for a bushel of grain was compelled to sacrifice 51 cents on every dollar paid him. With the close of the war there was a slight increase in the value of the greenback, but from 1865 to 1869 it constantly fluctuated from 63.6 to 75.2, rose to 87 in 1870, the year in which the Franco-Prussian war broke out; fell from 89 to 87.9 in 1873, rose to 89.9 the next year, and dropped again to 87 in 1875. The proposition to resume specie payment-that is, the use of silver and gold-began to be agitated about this time, and with this in prospect the greenback, assured of redemption in coin, began a steady upward tendency, rising to 89.8 in 1876, 95.4 in 1877, 99.2 in 1878, going to par after the resumption of specie payment. ac Acting under the so-called Gresham law, by which the better money is driven out of circulation by the cheaper, gold, on count of its greater value, went to a premium and was exported in such large quantities that Congress decided to adopt a policy which is one of the articles of faith of the Populists and other fiat money advocates. It attempted to legislate on the subject, and passed a law to prohibit the export of gold. And right here is shown a true object lesson in the utter powerlessness of legislation to regulate the value of money that has no intrinsic value. A gold dollar was worth nearly two greenbacks in June, 1864. In fluctuated from 194 cents to 1984 early in June, 1864. On June 17, 1864, a law went into effect entitled "An act to prohibit certain sales of gold and foreign exchange" (Statutes at Large, vol. 13, p. 132). This was an attempt to keep gold in the country and to stay the downward tendency of the greenbacks. On that day gold was quoted at 196%. The day following the enactment of this law it fell to 1954. The day after was Sunday, but bright and early Monday morning, June 20, the slaughter of the greenback continued, undismayed by statutory acts or Congressional makeshifts. Gold rose to 1984, and thence on rapidly, from day to day, jumped to 208, 230, 240, and 250. When it reached this point it was July 2, less than two weeks from the enactment of the law, and Congress passed another act, entitled “An act to repeal the act of the 17th of June, 1864, prohibiting the sale of gold and foreign exchange" (Statutes at Large, vol. 13, p. 344). Legislation had not been able to check the outflow of gold by the act of June 17; and the act of July 2, 1864, again demonstrated the impotency of Congressional enactments, for the greenback still kept falling, while gold rose, until one gold dollar was equal in value to nearly three paper dollars, touching the high-water mark on July 11, when it was quoted at 285. For convenient reference, the following table is attached, showing the fluctuation of the greenback from June 1 to July 31, 1864, covering the dates of both acts of Congress to which reference has been made-i. e., that of June 17 and that of July 2-and before and after those dates: Table showing quotations of gold exchange from June 5, to July 31, 1864 13. 19534 14. 15. 19734 17. 1965-196% 22. 210-230 23. 205-223 24. 213-217 25. 214-220 26. Sunday 27. 221-240 28. 234-240 29. 235-250 13. 26834-273 14. 258-268 15. 244-256 16. 2482-2611⁄4 25. 255-25834 30. 253-258 31. Sunday There can hardly be any sincere patriotism at the bottom of a proposition to conduct a great international war on a fiát money basis, which will swindle our own people; and there can be no denial of the charge that the Democratic leaders were aware of the worthlessness of the greenbacks in a crisis like the war with Spain, for it was admitted by them in Congress. Representative Sayres, of Texas, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations in the Fifty-third Congress, admitted it. In the debate on the war revenue bill in the House, April 27, 1898 (Record 102, p. 4746), Mr. Sayres contended that $400,000,000 of bonds, which it was proposed to authorize, was more than was needed. He argued that $300,000,000 was sufficient money to keep 200,000 men in the field for an entire year; but in this calculation he was leaving out of account the fact that the Navy had also to be provided for. The following colloquy ensued: Mr. HOPKINS. This is only an authorization. There is no necessity to borrow the money unless the Government needs it. Mr. DINGLEY. Now, Mr. Chairman, on that point I desire to call attention anew to the fact that in one year of the civil war the expenditure was eleven hundred million dollars on the part of the Federal Government. Mr. SAYRES. The year to which the gentleman refers, I believe, was 1865. Mr. DINGLEY. Eighteen hundred and sixty-five. Mr. SAYRES. Those expenses were counted in greenbacks, which then commanded 50 or 60 cents on the gold dollar. Mr. DINGLEY. So you do not think it would be wise to issue greenbacks now and go back to that condition? To this Mr. Sayres made no reply other than to say, "The gentleman must not evade the question." Coming from so eminent a member of the Democratic party in Congress, the proof is complete that a due regard for economy as well as our financial safety dictated the action of the Republican Congress in turning its face against an issue of greenbacks and adopting the wiser plan of issuing bonds. Scanning this table, can anyone doubt that the Republican members of Congress adopted a wise course in refusing to go back to the experience of 1864, and from 1864 to 1868, inclusive, by