the warden may designate as 'trusties' upon the approval of the warden, may benefit by 'additional' good time credits." 12 Amount of deduction.-"Statutory" good-time deductions are in accordance with a sliding scale.18 Additional goodtime credits totaling up to 10 days may be earned by "trusty" prisoners. Until 1935, trusty prisoners engaged in "productive and constructive" work received 3 days in addition.15 Forfeiture.-At the discretion of the warden all good time earned may be declared forfeited. Escaped prisoners upon recapture forfeit all good time previously earned and are not eligible to earn good-time credits for a period of 2 years from the date of their reimprisonment.16 Restoration. When the offense is such that statutory good time has been forfeited it may not be restored. Additional good time which has been declared forfeited may be reinstated by the warden. EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE Formalities of release.-The "ticket-of-leave" system of final discharge is in effect at the Colorado State Penitentiary.1 12 Colo. Laws 1935, ch. 101, § 1 (b). 13 See supra note 72 for sliding scale. 14 Colo. Laws 1935, ch. 101, § 1 (b). 15 Colo. Laws 1931, ch. 69, § 1. The 1935 law repeals all laws and parts of laws in conflict with it, and this is construed to repeal the 1931 provision for the additional 3 days allowance. 16 The forfeiture clause of the Colorado good time law provides that prisoners forfeit all "time credits" for assault on keepers, guards, for threatening or endangering the person or life of anyone, for violating or disregarding any prison rule or regulation. Escaped prisoners upon recapture lose all good time previously earned, and in addition are required to serve at least 2 calendar years from the date of their return to the penitentiary regardless of whether or not these 2 years extend beyond the maximum term of their sentence. No good-time credit is to be allowed during the service of these 2 years. Presumably, after the service of these 2 full calendar years, the returned prisoner becomes eligible to begin earning good time again in accordance with the proviso of the 1921 law. Colo. Laws 1935, ch. 101, § 2, 3 (b). See also supra note 53. 1 "Ten days prior to the day on which any convict now confined, or who may hereafter be confined in the penitentiary be discharged or to be paroled from said penitentiary shall be entitled to shall give such convict a ticket of leave therefrom, leave shall entitle him to depart from said prison Ann. (Michie, 1935) ch. 131, §§ 87, 88. * the warden which ticket of Colo. Stat. Effect of release.-Under the "ticket-of-leave" system, if the convict thus released leaves the county in which the penitentiary is situated within 24 hours from the time of his release, and does not return within 10 days, "he shall be held and deemed to be fully discharged from the penitentiary and from the sentence upon which he was confined therein." A prisoner may also be entitled to a certificate of good conduct from the warden, endorsed by the managers, and on presenting this to the Governor he has a right to be restored to citizenship. Discharge gratuities.-Discharged convicts leaving the penitentiary on a "ticket-of-leave" are provided with $5 in cash, new clothing and a nontransferrable railroad ticket to the railroad station at or nearest to the county seat of the county in which the crime was committed but without the county in which the penitentiary is located.* Prisoner's aid.-There is no State "follow up" of discharged prisoners, or any provision for assistance to themselves or to their families." CONNECTICUT SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE Suspension of sentence at common law.-The Connecticut court has not passed on the question whether the courts have power at common law to suspend either imposition or execution of sentence. There are some dicta to the effect that imposition of sentence should not be suspended, although the practice of deferring sentence indefinitely appears in several Failure to observe the conditions contingent upon the issuance of the "ticket-of-leave" may result in the reincarceration of the offender in the penitentiary for the "whole period of his sentence thereto." Id. ch. 131, § 89. Id. ch. 131, § 80. 'Clothing furnished includes a suit of clothes, shirt, socks, shoes, underwear, and the inmate's preference of a hat or cap. The name of the traveler is written on the back of the railroad ticket, as also is the fact that the ticket was "furnished by the State." Id. ch. 131, § 87. The Colorado Prison Association, a private agency supported in part by Denver Community Chest funds, and affiliated with the American Prison Association, maintains an office in Denver, Colo., and upon application, will be of assistance to discharged prisoners and parolees who are in want. 73114-38-VOL. I—14 cases.1 However, even though an attempt to suspend sentence be a nullity, jurisdiction to order execution of sentence subsequently is not lost." Statutes. The courts of Connecticut may suspend execution of sentence indefinitely, "when the mitigating circumstances clearly justify such action," except in State prison or reformatory cases, and other cases enumerated in the probation law. The procedure in such cases is the same as under the probation law. There must be due notice to all concerned, a hearing and pronouncement of the order in open court.* Execution of sentence may be suspended in nonsupport cases, upon the giving of sufficient surety to pay the sums fixed by the court or upon other terms." PROBATION Historical development.—Under the influence of the Connecticut Prison Association, a probation law was first en 1 In State v. Vaughan, 71 Conn. 457, 42 Atl. 640 (1899), imposition of sentence was suspended "until the next term of court, and until further order." The court said by way of dictum, that since review in this State is a matter of right, the courts have common law power to stay execution for purpose of appeal and to admit bail. "There is, therefore, no reason for suspending [imposition of] sentence until after the court of errors has passed upon the grounds for a new trial, even if such a course were legal. On the contrary, the judge who presides at a trial ought to determine the sentence; while it may legally be imposed by another Judge, this should be done only in case of necessity." In State v. Lindsay, 109 Conn. 239, 146 Atl. 290 (1929), the court speaks of the imposition of sentence as a ministerial act to be performed by the judge: "The judgment is the determination or sentence of the law speaking through the court, pronounced or made known in some appropriate way, orally or in writing." In State v. Elbert, 115 Conn. 589, 162 Atl. 769 (1932), the trial court deferred sentence after conviction for a few days until defendant reached the age of 16, so that the court could then sentence him to the reformatory. The court stated, however, that "whatever might be said as to the correctness of that procedure in this particular case, a practice of thus deferring sentence for any more than a brief period would not be proper." Hence, not only is an indefinite deferral of sentence bad, but even a definite one may not be made for more than a brief period. 