therein, but not to exceed 2 months for the first or any succeeding year of imprisonment.*

In 1902 a general revision of good-time credits was made, placing all Federal prisoners whether in United States penitentiaries or jails or in State or territorial jails, prisons or penitentiaries, upon an equal basis. The schedule of credits was made more liberal and graduated so as to increase with the length of the sentence. And it was also provided that when a prisoner had several sentences, the basis for computation of deductions should be the aggregate of the sentences. This law, with some amendments and additions, is now in operation.5

By whom administered.-Good-time credits are primarily under the control of the officials of the particular institution, since they are charged with the duty of maintaining proper discipline among inmates. All Federal penal institutions are supervised by the Department of Justice through the Bureau of Prisons and the formulation of general policies governing the administration of good-time deductions rests with the Bureau. Uniform policies are, so far as possible, applicable to all Federal institutions.

*

*

*

Persons eligible.-The statute provides that every Federal prisoner confined, for a definite term other than for life, "in execution of the judgment or sentence in any United States penitentiary or jail, or in any penitentiary, prison, or jail of any State or territory record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules and has not been subjected to punishment, shall be entitled to a deduction from the term of his sentence *996 It is to be noted that the prisoner

*

*

whose

must be actually confined in execution of his sentence; there

426 Stat. 840 (1891).

32 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 et seq. (1934).

32 Stat, 307 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 (1934). This section as enacted applied to every prisoner "who has been or shall hereafter be convicted"; but the concluding section of the same act specifically provided that it applied only to sentences imposed subsequent to the effective date of the act. It was held that the latter section was controlling. United States v. Farrar, 139 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); United States v. Jackson, 143 Fed. 783 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906). In 1906 the law was clarified so that the deductions set out in the 1902 act were made applicable to sentences imposed prior to 1902 if the deduction otherwise allowable amounted to less than under the 1902 act. 34 Stat. 149 (1906), 18 U. S. C. § 712 (1934).

fore good time cannot be granted for time spent in a county jail pending appeal from a penitentiary sentence although the sentence dated from the date of commitment to the county jail. Nor is a prisoner who has been committed after violation of probation entitled to good time for the period of probation. Formerly a parolee was entitled to good time deductions, but in 1932 the parole law was amended so that no deductions are allowed parolees. 10

Prisoners confined in county jails or other institutions of temporary confinement are not entitled to the credits.11 The non-Federal institution must be one falling within the classification of a State, as distinguished from a local or county, institution.

Prisoners transferred to prison camps or employed on public works may be allowed an additional deduction of 3 days per month of actual employment for the first year and not more than 5 days per month thereafter, in the discretion of the Attorney General.12

Amount of deduction.-The credits allowed per month are as follows: Five days upon a sentence of not less than 6 months nor more than 1 year; 6 days upon a sentence of more than 1 year and less than 3 years; 7 days on sentences between 3 and 5 years; 8 days on sentences between 5 and 10 years; and for sentences of 10 years or more, 10 days per month. For the purpose of computing these deductions the aggregate of the sentences, where a prisoner has two or more sentences, is the basis.13 In addition to these deductions, prisoners in any industry or prison camp may earn

Aderhold v. Elis, 84 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 5th, 1986), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936).

8 Swope v. Lawton, 83 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).

See Morgan v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Henratty v. Zerbst, 9 F. Supp. 230 (D. C. Kan. 1934).

10 47 Stat. 381 (1932), 18 U. S. C. § 716a (1934).

11 In re Corcoran, 47 Fed. 211 (C. C. Calif. 1889); but cf. In re Deering, 60 Fed. 265 (D. C. Calif. 1894).

12 46 Stat. 392 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 744h (1934). Another provision allows prisoners in certain camps an additional flat deduction of 5 days per month. 45 Stat. 1318 (1929), 18 U. S. C. § 852 (1934). The 1930 law is being applied to all camps.

18 32 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 (1934). However, a sentence for escape is not combined with the other sentence; in other words the prisoner earns good time only on the sentence for escape. Aderhold v. Hudson, 84 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).

3 days per month during the first year and 5 days thereafter, for the time actually employed in the industry or camp.14

The statute originally provided that deductions could begin only after the arrival of the prisoner at the institution to which he was sentenced.15 However, with respect to prisoners sentenced on or after July 29, 1932, the deductions "shall be computed beginning with the day on which the sentence commences to run." 10 Ordinarily, sentence begins to run from the date the person is received at the institution for service of the sentence. It is specifically provided, however, that if the prisoner is committed to jail temporarily to await transportation to the place in which his sentence is to be served, the sentence begins to run from the date he is received at such jail or other place of detention.1

Credits are not finally earned until the actual time served plus deductions equals the combined sentences. "The month is only a basis for the estimate, it being adopted as such because it is the most convenient basis. The 'record of conduct' essential to entitle the prisoner to the credit is not his record for any particular month or year, but for the entire term.” 18 Forfeiture.-Misbehavior or violation of any of the rules of the institution constitutes grounds for the forfeiture of credits theretofore accumulated as well as any that might be subsequently earned. Thus it has been held that an inmate who has been returned to prison after an escape forfeits "all credit for good behavior throughout the term, not merely that previously earned." 19 Likewise a prisoner returned because of parole violation, who had been released after serving one of two sentences, forfeits all good-time credits on both sentences.20

14 46 Stat. 392 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 744h (1934).

