard to act as spokesperson for the government and the senior Coast Guard officer was assigned to lead the interagency team. Captain Don Jensen, officer in charge of the interagency team, confers with members of the international community on overall oil spill response strategy. It was determined that the assessment team's mission should not be to clean up the discharges, but to assess their magnitude and impact on Saudi Arabia and advise the Saudi government on appropriate response strategies and techniques, and to train local clean up workers. During this period, the oil slick continued to move southward. The governments of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates also requested the assessment team to visit their countries and help prepare response strategies. Unique problems At no point in history has there ever been a mobilization of oil spill response forces within a war zone. Responding to a massive oil discharge in a hostile environment posed many logistical and unique problems. The intense pressure involved hampered response activities. For example, personnel were subjected to constant threats of SCUD attacks, and the possibility of nerve or biological agents carried in the warheads. Open water skimming operations were extremely hazardous due to submerged and floating mines. There were many travel restrictions throughout Saudi Arabia. Access to waterfront facilities was difficult for security reasons. Communications were equally difficult since much data, normally readily available during an oil discharge, such as weather information, discharge trajectories and aircraft arrival times, was classified during Operation Desert Storm. Organization of response As the magnitude of the discharges became more apparent, many countries sent offers of assistance of equipment and/or personnel to Saudi Arabia. Foreign experts were integrated into both the United States assessment team and the Saudi Arabian response organization. Collectively, these advisors became known as the International Interagency Assessment Team. Due to his operational experience, organizational skills and early arrival, the Coast Guard team leader continued to serve as the principal advisor to the Saudi Arabian Meteorological and Environmental Protection Agency and its onscene coordinator. An IMO representative took over the leadership of the international team. United States team members set up a computer data base to catalog and evaluate offers of commercial cleanup contractors and private vendors from all over the world. (More than 500 offers were processed by the end of February.) Data on new technologies was evaluated for possible use by a scientific committee at King Faud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The committee, assisted by the United States and the international assessment teams, helped with shoreline assessments, determining clean-up priorities, establishing wildlife rescue and rehabilitation centers, ensuring the use of proper clean-up techniques and developing practical shoreline rehabilitation programs for after the dispersal of the spill. Continued on page 44 |