lough' is a military term and means leave given to a soldier to be absent from service for a certain time, but the name should not control where it is at variance with the substance of the instrument." so The furlough system seems to have grown up in Arkansas partly to supplement the present practice of not allowing a prisoner to apply for parole until one-third of this sentence has been served. But this rule is self-imposed and may be changed by the board. We believe that while definite short-time furloughs have something to recommend them when carefully administered, the indefinite furlough is from the point of view of public protection much inferior to release under parole. In the long run the use of parole will best protect the interests of society when it is completely divorced from the Governor's power of executive clemency." "1 The present Governor has stated that his granting of furloughs was conditioned on receiving the approval of the trial judge, the prosecuting attorney, and the sheriff of the county a quo. An exception to this rule is where the furlough is applied for to allow the applicant to go home on account of death in his family. That there has been serious dissatisfaction with the system of releasing prisoners on pardons, paroles, furloughs and the like is indicated by the vigorous protest embodied in the report of the Pulaski County grand jury made to Judge McGehee in the first division of the circuit court, in Little Rock, in September 1935. It was partly as a response to such criticism that the legislature in 1937 created the board of pardons and paroles. GOOD-TIME DEDUCTIONS History.-The first good-time law in Arkansas appears to have been passed in 1867. This statute made it the duty of the Governor, when it appeared that the conduct of the prisoner had been satisfactory, to grant a deduction of not more than 2 days per month from the term of his imprison 80 Williams v. Brentz, 171 Ark. 367, 284 S. W. 56 (1926). 31 The Prison Labor Problem in Arkansas, a survey by the Prison Industries Reorganization Administration (1936) 35-36. ment.1 In 1899 this statute was revised into its present form, providing for graduated deductions." By whom administered.-The granting of good-time deductions rests with the Governor, who acts upon the reports and recommendations of the superintendent of the penitentiary.3 Persons eligible.-The deductions apply to "convicts confined in the penitentiary," whose conduct "has been exemplary and unexceptional for one whole year together 994 Amount of deduction.-The allowances are graduated according to the length of the sentence. One month is granted for the first year, 2 for the second, 3 months for each year thereafter up to the tenth year, and 6 months for the tenth and each succeeding year. These deductions are cumulative; that is, on a 10-year sentence the prisoner would actually have to serve only 71⁄2 years. 5 Forfeiture.-Escape or attempt to escape forfeits all rights to the "commutation" accrued up to that time Breach of prison rules for which the prisoner is corrected three times entails a loss of 1 month or so much of each month as the keeper may recommend. Restoration. There is no explicit provision relating to the restoration of credits forfeited because of misconduct. However, there seems to be no doubt that the Governor has the power to do so. EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE Formalities of release.-Upon release at expiration of sentence the prisoner is given a certificate of discharge showing that he is entitled to be at large. Effect of release.-Discharge at the expiration of sentence, whether by operation of good time deductions or by actual service of the full period of confinement fixed by the court, operates as a full satisfaction of the judgment. However, the person is not restored to electoral privileges, since it is provided by statute that no person who has been convicted of a statutory or common law felony may vote, and the records of the court are conclusive evidence of the conviction.1 A pardon in such case, generally termed a “restoration to citizenship," is necessary to restore voting rights. Discharge gratuities.-Although there appears to be no specific statutory provision allowing the equipping of prisoners upon discharge, they are allowed a suit of clothes and $2.50 in money. However, there is a very prevalent practice of permitting release 10 days prior to expiration of sentence if the prisoner will forego the clothes and the money allowance. Since the desire for freedom is strong, practically in every case the prisoner accepts the earlier release and goes forth in prison clothing and without money. No transportation is furnished, so that on the whole the discharged prisoner must rely upon his own resources. Prisoners' aids.-The State makes no provision for securing employment for ex-convicts nor for maintaining them after release while employment is sought. No effort is made to "follow-up" former inmates or render any special assistance in bringing about social and economic adjustment. CALIFORNIA SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE Suspension of sentence at of sentence at common law.-California courts have no common law power to suspend either the imposition or execution of sentence. But courts may impose sentence where sentence has not yet been imposed, or order the execution of sentence where execution was suspended, without regard to the validity of the suspension. 