CRS-9 artillery shells. 16 In all, some $1 billion was invested in the program before it was canceled under congressional pressure in 1987. U.S. observers did take notice of the successful use of unmanned craft by the Israelis against Syrian targets in the early 1980s. During operations in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon in 1982, Israelis were able to use their Mastiff and Scout UAVs (small propeller-driven UAVs with wingspans of some 4 meters) to pinpoint Syrian air defenses and missile batteries that were then neutralized with relative ease and without the loss of Israeli pilots." This contrasted with the well-publicized shootdown in 1983 of American naval aviators flying targeting missions over Lebanon for the USS New Jersey. As a result, then-Navy Secretary John Lehman moved decisively to acquire a UAV capability for the U.S. Navy. Lehman directed the purchase of several Israeli-manufactured Mastiff III UAVs in 1984 to serve as gunfire support for 16One observer argued in 1986 that: "The problem was, and still is, the insistent requirement that each Aquila, on every mission, be able to perform the dual role of forward artillery observation and tactical laser designation. Aquila can certainly do one or the other, but given the present state of electronic, optical and laser micro-technology, it simply cannot do both in the existing airframe; and any increase in the size of the aircraft would have a geometric decrease in the Aquila's survivability." Don L. Harvey, "A Troubled Nest for Aquila," NATO's Sixteen Nations, April 1986, p. 76. 17According to one report, "Months before the attack, Israeli UAVs 'fingerprinted' Syrian surface-to-air radars by gathering the electronic frequencies of those radars and programming them into Israeli antiradiation missiles for use during an attack. When the attack came on 9 June, UAVs flew over the battlefield first, emitting dummy signals designed to make Syrian radar operators believe real Israeli aircraft were attacking. This tactic was effective in two ways. First, the Syrians launched most of their available surface-to-air missiles (SAM) against the UAVs. When the SAM batteries were in the midst of reloading, Israeli fighters attacked. Second, this deceptive tactic caused Syrian radars to actively track the UAVs, thus tipping off the Israelis to where the emitting radars were. Using the electronic frequency signature gathered earlier, Israeli fighters carrying antiradiation missiles closed in and, along with artillery fire, destroyed the SAMs. The accuracy of the lethal artillery barrage was helped by UAVs performing a surveillance role. The flying vehicles transmitted real-time pictures of the Syrian SAM sites to Israeli commanders so they could assess the effectiveness of their artillery fire and adjust it accordingly. The Israeli Air Force also used UAVs in a surveillance role by positioning them over three major airfields deep within Syria to gather data on when and how may aircraft were taking off from Syrian airfields. . . ." Brian P. Tice, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force Multiplier of the 1990s," Airpower Journal, Spring 1991, pp. 43-44. CRS-10 18 battleships. The Navy also initiated an expedited procurement program that resulted in the acquisition of Pioneer UAVs from the AAI Corporation of Baltimore, Maryland, in cooperation with Maslat Ltd., an Israeli firm. This procurement effort was based in large measure on current technology rather than on a new design utilizing research and development. The FY1986 $25.8 million contract was for three Pioneer systems (a system consists of ground control/monitoring stations and eight vehicles) with options for six more for an additional $61.9 million in FY1987 and FY1988. The system was equipped with a jam-resistant, two-way data link to provide real-time video imagery." Eventually five systems have gone to the Navy, three to the Army and one to the Marine Corps. The Pioneer, which would subsequently see extensive use in Desert Storm, has a length of 4.2 meters and a wingspan of 5.2 meters, and is propeller-driven by a 26 horsepower engine. It has a range of 185 km and an endurance of 5-6 hours, flying at altitudes up to 15,000 feet. In the next few years, the Navy, Marine Corps and Army acquired additional Pioneers.20 Renewed interest in UAVs also emerged in other parts of the Pentagon. In 1984, the Defense Department's Defense Resources Board had tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to review requirements for UAVs by the individual services. Primary requirements included survivable, easy to operate and low-cost systems with real-time data links. It was apparent that technological developments such as miniaturization of electronics, improvement of sensors, development of reliable and jam-resistant data links, and improvement of navigation accuracy could make it feasible to overcome the limitations of Vietnam-era systems.21 Key differences existed in the individual service's requirements, however. This was especially so in regard to the Navy's needs for shipboard recoverability that was more risky and complicated than recovery on a runway. As a result of this study, eventually approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Reagan Administration's FY1987 budget submission included renewed UAV procurement. As noted below, pp. 13-18, Congress supported acquisition of UAVs, but only in the context of a DOD-wide effort. 18Subsequently, Mastiffs were transferred to the Marines, providing "for the first time company and battalion commanders . . . [with] real time sensor intelligence organic to the division." Statement of Rear Admiral Stan Arthur, Defense Department Authorization and Oversight Hearings on H.R. 4428 [H.A.S.C. No. 99-36], p. 253. 19Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "U.S. Military RPV Programs Have Taken Big Strides in 1986," Armed Forces Journal International, December 1986, p. 66. 20RPVs have also been used on a trial basis in drug interdiction efforts, flying along the U.S./Mexico border. See "UAVs Soar into the Drug War," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1990, p. 47. 