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Helicopters were among the heavy equipment sealifted to Damman to support allied troops in Operation Desert Storm.

Fast sealift ships -- the former SL-7s -- are maintained by the Military Sealift Command on a four-day readiness status. Seven of these ships delivered more than nine percent of all the dry cargo.

In addition, mostly short-term United States-flag commercial charters delivered 14.3 percent and foreign-flag charters lifted 19.4 percent of all dry cargo.

The ready reserve force, maintained by MARAD on a five-, ten- and 20-day readiness status, lifted slightly more than 20 percent of all dry cargo, including a third of the unit equipment.

Sealift agreement

Under another option, the Military Sealift Command entered into an agreement with seven United States- flag ocean carriers called "the Special Middle East Sealift Agreement." Under this agreement, arrangements were made by the carriers to move up to 2,700 boxes per week, as a modification to their commercial service.

By mid-March, nearly 29 percent of all the dry cargo delivered to the Persian Gulf region had gone under the Special Middle East Sealift Agreement. In contrast to earlier "surge" period cargo, deliveries of "sustainment-type" cargo is precisely how commercial carriers can become sealift protagonists. This was the role the agreement was meant to address, and the carriers responded superbly.

Had the actual conflict been of a long duration, this sustainment lift would have grown proportionately.

Foreign charters.

There is a good deal of discussion about

the role of foreign charters. In this instance, the United States was fortunate to have ready access to foreign lift capability. By the time the ground campaign began on February 23, more than 160 foreign-flag vessels had been chartered. But, in contrast to most of the United States-flag charters, many of the foreign charters were for

few voyages, many of them single voyages. In addition, the average size of foreign vessels was somewhat smaller than the United States ships. Hence, less than 20 percent of the dry cargo went by foreign-flag, although there were many foreign ships participating. Nonetheless, the availability of foreign-flag vessels to meet United States lift requirements in future crises is an issue. It will be discussed at DoD and the Department of Transportation.

As far as planning for future contingencies is concerned, the issue is closely related to the continued decline in the active, oceangoing United States-flag commercial fleet. Had foreign charters not been as widely available, other options, such as the Sealift Readiness Program or outright requisitioning of United States vessels could have been taken.

Either choice would have severely disrupted United States-flag commercial trades, because operators would have had to pull ships out of their normal trades and face major longterm business losses. Fortunately, enough tonnage was available on the commercial market to make these options unnecessary. Notably, in this regard, our nation was not fully mobilized. Success factors

Despite its massive logistics nature, Desert Shield/Desert Storm did not represent a worst case scenario. We must learn from our experiences, but avoid planning for all future contingencies based only on this most recent operation. Many favorable factors contributed to the success of the sealift:

The coalition forces controlled the air and shipping lanes.

The United States had near-unanimous support overseas for what was a relatively popular effort, which meant that foreignflag ships and crews were readily available.

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We had six months to build up the inventory of equipment and supplies needed to launch offensive operations.

Access to modern port facilities in the Persian gulf expedited the offloading of cargo, and we had no battle damage to either ports or attrition of shipping at sea.

We had shipyards with large drydocks available in theater.

Ample supples of ship fuel were available in the Gulf.

More parochially, for MARAD, the phased activation of ready reserve force vessels mitigated difficulties in repairing vessels and obtaining crews.

Reserve force activation

MARAD began activating ships from the ready reserve force on August 10, 1990, eight days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Although individual or pairs of ships had been activated for special missions and test exercises in the past, this was the first multiple activation of the reserve force in "real time" since it was established in 1976.

There were problems in activating the ready reserve force. It is clear that shipyard limitations and crew shortages would have caused more substantial problems, if all 96 ready reserve vessels were required to be activated all

at once.

Once tendered, the ready reserve force ships achieved a very high 93 percent reliability level and, more importantly, all the components of the sealift accomplished their mission.

It would be simple to declare that the sealift was a success and return to business-asusual. But we must learn from this experience, identify shortcomings and develop corrective measures to improve our performance.

As far as the ready reserve force is concerned, MARAD, with broad DoD support, is focusing on modifications to improve readiness in the areas of ship material conditions, contractual issues and manning.

Deferred maintenance

MARAD faced activation delays from the beginning of the operation, because some ships suffered from deferred maintenance due to funding shortfalls.

