Summary The Coast Guard safety net expanded from the vessel to various staging areas and rail head operations to assure that all cargo was checked early. The deficiencies were corrected so as not to interfere with cargo loading operations. A loadout operation of this magnitude requires a significant coordinated emphasis on safety. This successful loadout clearly demonstrated that all safety considerations can be met without delaying crucial war materials. By late February 1991, all military cargo scheduled to move through Barbours Cut had departed. A total of 23,323 pieces of equipment (211,705 short tons) had been loaded onto 40 ships for transport to Saudi Arabia. The emphasis on safety and expediency placed on the operation by Army, Navy, Coast Guard and portrelated industries was entirely successful. There were numerous lessons learned from this operation. Future loadout plans will reflect a greater emphasis on cargo safety, and Coast Guard reservists will be prepared with the necessary expertise in loading explosives. In addition, Coast Guard reserve personnel assigned to the Houston area must receive weapons proficiency training every six months. In conclusion, the flexibility of the Houston Coast Guard detachment to quickly switch emphasis from security to safety concerns was possible because all personnel were cross trained in both areas. This flexibility allowed the Coast Guard to concentrate on the risk at hand, ensuring the safe movement of highly dangerous materials. CDR Rex J. Prosser is the chief of the Port Operations Department and LT Michael T. de Bettencourt is an assistant chief of Port Operations at MSO Houston, Texas. Telephone: (713) 671-5122. During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Port of Jacksonville, Florida, became one of the busiest outload ports in the United States. From August 8, 1990 to May 31, 1991, more than 31,000 pieces of essential equipment and one million pounds of class "A" military explosives were loaded onto 67 Navy Military Sealift Command chartered vessels at Jacksonville. The Coast Guard logged 86,271 manhours and 6,814 underway boating hours in the bustling port, as a direct result of the operations. Numbers, however, don't begin to tell the story of the Coast Guard's role in the historical deployment. Nor do they convey the challenges encountered by MSO personnel, both regular and reserve Coast Guard, who were faced with the dual responsibility of expediting supplies to overseas forces, while maintaining safety on ships that had been sitting in the reserve fleet for as long as 45 years. Dockside view of loading operations. Normal MPS operations Since 1986, Coast Guard reserves have assisted the Jacksonville MSO in supervising maritime prepositioned ship (MPS) operations. These operations are part of DoD's rapid deployment tactics of placing munitions-laden vessels leased by the Military Sealift Command in strategic locations around the world. Between 1986 and August 1990, the Coast Guard conducted some 40 standard MPS operations at Jacksonville's Blount Island Terminal. Normally, up to 30 reservists are given five days of orientation and training for such operations. Most of these men and women are in port security ratings, but there are some boat crew personnel, yeomen (administrative) and other specialties involved. The reserves, working with regular Coast Guard MSO personnel, perform the following duties during standard MPS operations: The experience gained from previous MPS operations, along with the quick response capabilities of reservists contributed to extraordinary efficiency. For example, the M/V Baugh, a Maersk Class container/RO/RO ship, was needed immediately to transport enough equipment to sustain a marine amphibious brigade in the Kuwaiti Theater for 30 days. The COTP was able to issue the explosive loading permits right away, and the vessel sailed ahead of schedule. Division XIV of the Coast Guard Auxiliary also contributed to the Jacksonville efforts. Members provided about 300 manhours and 90 boat hours, helping with security and safety zone patrols maintained during explosives loading. Skill and discretion Under normal conditions, the MSO enforces strict regulations regarding the shipping of hazardous cargo. However, under conditions of national emergency, DoD) is granted exceptions to many routinely enforced regulations. Reserve fleet challenges From the very beginning of the operation, COTP CAPT Robert J. O'Pezio assured that all vessels leaving the Port of Jacksonville bound for the Kuwaiti Theater would successfully complete their voyage without breaking down. He also said that commercial shipping would not be delayed because of military operations. These commitments meant long, hard hours for the members of the Marine Inspection Department. To provide necessary logistical support, ships from the government's reserve fleet under MARAD were recalled for active service from their three locations: Concord, California; Norfolk, Virginia and Beaumont, Texas. The reserve fleet consists of older, mostly steam-powered ships, which survived earlier conflicts, including World War II and Vietnam. These ships are inspected annually by MARAD representatives, but they seldom get underway. Consequently, many of them arrived in Jacksonville with long lists of repairs which had to be made before they could be deployed. The Coast Guard inspectors were not only responsible for routine inspections, but also for ensuring that all repairs were done correctly. Most of the problems with these older ships were simply factors of aging. The steampowered vessels were prone to boiler failures, and many of the boilers had to be retubed. Also the use of asbestos was common when the ships were built, and some vessels had to be rehabilitated to insure the safety of the crews. When repairs required welding, the welds had to be tested, and the integrity of cargo holds and hatches had to be checked. (One ship had been damaged by torpedoes in World War II.) Life-saving and firefighting equipment had to be replaced, and marine sanitation devices and condensers required by current regulations installed. Many older mariners were brought out of retirement to operate ships in the reserve fleet. Coast Guard inspectors had to inform them about all the new regulations and requirements. (One crew member was a 70-year-old chief engineer working as a third assistant engineer to ensure that a sufficient number of steamqualified mariners was on board.) Realizing that the older ships were likely to experience mechanical difficulties, CAPT O'Pezio requested the assistance of the St. Johns bar pilots. The pilots conducted thorough navigational equipment tests on the vessels before they were brought into the port. The cooperation of these pilots helped prevent serious steering mishaps in the port. Summary It was ironical that the most highlytrained soldiers ever placed on a battle field, armed with the newest high-tech weapons, would be supplied by materials delivered in aging ships with older crews. Only two of the 67 vessels deployed from Jacksonville experienced difficulties en route, and one ship broke down just 200 yards from the dock after being onloaded. There were no injuries or losses of equipment involved. (The inspectors who ensured the reliability of these ships also completed 600 commercial vessel inspections during the same time period.) MSO Jacksonville is justifiably proud of its record of high performance and productivity. Photos accompanying this article are by PAI Helen B. Carney and PA2 Alastair Worden. PAI Helen B. Carney, USCGR, is a photo journalist assigned to the Coast Guard Reserve Unit, MSO Jacksonville, Florida. Telephone: (904) 791-2648. |