15 32 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 710 (1934). Thus even though the judgment provided that time spent in jail pending appeal should apply on a penitentiary sentence, no good time could be granted for this period. Aderhold v. Ellis, 84 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936). 16 47 Stat. 381 (1932), 18 U. S. C. § 710a (1934).

17 Id. 709a.

18 28 Opinions Att'y Gen. (1909) 110. And see Ebeling v. Biddle, 291 Fed. 567 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Carroll v. Zerbst, 76 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935). 19 Carroll v. Zerbst, 76 F. (2d) 961, 962 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).

20 Aderhold v. Perry, 59 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 5th 1932); Morgan v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).

Forfeitures for breach of institutional rules are determined by the warden after the inmate has been given a hearing before a disciplinary board composed of three members of the prison staff with the deputy warden or the disciplinary officer acting as chairman. The prisoner has the privilege of replying and may choose some member of the staff to represent him as counsel. This board thoroughly investigates the alleged misconduct, hears the prisoner and any witnesses he may wish to present, and the members individually recommend to the warden the extent of discipline.

Restoration. The Attorney General is granted authority to restore credits lost because of misconduct of prisoners in "any United States penitentiary upon recommendations and evidence submitted to him by the warden in charge." 21 As to prisoners confined in State or territorial institutions, restorations are governed by the rules of the particular institution.22

Discharge gratuities.-Upon discharge every Federal prisoner is entitled to transportation to the place of conviction, his bona fide residence within the United States, or to such other place within the United States as the Attorney General may authorize. If the term has been 6 months or more the statute provides that he shall be furnished with suitable clothing and, in the discretion of the Attorney General, not more than $20 in money.23

ALABAMA

SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE

Suspension of sentence at common law.-Courts in Alabama have no inherent power to suspend sentences. Suspension of either imposition or execution of sentences has been held to be an encroachment on the executive power to pardon commute, and reprieve.1

132 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 711 (1934). Inmates of prison camps are governed by this provision also. 45 Stat. 1318 (1929), 18 U. S. C. § 852 (1934); 46 Stat. 392 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 744h (1934).

22 32 Stat. 397 (1902), 18 U. S. C. § 711 (1934).

23 44 Stat. 901 (1926), 18 U. S. C. § 746 (1934). Industrial reformatory inmates are entitled to $10 on discharge. 43 Stat. 726 (1925), 18 U. S. C. 840 (1934).

1 Montgomery v. State, 231 Ala. 1, 163, So. 365 (1935); Daley v. Decatur, 18 Ala. App. 141, 90 So. 69 (1921); Vinson v. State, 16 Ala. App. 536, 79 So. 316 (1918).

Temporary suspension of execution of sentence was practiced in early times in the absence of statutory power to enable a prisoner to apply for a pardon or to inquire into the sanity or pregnancy of the defendant, but temporary suspension for such causes was the extent of the court's powers. This inherent power was superseded by statute.

Statutes. Whenever the court imposes additional punishment where a fine has been assessed by the jury, or whenever the court is authorized to impose punishment of imprisonment in the county jail or hard labor for the county, the court may suspend execution of the sentence "until a subsequent term of court and may then order it to be executed or remit the same, or further suspend the execution of the sentence." But the suspension under this statute must be to a definite date, and not an indefinite suspension "pending defendant's good behavior."

The statutes also authorize temporary suspension of execution pending appeal,' pending application for a pardon,s pending pregnancy in cases where a woman is sentenced to death,' pending a return to sanity of an insane defendant," and suspension by allowing a confession of judgment when a fine is assessed,11 and in cases of nonsupport.12

PROBATION

Alabama has no general probation law. In 1931, the legislature attempted to vest in the courts power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentences and grant probation in cases where the punishment was fixed at not more than 10 years' imprisonment, including cases when impris

2 Vinson v. State, 16 Ala. App. 536, 79 So. 316 (1918).

Ibid.

Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 5284. The same power is conferred upon the Jefferson County court of misdemeanors. Ala. Local Acts 1919, p. 121; Barrett v. State, 18 Ala. App. 246, 90 So. 13 (1921).

5 Clark v. State, 20 Ala. App. 472, 102 So. 916 (1925); Snyder v. State, 18 Ala. App. 188, 90 So. 40 (1921); see also Barrett v. State, 18 Ala. App. 246, 90 So. 13 (1921); Montgomery v. State, 231 Ala. 41, 43, 163 So. 377, 379 (1935). Vinson v. State, 16 Ala. App. 536, 79 So. 316 (1918).

Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928), §§ 3241-3245, 3255.

& Id. § 5321.

Id. §§ 5300-5303.

10 Id. § 4576.

11 Id. § 5288.

12 Id. §§ 4479-4495.