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In every case, an attempt is made to secure as adviser the person in the community in which the parolee will live who will be most able to direct him toward rehabilitation through the normal community agencies of social control.

Supervision: Procedure on violation of parole.-The Board of Parole, or any one of its members, has the exclusive authority to issue a warrant for the arrest of a parole violator.18 Such a warrant may be issued at any time prior to the expiration of the sentence of the parolee if the Board or any member thereof has reliable information that the offender has violated his parole.19 The warrant may be executed by any officer of the prison from which the parolee was released or by any Federal officer authorized to serve criminal process within the United States, and the officer who executes the warrant has power to return the parolle to prison.20 At the next meeting of the Board at the prison after the issuance of the warrant, the parolee, if he has been returned to prison, will be given an opportunity to appear before the Board "and the said Board may then or at any time in its discretion revoke the order and terminate such parole or modify the terms and conditions theerof." 21 If a parolee violates the conditions of his parole a warrant for his arrest must be issued prior to the original expiration date of his sentence. However, if he eludes arrest or if for some other reason he cannot be returned to the institution from which he was paroled until after that date, his parole may, nevertheless, be revoked after his return. If a warrant for the arrest of a parole violator is issued during the term of his sentence, and if because of the imprisonment of the parolee under a new sentence his arrest and return to the institution from which

18 46 Stat. 272 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 723c (1934). 19 18 U. S. C. § 717 (1934).

20 36 Stat. 820 (1910), 18 U. S. C. § 718 (1934).

18 U. S. C. § 719 (1934). Apparently the right to appear before the Board exists only when the parolee is present in the prison at the time of the meeting of the Board, See Harrell v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 189, 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). It has been held that a hearing before one member of the Board is valid if acquiesced in through failure to object, U. S. ex rel. Rowe v. Nichol. son, 78 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), cert. den., 296 U. S. 573 (1935); or if the right to a hearing before a quorum is waived, Harrell v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). A parolee must be arrested prior to revocation of his parole. Ferris v. Cow (N. D. Ga., Atlanta, August 1937).

he was released is not had until after the date on which his original sentence would ordinarily have expired, his parole can then be revoked and he can be reimprisoned. The violation of parole interrupts the running of a sentence in the manner of an escape.2 22

Recommitment: Effect on further parole.-A Federal parole violator may be reparoled at any time by the Parole Board.

Recommitment: Effect on original sentence.-When parole is revoked "the said prisoner shall serve the remainder of the sentence originally imposed; and the time the prisoner was out on parole shall not be taken into account to diminish the time for which he was sentenced." 28 "The unexpired term of imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to run from the date he is returned to the institution * * * 24

Final discharge.-Upon the expiration of a parolee's term of sentence, the parole executive sends him a letter stating that he has apparently completed his parole period satisfactorily. No formal certificate of discharge is issued to him.

Parole of Federal prisoners in State reformatory institutions. If a Federal prisoner is confined in a State reformatory institution, "if such State has laws for the parole of prisoners committed to such institutions by the courts of that State, such person convicted of any offense against the United States shall be eligible to parole on the same terms and conditions and by the same authority and subject to recommittal for violation of such parole in the same manner, as persons committed to such institutions by the

Anderson v. Corrall, 263 U. S. 193 (1923); Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Stockton v. Massey, 34 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929), cert. den., 281 U. S. 273 (1930); cf. Biddle v. Asher, 295 F. 670 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924). Parole cannot be revoked merely because prior to the granting of the parole the parolee had committed acts which, if they had been known to the Board at the time, would have prevented the granting of parole. Ez parte Urbanowicz, 24 F. (2d) 574 (D. C. Kan., 1928).

218 U. S. C. § 719 (1934); Anderson v. Corrall, 263 U. S. 193, 44 Supp. Ct. 43 (1923).

24 46 Stat. 272 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 723c (1934). In actual administration the unexpired term of imprisonment begins to run from the date the violator is taken into custody on the Parole Board's warrant. This procedure is based upon 18 U. S. C. § 709a.

courts of said State, and the laws of said State relating to the parole of prisoners and the supervision thereof in such institutions are hereby adopted and made to apply to persons committed to such institutions for offenses against the United States. * When a prisoner is committed to such institution outside of the State where he lives he may be permitted by his parole to return to his home, and in such case the supervision of such prisoner on parole shall devolve upon the marshal of the district where said prisoner lives, and in case such prisoner should violate his parole, a warrant for his recommitment shall be delivered to and executed by said marshal." 25 The parole of any Federal prisoner in a State institution must be approved by the Federal Board of Parole before it becomes effective.26

Persons released by good-conduct deductions under parole supervision. If an offender is denied parole from a Federa institution, or if he waives his right to apply for parole, and if he is later released prior to the expiration of his sentence because of good-conduct deductions, he "shall upon release be treated as if released on parole and shall be subject to all provisions of law relating to the parole of United States prisoners until the expiration of the maximum term or terms specified in his sentence." 27 He is supervised in the same manner in which parolees are supervised, and his conditional release may be revoked if he violates the parole rules.


