Jarvis v. Sewall. ations of law, issue, and which they are bound to obey. And as they are supposed and bound to know the form and manner, as well as the authenticity, of the attestation of a document received by them and placed upon the records of the colonial court as the order or decree of the queen in privy council, it becomes a part of the records of that court, and of the proceedings in the cause to which it relates, and may be exemplified by the proper officer having their custody. Whether the certificate imports absolute verity, so that the genuineness of the document purporting to be from the queen cannot be controverted, need not be considered. It is certainly prima facie evidence in any court and jurisdiction in which it becomes material. Without some proof that there is better evidence of the judgment of the queen, the record produced upon this appeal is competent. It may be added that recent English statutes dispense with a seal on certain exemplifications, and if the decrees and remittiturs of the queen's council are within the statutes, then the judgment was properly certified to the court in Canada. In Vandervoort v. Smith, (2 Caines, 155,) there was no evidence that the officer certifying to the proceedings sought to be proved had the official custody of such proceedings. In Wilson v. Conine, (2 John. 280,) neither the decree sought to be proved, nor a copy, was produced from any custody. It was sought to be established by a recital in another decree. There was some evidence here that the evidence produced was the best and only evidence that could be had, and that there was no record of the proceedings and order of the queen in any office in England, and that there was no seal of that tribunal by which documents were or could be attested. The record of the recovery against the sureties on the appeal, in the Canada court of common pleas, was competent evidence against the defendants here. It established the liability of the plaintiff's assignors, and the extent and amount of that liability. (Candee v. Lord, 2 N. Y. Rep. 269. Ra Ackerman v. Cross. pelye v. Prince, 4 Hill, 119. Lee v. Clark, 1 id. 56. Holmes v. Weed, 19 Barb. 128. Chace v. Hinman, 8 Wend. 452.) There is no complaint of the amount of the recovery, and the judgment must be affirmed. MULLIN, J. dissented. Judgment affirmed. [ONONDAGA GENERAL TERM, December 22, 1863. Allen, Morgan, Mullin and Bacon, Justices.] ACKERMAN and others vs. CROSS and others. Voluntary transfers of personal property, wherever in point of fact the situs of the property itself may be, are controlled and regulated by the law of the owner's domicil, and if valid there, to transfer a title, are valid every where else. A voluntary assignment of property, by a debtor, for the benefit of his creditors, stands in this respect upon the same footing, and the assignees are entitled to assert the same rights as purchasers in any other form from the original owner. Accordingly held that an assignment executed in Canada, where all the parties resided at the time of its execution, and which was valid and effectual by the law of that country, operated to convey property in the state of New York, as against a valid attachment of a creditor of the assignors and a citizen of this state, although the assignment was not acknowledged, filed or recorded here, nor in other respects in conformity with the act of April 13, 1860. A PPEAL by the defendants from a judgment for the plain tiffs, entered on the report of a referee. The action was brought by the plaintiffs, Ackerman and Innes, as general assignees of Curry, McCandlish & Field, to recover for the conversion of nine cases of nutmegs, and sixty-one boxes and cases of tobacco. The assignment under which the plaintiffs derive title, was made at Bellville, Canada West, on the 10th day of June, 1861, where the assignors then resided, and had been doing business as merchants, under the firm VOL. XL. 30 Ackerman v. Cross. name of Curry, McCandlish & Field. The property in question was shipped by the said firm, on the last day of May, or the first day of June, from Bellville to the city of New York, for sale. It arrived at Cape Vincent, in this state, on the 4th day of June. On the 11th day of June, while in the custody of the collector of customs at Cape Vincent, one of the assignors made a formal delivery of it to the plaintiffs, as assignees, and it was allowed to remain there in the custody of the collector as the nominal agent and bailee of the plaintiffs, subject to the lien for duties thereon. The defendants are merchants, residing in the city of New York, and being the creditors of the said assignors upon a debt created at said city, on the 12th day of June, 1861, issued an attachment in due form of law, and levied upon the property in question, at Cape Vincent, and thereafter caused the same to be sold on an execution on the judgment in the action. The said assignment was executed conformably to the laws of the province of Canada, but not in conformity to the laws of this state, in any essential particular; it was not acknowledged, filed or recorded in any county clerk's office in this state, nor was a bond given by the assignees, as required by the act of our legislature, passed April 18, 1860, (Laws of 1860, ch. 348.) The assignees were, at the date of the assignment, and are now, residents of Bellville aforesaid. The conclusions of law of the referee were as follows: 1. That said assignment was a valid instrument, and was operative to and did pass to the plaintiffs as assignees the property in the goods, the subject of this action then being at Cape Vincent, within this state. 