2 Leifert v. Turkington, 115 Conn. 600, 162 Atl. 842 (1932). 3 Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1931) § 1725c. A justice of the peace may not suspend sentence under this statute. Alcorn v. Fellows, 102 Conn. 22, 127 Atl. 911 (1925). Since suspension of sentence under the probation law has been held not to be an invasion of the pardon power, the same is probably true as to this statute. Belden v. Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 91 Atl. 369 (1914). See Alcorn v. Fellows, 102 Conn. 22, 127 Atl. 911 (1925). acted in this State in 1903. Under that law persons subject to a State prison sentence could not be placed on probation.1 In 1905 the exception was taken out. In 1907 judges were given the authority to place on probation even after the term of court had closed. In 1915 the act was amended, excepting from its application State prison and reformatory cases. Upon recommendation of the State judicial council the assembly in 1929 amended the statute governing suspension of execution of sentence by excepting from the application of that statute, in addition to State prison and reformatory cases, all cases of persons twice convicted for drunken driving within a period of 6 years, and all cases of persons thrice convicted of felony. In 1930 the court held that the new exceptions applied to the probation law. In 1931 the probation act was amended so as definitely to include the exceptions in question. The Connecticut Prison Association, organized in 1875 and incorporated in 1879, was, from the beginning of probation in Connecticut, charged with its supervision. Aside from the changes indicated, the present law is the same as the one first enacted. Administrative organization.-Probation in Connecticut is under the control of local courts, county, city, town, and borough. Officers are appointed and removed by them and act under their direction." Probation service in the State is under the general supervision of the Connecticut Prison Association, and this supervision consists in requiring reports from probation officers, making an annual report to the Governor on the operation of the probation system and making recommendations for improvement of the service. The association has recently made a study of the needs of the system, revised the reporting procedure, secured the cooperation of judges in the work of probation, and promoted conferences. 1 Conn. Pub. Acts 1903, ch. 126. 2 Id. 1905, ch. 142. 3 Conn. Pub. Acts 1929, ch. 285. ♦ Kelley v. Dooley, 111 Conn. 281, 149 Atl. 840 (1930). Ann. Rep. Conn. Prison Ass'n (1934-35) p. 45. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) §§ 6515, 6520. " Id. § 6521. Ann. Rep. Conn. Prison Ass'n (1934-35) p. 15. The association is a private corporation, whose officers are elected by the members, and functions through an executive committee of its officers. The probation work of the association is done by a standing committee on probation together with the executive secretary of the association." The association is semiofficial in the sense that it is charged by statute with the "supervision" of the probation law, and it receives a small appropriation from the assembly.1 10 Procedure. Any criminal court or judge holding such court may suspend the execution of sentence in cases where the defendant is eligible for probation, and place the defendant in the custody of a probation officer. Suspension may be made during that session of court "at which such commitment was issued" or after it." However, valid suspension requires a hearing and due notice and publication by oral pronouncement in open court, or upon the records of the court. The facts upon which the action is based must be made part of the record of the case.12 Even though an ⚫ Id. 29, 31. 10 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) §§ 6521, 1993. 11 Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1931) § 1725C. It was held in Belden v. Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 91 Atl. 369 (1914), that under this statute as then worded the court could suspend either imposition or execution of sentence and place the prisoner on probation. However, the statute at that time did not contain the provision now found therein authorizing the court to continue the case or suspend execution during or after the session "at which such commitment was issued." This perhaps means that such action cannot be taken until after there has been a commitment. 12 Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1931) § 1725C; Alcorn v. Fellows, 102 Conn. 23, 127 Atl. 911 (1925). In this case a justice of the peace sentenced a liquor-law violator and issued a mittimus and delivered it to the sheriff. The Justice intended to suspend sentence, but issued the mittimus to impress the defendant, meaning to recall it later. While the sheriff was delivering the prisoner to the Jailer, the justice took the mittimus from the sheriff's hands, tore it up, and ordered the prisoner released. Subsequently, the justice made an entry of suspension on his judgment file at his home without notice or hearing. The State's attorney brought mandamus to compel issuance of a new mittimus. The court held that a justice of the peace was not a "court" within the terms of the probation law or the law allowing suspension of sentence without probation. It held further that even if a justice did come within the meaning of the statute allowing suspension of sentence, a court cannot suspend sentence as informally as he did. Inferentially, this case holds that a justice of the peace has not the power to suspend sentence either by common law or by statute. However, the court seems to have overlooked Gen. Stat. § 6520, which authorizes justices of the peace to appoint probation officers pro tempore whenever the Justice thinks a person should be released on probation. This statute seems to give Justices the power which the court in the Alcorn case denied they had. In Leifert v. Turkington, 115 Conn. 600, 162 Atl. 842 (1932), the court had under consideration the power of a justice of the peace to suspend sentence, and, without directly passing on the question, seemed to approve the Alcorn case. |