Power in President.-The power of pardon is vested in the President by the Constitution, which provides that he "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for of fences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." In addition, Congress has provided that where "any person is sentenced to two kinds of punishment, the one pecuniary and the other corporal, the President


236 Stat. 821 (1910), 18 U. S. C. § 722 (1934). Juveniles who are paroled from institutions not located in State of legal residence of the juvenile are now supervised by the Federal probation officers in accordance with regular parole procedure.

20 46 Stat. 272 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 723b (1934). 27 47 Stat. 281 (1932), 18 U. S. C. § 716b (1934). 1 U. S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

shall have full discretionary power to pardon or remit, in whole, or in part, either one of the two kinds, without, in any manner, impairing the legal validity of the other kind, or of any portion of either kind, not pardoned or remitted.2 The President may exercise the pardoning power by way of a proclamation of amnesty, applicable to particular classes of persons. This type of clemency is illustrated by the proclamations issued after the Civil War. There is little difference between amnesty and pardon, except that the former is rarely exercised in favor of single individuals, but usually in behalf of a class of persons who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted. Although the President's pardoning power "is not subject to legislative control, nevertheless Congress has power to pass acts of general amnesty."

There is no limitation upon the time within which the power may be exercised. It has been stated that it may be exercised at any time after the commission of the offense, "either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment." However, it

has been thought "unwise and inexpedient, as a general rule, to interpose the pardoning power in anticipation of trial and condemnation," and consequently, the power has generally been exercised after conviction."

Rev. Stat. § 5330 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 568 (1934).

See, e. g., 15 Stat. 699 (1867); 15 Stat. 711 (1868). These proclamations have the force of public law and need not be specially pleaded. Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U. S. 546 (1892).

Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 601 (1896).

Er parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 380 (U. S. 1867). See United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (U. S. 1871), holding void a statute making a pardon inadmissible in evidence to forward a claim for confiscated property. Cf. Hart v. United States, 118 U. S. 62 (1886).

Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 601 (1896).

Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U. S. 1867).

6 Opinions Att'y Gen. 20, 21 (1853). In Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79 (1915), it was contended that a full and unconditional pardon could not be given for an offense not established. But the court specifically declined to decide the point.

9 A perusal of the Report of the Pardon Attorney, incorporated in the Annual Report of the Attorney General, indicates that such is the case. For example, in 1935-36, out of 154 pardons granted, none was granted before conviction. Indeed, 152 of the 154 were granted only after completion of sentence, for the purpose of restoring civil rights. In the same year sentences were commuted in 28 cases and conditionally commuted in 155. Rep. Att'y Gen. (1936) 153.

Pardon for contempt of court.-With the exception of cases of impeachment, the applicability of the pardoning power to any particular act depends upon whether it falls within the category of "offenses against the United States." Once it is decided that an act is such an offense, pure logic would dictate that the pardoning power extends to it.10 There is no difficulty in applying this reasoning to the various crimes defined by statute. But a source of difficulty has been the status of contempts of court with respect to the pardoning power.

There seems to be no doubt that, where in a civil suit the court commits a person for contempt as a coercive measure— until the order or decree of the court is obeyed, such sentence is not subject to the pardoning power.11 But where the contemnor is fined or imprisoned as punishment and is not required to perform or desist from doing any act affecting the rights of parties to a civil suit, he may be the recipient of executive clemency.12

Pardon for legislative contempt.-No Federal case has been found which upholds or denies the application of the pardoning power to legislative contempts. Story expressed the opinion that the executive could not pardon persons committed for contempt of a branch of the legislature on the ground that otherwise the legislature would be, in effect, dependent upon the President for the proper exercise of its legislative duties.13 But refusing to answer questions pertinent to an inquiry being conducted by either House of

10 However, it has been suggested that a distinction be made between offenses against the United States generally and offenses against the United States within the meaning of the constitutional clause granting the pardoning power to the President. See Lardner, Executive Pardon far Contempt of Court (1930) 2 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 137, 146.

See Morris, Some Phases of the Pardoning Power (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 183, 186. Such orders are civil and remedial in nature, being in aid of parties to a civil suit and not in execution of the criminal laws.. In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).

12 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925); In re Mullee, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,911 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1869); 3 Opinions Att'y Gen. 622 (1841); 4 id. 458 (1845). See generally, Morris, supra. But see Note (1903) 16 Harv. L. Rev. 291.

1 Story, Constitution (4th ed. 1873) § 1503. "The Constitution is silent in respect to the right of granting pardons in such cases, as it is in respect to the jurisdiction to punish for contempts. The latter arises by implication; and to make it effectual, the former is excluded by implication." Ibid. But like reasoning applies to the "inherent" power of the courts to punish for direct contempt.

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