2. That by virtue of said assignment, and the actual delivery of said goods under and in pursuance of the same, the title to the goods so seized and taken by the defendants, vested in the plaintiffs as assignees and upon the trusts of the said assignment. 3. That the plaintiffs are entitled to recover against the defendants the value of the said goods, with interest thereon, amounting in the aggregate to one thousand four hundred Ackerman v. Cross. and eighty-eight dollars and twenty-five cents, ($1488.25,) and for that sum with costs of the action he ordered judgment. F. W. Hubbard, for the appellants. I. It may be conceded that the assignment in question is valid, under the laws of Canada, and, by the courts of Canada would be held effectual to vest the title to the assigned property in the assignees, in a controversy between subjects of that province. It may be conceded further that our courts would give it effect in a controversy between Canadian subjects, in which our citizens had no interest. This upon the principle applicable to foreign bankrupt assignments. Such assignments pass no title to property here. (5 Cranch, 289. 12 Wheat. 213. 3 Wend. 538.) Still assignees are permitted to sue in our courts, provided the rights or interests of our citizens are not infringed. (3 Wend. 538. Story on Conf. of Laws, On the other hand it must §§ 420, 421. 1 Seld. 327, 341.) be admitted by the plaintiffs that, tested by the stringent provisions of our statute alone, the assignment cannot stand. (Sess. L. 1860, ch. 348.) It would be pronounced invalid had it been made by citizens, to assignees residing in this state. None of the essentials of the statute were complied with, and no attempt at compliance; the Canadian statute was alone consulted in drafting it. It was not acknowledged by the assignors, nor was any sufficient schedule of property made. No bond was executed by the assignees, nor was the assignment filed or recorded in any county clerk's office in this state. To sustain this action, the plaintiffs must take the case out of the operation of our statutes. II. Our statutes cannot be rendered nugatory by force of the rule of the comity of nations. It is submitted that our courts will not give effect to a foreign assignment for the benefit of creditors, operating on property situated here, against creditors residing here, when such assignment contravenes the policy of our laws. This assignment comes in direct conflict with the letter and policy of our statutes. and infringes the Ackerman v. Cross. interests of the defendants, who are citizens of this state, in respect to the property in litigation. Justice Story, in his Conflict of Laws, § 38, defines the law of comity, and the principle of its operation, as follows: "There is not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase 'comity of nations,' but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligations of the laws of one nation within the territories of another. It is derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the latter, and is inadmissible, when it is contrary to its known policy, or prejudicial to its interests. In the silence of any rule affirming or denying, or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice will presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to its interest." (See note 3 to § 38. 13 Peters, 519, 589, 597. 1 Seld. 340.) The same rule prevails in relation to foreign contracts as foreign laws-neither have any extra territorial operation, proprio vigore-their operation depends on the national courtesy alone. (Story on Confl. of Laws, § 7. 2 Kent's Com. 406. Hoyt v. Thompson, 1 Seld. 340. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 568.) This is an universal rule of international law, and is simply the expression of national sovereignty. Every nation, in the exercise of its sovereignty, has a right to prescribe its own rules and remedies, pertaining to persons or property, within its territory. The general rule in regard to the owner's domicil, governing the alienation or assignment of personal property, is susceptible of being modified or abrogated, by the exercise of the sovereign power. (Burrill on Assign. 362.) It is but another form of expression to say the lex loci may be modified or annulled by the lex fori. And when there is a conflict, the former must yield. (Story on Confl. of Laws, §§ 326, 327. 2 Kent's Com. 407.) It is only in cases where there is no such conflict that the laws and contracts made by or in a foreign country, are permitted operation here, in our courts. The statute of 1860 entirely |