2 1 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 3737. 1 People ea rel. Lindauer v. O'Donnell, 174 Pac. 102 (1918) ("The authority in a court to suspend sentence or execution thereof in a criminal case is wholly statutory and the statute itself furnishes the measure of the power which may thus be exercised *"); People v. Harvey, 137 Cal. App. 22, 29 P. (2d) 787 (1934); In re Claude Taylor, 140 Cal. App. 102, 34 P. (2d) 1036 (1934); In re Eyre, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 451, 36 P. (2d) 842 (1934); People v. Wallach, Cal. App. (2d) 129, 47 P. (2d) 1071 (1935); see also Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1937) § 12. People v. Patrick, 118 Cal. 332, 50 Pac. 425 (1897). 3 In re Collins, 8 Cal. App. 367, 97 Pac. 188 (1908); Ex parte Moore, 12 Cal. App. 161, 107 Pac. 129 (1909); In re Clark, 70 Cal. App. 643, 234 Pac. 109 (1925); In re Howard, 72 Cal. App. 374, 237 Pac. 406 (1925). See also, In re Higgins, 70 Cal. App. 170, 232 Pac. 757 (1924). Statutes. By statute sentence may be suspended in nonsupport cases, upon the giving of sufficient sureties by the defendant for the payment of support to wife or child. The only other statute authorizing suspension of sentence is the probation law. PROBATION Historical development.-In 1872 the California legislature passed a law authorizing criminal courts summarily to hear "circumstances which may be properly taken into view either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment" in their discretion, upon oral suggestion of either party.1 The general probation statute grew out of this law. In 1903 the courts were authorized to suspend the imposition of sentence in the case of any person over 16, if it appeared that there were circumstances in mitigation "or that the ends of justice will be subserved thereby." The defendant could be placed under the supervision of the probation officer of the court. The period of suspension was restricted to the maximum term of sentence. In the case of a judgment to pay a fine, execution of sentence could be suspended. In the latter case, probation was to cease on satisfaction of judgment. Probation officers could arrest without warrant "if the interest of justice so requires, and if the court, in its judgment, shall have reason to believe that conditions are violated or that the defendant is engaging in criminal practices, or has become abandoned to improper associates or a vicious life." The judges could appoint an officer of a charity organization or any citizen as probation officer. Officers received no compensation and had the duties of investigation and report under the direction of the court.3 * In 1905 the law was amended to allow release on probation only after investigation and written report by the probation officer. By this amendment provision was made also for supervision of probationers by the officer of other county courts. Furthermore, the law stated that the time of sus Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1931) § 270b. 1 Cal. Pen. Code (Haymond and Burch, 1874) § 1203. 2 Cal. Stat. 1903, p. 34. Id. at 36. pension could not count as any part of any term of imprisonment. In 1905 the legislature also changed the method of appointing officers. The judges of the superior court of a county were authorized to appoint "seven discreet citizens of good moral character" to act as a probation committee which in turn was to appoint probation officers subject to the approval of the judges. The same probation committees and officers created under the juvenile court law were to act under the adult probation law.5 In 1909 the restriction of probation to cases investigated by probation officers was modified to allow release by way of probation if the circumstances in mitigation appeared either from the record furnished by the probation officer "or otherwise." In the same year a provision was added which permitted a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty or permitted the court to set aside the verdict upon fulfilment of the conditions of probation or discharge prior to the end of the period. This could only be done, however, within a term, dating from the defendant's discharge or the end of the period, equal to the maximum period of punishment. When the defendant was allowed to withdraw his plea or when the court set aside the verdict, the defendant was entitled to a dismissal of the information against him and a release from all penalties and disabilities involved in the conviction." The law was amended in 1911 to allow the granting of probation not only upon the oral suggestions of either party but also upon the court's own motion. It was also amended to apply to all persons over eighteen. The court was allowed to suspend either imposition or execution of sentence in all cases. The provision that the time of suspension could not be counted as part of any term of imprisonment, was omitted." The law was changed again in 1913 to provide for a maximum period of suspension of 2 years where the maximum possible sentence was less than 2 years. It further provided that in nonsupport cases the period could not continue 4 Cal. Stat. 1905, p. 162. 5 Id. at 780. Cal. Stat. 1909, p. 357. |