Proceedings is published bimonthly by the Coast Guard's Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection, in the interest of safety at sea under the auspices of the Marine Safety Council. Special permission for republication, either in whole or in part, with the exception of copyrighted articles or artwork, is not required provided credit is given to this magazine. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent official Coast Guard policy. All inquires and requests for subscriptions should be addressed to Editor, Proceedings Magazine, U.S. Coast Guard (G-MP-4), 2100 Second Street, SW, Washington, DC 20593-0001; (202) 267-1408. Please include mailing label when sending a change of address. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this agency.

Admiral J. William Kime, USCG Commandant

The Marine Safety Council of the United States Coast Guard

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Port Safety/Security Staff Maritime Administration plays vital role in sealift Dr. Robert E. Martinez

Loadout operations -vessels and tonnage by port

Activation activities are intense at MSO Hampton Roads

LTJG David Haynes

CW02 Brian Fisher

Sealift ships inspected for safety

LCDR Charles A. Barrett

Mr. John J. Hannon

Explosive loading in New York

CDR William Helgeson

Two disasters that did not happen during Desert Storm

Flexibility...

the key to success in Houston

CDR Rex J. Prosser

LT Michael T. de Bettencourt Jacksonville...

a busy port in the "storm"

PA1 Helen B. Carney, USCGR Teamwork spells success at MSO San Francisco Bay

LTJG Keith T. Whiteman

Midshipmen deployed to Middle East Mr. Martin Skrocki

Wilmington MSO loads 37% of all Class "a" explosives

ENS Gregory A. Howard World's largest oil spill... Operation Clean up

CDR Douglas A. Lentsch

LCDR James M. Obernesser

New international convention

battles environmental catastrophe

LT Mark McEwen

Departments

Nautical queries

Chemical of the month:

Benzene

New publications

Background

One of the most rapid military buildups in the history of our country, Operation Desert Shield, beginning in August 1990, contributed significantly to the overall victory of the United States, Kuwait and its allies over Iraq. Our impressive display of military might in the Persian Gulf came about through the extraordinary efforts of military, government and civilian authorities.

Logistical obstacles in the rush to deliver troops, weapons, equipment and supplies to our armed forces in Saudi Arabia were formidable. Massive amounts of munitions and equipment were needed overseas immediately. Since most of this cargo was to be transported by ship, many United States ports were rapidly inundated with materials.

The Coast Guard played a critical role in assuring the safe movement of vessels in our ports, and in supervising the loading of crucial cargoes. This massive movement of troops and cargoes, known as Operation Loadout, presented many problems for the Coast Guard.

Challenges included the first large-scale activation of the ready reserve fleet, the adaption of port facilities to meet the needs of the Department of Defense (DoD), and the provision of adequate safety and security in port areas.

The success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm depended upon the rapid sealift of essential materials. As a matter of fact, 95 percent of all dry cargo and 99 percent of all petroleum products delivered for the operation came by sea.

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Marine safety offices

Coast Guard personnel attached to marine safety offices (MSOs) throughout our coastal ports were involved in loadout activities. Such activities included pre-stow vessel inspections and plan review, hazardous materials and cargoloading inspections, enforcement of safety and security zones, vessel escorts and assistance to numerous DoD commands.

At the height of the operations, approximately 650 Coast Guard men and women were assigned to support loadout activities at MSOS throughout the country. They monitored the loading of nearly 1.7 million short tons of dry cargo transported by ship to the Persian Gulf.

Overall, a total of about 2.9 million short tons of dry cargo and seven million short tons of fuel were shipped by allied forces in support of Desert Shield. Although United States ships carried more than 80 percent of this cargo, 38 different countries and more than 400 ships participated in the effort.

A total of 334 ships outloaded from our ports with no significant accidents. This was accomplished by MSOS, which continued to meet their regular marine safety and environmental protection responsibilities at the same time.

Port security

Port security, a critical link in the national defense chain of events, is a vital concern of any mobilization and deployment mission. Heightened global tensions can generate an increase in subversive and illegal activities.

With the advent of Desert Shield, United States ports were more vulnerable to internal threats of sabotage and theft, particularly with the staging of billions of dollars worth of equipment and ammunition. There were threats of

Coast guardsman checks security in port staging area.

sabotage and civil disorder, however, there were no organized attempts to compromise or destroy our rapid sealift capabilities.

The Coast Guard responded to significant amounts of intelligence provided, especially regarding the ports of Norfolk, Virginia; Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and San Francisco and Concord, California. There were some reports of civil disobedience, and threats of acts of terrorism, which, luckily, did not occur.

The Coast Guard coordinated their assessments of threats and surveillance of facilities involved in loadout activities with local law enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation and DoD counter-intelligence authorities.

Coast Guard district offices and MSOS responded to increased security threats in many ways. One was to ensure that Military Sealift Command-chartered foreign flag vessels adhered strictly to all vessel entry and crew make-up restrictions placed upon vessels and crews of countries not friendly to the United States.

The Coast Guard worked with federal, state and local authorities to ensure that United States ports did not become bottlenecks because of civil disobedience or terrorism. The Captains of the Ports (COTPs) helped protect vessels and waterfront facilities, although the owners, operators, masters and agents were primarily responsible for their own security.

COTP personnel conducted foot and vehicular patrols, manned guard posts and provided waterside security for vessels involved in Desert Shield. In some ports, they provided physical shoreside security for DoD personnel and equipment, until members of the Army Terminal Transportation Unit or the military police arrived to take over. In other ports, they assisted Navy security forces in protecting Navy assets.

Working under a vast array of laws and regulations, the COTPs maintained broad authority to provide waterside security and to monitor the activities of those responsible for shoreside security.

Port safety

COTP personnel were soon diverted from security issues to increased safety concerns. As DoD units conducted more and more physical security activities, the Coast Guard was able to concentrate more efforts toward port safety.

The primary port safety function was to monitor military and commercial cargoes for compliance with safety rules and regulations to ensure their safe transit overseas. Shipments of munitions and hazardous materials, in particular, were inspected to ensure safe and proper stowage, segregation, hazard communication and adherence to specific vessel requirements. DoD's desire to deliver combat-ready vehicles and equipment often posed problems for planners and loading personnel, port officials and Coast Guard safety inspectors. Vehicles and combat equipment were delivered to port loading areas fully loaded with fuel and munitions, which violates explosive loading and hazardous material regulations.

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