launching another burden of one hundred and fifty million 50cent paper dollars on the people, and in the light of these exhibits, will anyone question the wisdom of offering an issue of bonds, drawing 3 per cent interest, in such manner that "the common people" may find a safe investment for their surplus earnings? The 3 per cent interest is paid by indirect taxation and is not seriously felt, whereas a depreciated dollar affects every individual, mechanic, merchant or millionaire; for 3 per cent on $150,000,000 of bonds, distributed among a population of 75,000,000 people, is about 6 cents per capita, whereas a 50-cent dollar, which the Government is unable to maintain at par, represents an individual loss of 50 cents. The question is what is real patriotism—giving the people worthless paper money, or giving them a hundred-cent dollar and ask them to stand by the Government like loyal citizens in time of war? BONDS IN TIME OF WAR. "I believe that if a Democratic administration was forced to sell $300,000,000 in bonds to run the Government in times of peace, that a Republican administration might be allowed to sell bonds enough to run the Government in time of war."-From the speech of Representative Amos Cummings (Dem.), of New York, May 2, 1898. POPULAR LOANS AND THE GOVERNMENT. [From the Financial Chronicle.] The subscriptions to the "popular loan," which closed Thursday at 3 o'clock, are announced to have reached $1,325,000,000. As an indication of the credit of the Government this response from such a mass of capital for a 3 per cent loan at par, having probably only ten years to run, is highly gratifying. It affords, too, timely and impressive testimony of the abundance of wealth in our midst waiting for investment, telling the public that the only condition needed to make this wealth serviceable for industrial expansion is confidence. TAMMANY FOR GOLD BONDS. [From the Chicago Tribune.] The city government of New York, which is controlled absolutely by Tammany, has just authorized the issue of bonds to the amount of $27,000,000. They are made payable in "gold coin of the present standard of weight and fineness." The Tammanyites were told that "gold" bonds would sell for more than "coin" bonds, and, as they are anxious to show that the credit of the city has not been impaired by their being in charge of its affairs, they decided to issue "gold" bonds. That was perfectly proper, but now, after having done that, can Tammany delegates in a State or national convention indorse that Chicago platform which demands, among other things, "such legislation as will prevent for the future the demonetization of any kind of legal-tender money by private contract?" The sale of "gold" bonds by a city is as much a demonetization of legal-tender silver as an agreement on the part of an individual to repay in gold the gold value money he has borrowed. Tammany can not repudiate a platform in practice and then adopt resolutions favoring it. The sale of “gold” bonds because they will bring more than “coin" bonds, which might possibly be redeemed in cheap silver, is equivsient to an admission that the General Government ought to sell "gold" bonds when it sells any, and that the equivocal word "coin," The use of which hurts the public credit, should be stricken out of the statutes. The businesslike course adopted by Tammany in regod to city bonds is neither more nor less than an abandonment of Bryanism. That organization can not consistently support any of his policies henceforth. That organization can not consistently allow Congressmen to be elected in the districts it controls who will vote for the free coinage of silver into cheap dollars, to be used retroactively in the payment of existing obligations based on the gold standard. The city of New York has millions of "coin" bonds outstanding, whose value Tammany does not wish to depreciate, and whose holders it does not wish to cheat. Tammany has shown that by giving the preference to "gold" over "coin" bonds. BRYAN. The New York Journal's Relations to the Late Demo-Popocratic Candidate for President. As is well-known, the New York Journal was the only influential paper in the East which espoused the cause of William J. Bryan in the last Presidential campaign and indorsed the free silver platform upon which he made his appeal for votes. "Immediately after the election friends of Mr. Bryan, searching for his name upon the editorial page of the Journal, looked for it in vain. Apparently Mr. Hearst's Eastern paper had forgotten that there was in existence such a personage as the gifted Nebraska orator, whose incendiary eloquence in the old Coliseum building made him a Presidential nominee in 1896. "A few days ago, however, there appeared upon the editorial page of the Journal a signed communication written by Arthur McEwen, the chief editorial writer of that paper, attacking Mr. Bryan most savagely. Afterward the Journal hastened to explain editorially that it had not officially repudiated Bryan, but would support him again in 1900 'if he is nominated.' "The Journal now follows up its first attack by another three column communication by Mr. McEwen, which contains dozens of such charming paragraphs as this: 66 'Everything now points to the renomination of Mr. Bryan in 1900. It is the knowledge of that which causes Democrats of my kind to deplore that as he comes to be better known, to be subject |