In FY 1990, MARAD requested $239 million, but Congress appropriated only $89 million. Hence, no funds were available for test activations and some maintenance had to be deferred.

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Crewing

MARAD received outstanding cooperation from the seafaring unions in crewing its ships. Most ready reserve ships were crewed relatively quickly, in four or five days. Some vessels, however, experienced a slow response rate for some shipboard jobs. When senior engineering jobs remained unfilled for a time, other key activation actions were delayed.

Stepping aboard a vessel which has been in "cold storage," means starting from step one. Crew members have no one to ask how the ship had been running or where the problems are. They have to learn the problems first hand and hands-on, and correct them as they go along.

Keeping the ready reserve force in "cold storage" creates zero seafaring jobs on a day-today basis. Only when a ship is activated are any seagoing jobs created. Accounting for the

concerned about the negative effects on emergency vessel manning resulting from the long downward spiral of shipboard employment opportunities.

Soon there may be an insufficient number of trained officers and seamen working in the oceangoing United States-flag fleet to crew the ready reserve force in an emergency. Expanding the base of jobs in the active fleet is unquestionably the preferred solution. But even a reinvigorated merchant fleet is unlikely to result in more shipboard jobs, given the larger ships and smaller crews that have become the norm.

Many former mariners who wanted to assist in crewing ready reserve ships were deterred from leaving their shoreside jobs, because of their lack of reemployment rights

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accorded to military reservists. To correct this problem, the (Bush) administration included a provision in its proposed "Uniformed Services Employment Services Act" to provide reemployment rights for merchant mariners who respond to a request by the secretary of Transportation to crew ships in a national emergency. Enactment would greatly enhance our ability to obtain additional civilian manpower for the Merchant Marine to meet national requirements.

In addition, MARAD is working with DoD to evaluate future requirements for emergency personnel, and will pursue developing a manpower reserve program tailored to the ready reserve force.

Readiness improvements

Full Congressional funding of MARAD's current budget request will permit a longplanned fleet expansion and several readiness improvements previously curtailed by budgetary limitations.

Every ship in the ready reserve fleet on five-day readiness should be test activated with a full-power sea trial every other year. One simply cannot guarantee the readiness of a ship laid up in "cold storage," unless it is taken out to sea periodically.

MARAD is also looking at some partial peacetime crewing of high-priority ready reserve force vessels. A few vessels would be maintained in a manner similar to the Military Sealift Command's fast sealift ships. Also, there would be more outporting of vessels near loadout ports or activation facilities.

Contracting is an essential part of ready reserve force maintenance. MARAD relies on private sector contractors to manage the day-today maintenance of the fleet.

In the future, each ship will have a manager, backed up by a general agent. Ship manager contracts are awarded based on technical expertise, managerial and organizational resources, and cost.

A better balance of technical expertise and cost must be struck to exclude firms without the necessary resources to manage in a crisis. Therefore, our contractor selection criteria will be revised to raise the technical and resource qualifications.

Because ships under contract to managers will be assigned mostly in pairs, small firms fully capable of managing two to four vessels will not be precluded from winning awards. Sister ships will be "nested" side-by-side for easier management.

Mobility Requirements Study

Much attention is being focused on the Mobility Requirements Study being undertaken by the joint staff for the secretary of Defense. This study will define mobility requirements, including sealift, for the remainder of the decade. The interim response to the Mobility Requirements Study on April 22 identified a general need for more large, medium speed RO/RO (roll-on/roll-off) vessels, which were the "ships of choice" in the Gulf conflict. It is clear that DoD will assign high priority to expanding the number of RO/RO ships in the ready reserve force. There are now 17, all of which began activation at the onset of the first phase of the sealift.

There are other pressing tonnage requirements. For example, there will be a precipitous decline in the inventory of United States-flag tanker vessels by the end of the century. A lot of petroleum product was lifted in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, but it was not carried directly into the theater one of the unique characteristics of this operation. However, not every future contingency will occur in oil-producing regions, and we will need to provide lift.

On a related matter, MARAD hopes to assist the Coast Guard in assessing the potential impact of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 on future vessel supply for tankers and other vessel types. We do not yet fully understand the potential impact of the liability provisions within this act, which will be far-reaching.

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