21Defense Department Authorization and Oversight Hearings on H.R. 4428 [H.A.S.C. No. 99-36], p. 243. CRS-11 UAVS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR In the Persian Gulf War, U.S. forces made extensive and unanticipated use of UAVs. There was a need for accurate and extensive information on the strength and disposition of Iraqi forces within time constraints that could not be met by other systems, including satellites. The Navy used Pioneers launched from battleships to support shore bombardment operations with fire direction and spotting; the Army and Marines used UAVs for target designation, damage assessment, and reconnaissance and warning.22 The Marines faced an especially serious tactical intelligence shortfall as their RF-4b had recently been taken out of service and had not yet been replaced. As described in one account: UAVs were used to map Iraqi minefields and bunkers, thus allowing During the attack on the Iraqi-held Kuwait International Airport: a live Pioneer RPV picture, showed a battalion of Iraqi tanks poised 23 The Commander of the Second Marine Division during Desert Storm, Lt. Gen. William M. Keys, judged that: The RPV worked very well, but we needed many more of them, plus 22 The Army and Air Force also used UAVs in missions not properly described as intelligence related to deceive, confuse and saturate Iraqi air defenses. See "US UAV Programmes: Where Do We Stand?," Military Technology, October 1991, p. 19. In some cases, UAVs were used to confirm ground targets first identified by JSTARS aircraft. U.S. Department of Defense, [UAV Joint Program Office], Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Master Plan, 1992 (Arlington, VA: Joint Project Office, 1992), p. 60. 23 David A. Fulghum, "UAVs Pressed Into Action To Fill Intelligence Void," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 19, 1991, p. 59. 24" Rolling with the 2d Marine Division," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991, p. 80. CRS-12 The Defense Department's Desert Storm Final Report noted that: "During one mission, a Pioneer located three Iraqi artillery battalions, three free-rocketover-ground launch sites, and an antitank battalion." It concluded that Pioneers "proved excellent at providing an immediately responsive intelligence collection capability."25 UAVs served to supplement intelligence collection by reconnaissance aircraft and satellites and indeed provided detailed bomb damage assessment of tanks and other vehicles that satellites and aircraft could not have acquired. The new JSTARS aircraft successfully provided real-time data on Iraqi ground forces. Other reconnaissance aircraft, carrying various sensors, operated from bases in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region. Satellites were used in innovative ways in Desert Storm to support lower-level field commanders. Nevertheless, there were limitations to the coverage given the numbers of satellites then deployed (which could not be drastically augmented within a few months).26 As one non-government observer has concluded based on interviews with intelligence analysts: The US also lacked the ability to scan more than a portion of the The Gulf War demonstrated the effect of computerized technology on postCold War military operations. Although there were significant shortcomings, lower-level commanders now have the technical capability to obtain and utilize intelligence from a variety of sources, both those under their own control as well as systems controlled at the theater and national levels. The amount of photography and other forms of imagery (e.g., from overhead radar and infrared systems) and signals intelligence enables commanders to plan and conduct operations with a better understanding of the enemy's capabilities and force dispositions. The Desert Storm experience demonstrated that improved intelligence, combined with precision-guided munitions, makes it possible to conduct air campaigns (and shore bombardment) with far greater accuracy than 25U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992, Appendix C, p. 12. 26See Marcia S. Smith, Military and Civilian Satellites in Support of Allied Forces in the Persian Gulf War, CRS Report 91-215SPR, February 27, 1991, especially p. 9. 27 Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Volume of Data Cripples Tactical Intelligence System," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1992, p. 36. CRS-13 has been possible in the past. Ground operations can be conducted with improved confidence and opportunities for victory and with lower casualty rates. Some of the advantageous conditions prevailing in Desert Storm will probably not be present in the future. Many countries are undoubtedly working on countermeasures to U.S. intelligence systems, including UAVs, and future enemies will seek to neutralize the technological superiority recently demonstrated by the United States. Such antagonists will, in addition, make use of intelligence and communications technology that is to a large extent commercially available throughout the world. CONGRESS AND UAVS; CURRENT R&D AND PROCUREMENT The role of Congress in encouraging the acquisition of UAVs differs from the usual pattern in which a service initiates new technologies and seeks congressional authorization and appropriations. UAVs have never had pervasive and determined support by any service, but armed services and appropriations committees in both houses have sought to encourage the procurement of UAVs because of their comparatively low cost and their utility to military operations and to do so in a way that would avoid unnecessary duplication among any UAV programs that might be initiated. As a result of growing concerns about the high costs of the ill-fated Aquila project in the mid-1980s, Congress had taken a close look at efforts to provide UAVs when the Reagan Administration proposed renewed acquisition in FY1987. There was particular concern about the possibility of single-service efforts that might duplicate programs underway elsewhere in DOD. Congress elected to establish a DOD-wide program which could be closely supervised by the civilian-led Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Continuing Appropriations Act for FY1988 (P.L. 100-202) provided that funds for UAVs not be obligated or expended until DOD submitted to Congress a Master Plan explaining which UAVs would be supported with the available funds, and assessing the cooperation by the military services with efforts to coordinate UAV programs and to eliminate duplication. A UAV Executive Committee was formed to oversee the UAV effort in April 1988 and the JPO was established, with the Naval Air Systems Command as executive agent for DOD. Beginning in 1988, the JPO has issued a series of UAV Master Plans laying out the main goals of the program.28 The FY1988 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 100-180) authorized funding for the development of UAVs in a Defense Agencies account instead of separate service 28 The plans were published by the JPO; a review of the initial version is U.S. General Accounting Office, "Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan," Report No. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR, December 1988. |