When Operation Desert Shield began, the Military Sealift Command asked MARAD to activate portions of the ready reserve force. By the end of February 1991, MSO Hampton Roads in Norfolk, Virginia, had participated in the activation of 21 -- more than 27 percent -- of a total of 78 vessels restored to active duty for the Gulf war. The inspection process was intense and often unconventional.

Ready reserve force

A key element of any strategic sealift, the ready reserve force is designed to transport Army and Marine Corps unit equipment and initial resupply for armed forces deploying anywhere in the world during the critical period before adequate numbers of Navy-controlled or requisitioned ships can be marshaled. This force consists of merchant-type ships, either selected from MARAD's National Defense Reserve Fleet and upgraded, transferred from the Navy, or chartered directly from United States or foreign owners. They must have a high degree of military usefulness and a significant remaining life. On Virginia's James River, a designated lay berth port for nearly 120 military usable vessels, there are normally more than 30 vessels in ready reserve force status.

Preparations

On August 10, 1990, just eight days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, MSO Hampton Roads prepared to conduct safety and compliance inspections of the ready reserve force vessels slated for five-, ten- or 20-day activations for Operation Desert Shield. Before the vessels arrived at local shipyards, representatives from MARAD, the vessel managing companies, shipyards, the American Bureau of Shipping and the MSO discussed the urgent task ahead.

The MSO was to conduct the required vessel inspections as thoroughly and quickly as possible. Major inspection work force reallocations had to be made to achieve this.

Marine inspectors assigned to other duties were shifted to inspection work. Those with considerable experience supervised teams at each of the local activation shipyards. Inspectors on leave were recalled and others were brought in from other Coast Guard units. To ensure that routine work did not suffer, minimum crews of marine inspectors were maintained at local shipyards.

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The first five vessels broken out of the James River fleet were in either a five- or tenday activation status. Initially, the vessels came to life slowly as shipyard workers hooked up the necessary equipment.

Before long, with miles of cable, wire and hose running from every available hatch, porthole and, in some cases, newly cut holes, the vessels were quickly revitalized. As electricity began to flow to idle equipment, as vital fluids were pumped through miles of piping, and as numerous deteriorated components were identified, the scramble for spare and replacement parts began.

Normally, Coast Guard inspectors determine compliance with safety requirements, but do not direct the shipyard workers' activities. In this urgent situation, however, the vessel managing company representatives and MSO inspectors worked as teams in directing shipyard personnel to complete required tests and correct safety deficiencies.

As the activations continued, marine inspectors acted to ensure that pressure to deliver vessels quickly did not erode thorough evaluations of safety-related systems. Some managing companies suggested that national defense waivers be requested to allow the ready reserve force vessels to sail without meeting certain Coast Guard requirements. These waiver requests never materialized at Hampton Roads.

Deficiencies

Initially, many vessels were not in compliance with the requirements of international conventions and federal regulations that had come into effect after their acceptance in the ready reserve force and subsequent deactivation. For example, one vessel's navigation lights did not meet 1977 collision-prevention regulations which had applied to the vessel since 1987.

Many vessels had deficiencies relating to marine pollution prevention requirements in effect since 1983. Normally, managers would have to submit vessel plans to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center in Washington, D.C., for approval to comply with any new regulations. To expedite activations, plans submitted for ready reserve force ships were evaluated at the MSO, permitting the required equipment to be installed, tested and verified almost immediately.

Unfamiliarity

The lack of familiarity with older vessel systems by crews and managing company personnel posed significant obstacles to rapid and safe activations. Crew members, shipyard workers and inspectors researched plans and vendor manuals to understand and test unfamiliar systems.

An example was the fixed high expansion foam firefighting system on the RO/RO Adm. W. H. Callaghan. This unique system employs a series of individually activated foam generators

located throughout the cargo holds. Each generator is fed from a proportioner located on an upper deck. When in use, thousands of cubic feet of foam are rapidly generated, filling the affected hold. Before successfully testing this long dormant system, numerous components were reworked or remanufactured by the shipyard.

The lack of current plans on some ships complicated the testing of cargo hold fire detection equipment and carbon dioxide extinguishing systems, remote emergency equipment shutdowns and machinery automation controls.

Cannibalization

A major problem was cannibalization. One vessel arrived at a shipyard for activation minus its anchors, windlass motor and 50 major valves. Another was missing more than half of its cargo hold ventilation fan motors.

Reflagged vessel problems

Other problems faced by marine inspectors concerned foreign-built vessels that had been reflagged before being accepted in the ready reserve force. Onboard equipment on most reflagged vessels does not meet all technical requirements of United States regulations, since the vessels were built to foreign standards.

When these vessels were reflagged, each system was evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the Coast Guard to determine whether or not they provided equivalent levels of safety. Due to changes in managing companies and a resulting lack of adequate documentation, marine inspectors had difficulty determining whether some systems had been adequately addressed at the reflag inspections.

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The sudden demand for spare equipment emptied warehouses across the nation of essential items, from pipe expansion joints and valves to Coast Guard-approved flares and emergency drinking water for liferafts and lifeboats.

Vessel manning

During the initial wave of vessel activations, operating companies found sufficient qualified mariners to crew the ships. As more ships were activated, however, the pool of qualified merchant mariners shrank.

The master of an early activated vessel had nine crew members quit before the vessel completed its shipyard period. The commanding officer evaluated manning adequacy on a caseby-case basis and, in at least eight instances, ready reserve force vessels were permitted to sail shorthanded. However, other vessels had critical crew members sign on just hours before getting underway.

Crews on board for only a few days were visibly fatigued from extreme overtime hours preparing for sea trials. In several instances, the MSO commanding officer, acting as the officer in charge, marine inspection, supported masters in adjusting their sailing times to provide rest for their crews.

Equipment testing

Shipyard workers conducted start-ups and machinery testing during most of the activations. Marine inspectors later required that certain equipment tests and safety checks be performed by crew members, even if this meant retesting equipment.

Personnel problems

Soon after vessel deployments, the managing companies and ship masters began reporting personnel problems and associated marine casualties. The officer in charge, marine inspection decided that extraordinary personnel problems might significantly reduce the mission capabilities of the vessels. He therefore established a proactive vessel visitation program to identify and overcome personnel-related problems.

When a ready reserve force vessel arrived at or left Hampton Roads, an MSO investigating officer contacted the master to review the vessel's official log book. Where necessary, the investigating officer immediately initiated personnel investigations leading to possible action against the involved mariner's document or license.

MSO Hampton Roads investigated seven personnel and nine casualty cases that took place aboard ready reserve force vessels. Charges in the personnel cases included desertion, failing to turn to, AWOL, absent over leave, assault, misconduct, intoxication, reports of incompetence and the use of dangerous drugs. The casualty cases dealt primarily with main propulsion plants and associated equipment.