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much diminished if that superiority was shared among three or four great powers. It is unquestionably the interest of such weaker states to discountenance and resist a measure which fosters the growth of regular naval establishments."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Count Sartiges, French min., July 28, 1856,
55 Br. & For. State Papers, 589, 591, replying to the invitation to
adhere to the Declaration of Paris.

In the same note Mr. Marcy says: "The right to resort to privateers is
as clear as the right to use public armed ships, and as incontestable
as any other right appertaining to belligerents." Id. 590.
"The right of a commercial state, when unhappily involved in war, to
employ its mercantile marine for defense and aggression, has hereto-
fore proved to be an essential aid in checking the domination of a bel-
ligerent possessed of a powerful navy. By the surrender of that
uncontested right one legitimate mode of defense is parted with for a
like surrender only in form by a strong naval power, but in effect the
mutual surrender places the weaker nation more completely at the
mercy of the stronger." (Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Gadsden, ́
min. to Mexico, No. 66, July 14, 1856, MS. Inst. Mexico, XVII. 73;
and, to the same effect, Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Seibels, No.
19, July 14, 1856, MS. Inst. Belgium, I. 94.)

"Though the President does not seriously apprehend that the rights of the United States in regard to the employment of privateers will be affected directly or indirectly by the new state of things which may arise out of the proceedings of the congress at Paris, yet it would be gratifying to him to be assured by the Government of Sardinia that no new complications in our relations with it are likely to spring from those proceedings. He trusts that, so long as Sardinia is, and he anxiously desires she should ever be, a friendly power, her ports will be, as they heretofore have been, a refuge from the dangers of the sea and from attack as well for our privateers as for our merchant vessels and national ships of war in the event of hostilities between any other European power and this country."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Daniel, min. to Sardinia, No. 18, July 29, 1856, MS. Inst. Italy, I. 93.

"You will see by the enclosed slip just cut from the Globe newspaper that Mr. Cobden anticipates for your conditional surrender of privateering, an almost unanimous decision in the House of Commons in its favor. This is a sincere, and I believe a sound opinion, viewing the question as an English one. They will gain everything, first. for the security of their commerce, and, second, in the concentrative efficacy of their prodigious naval armament. War will not endanger their merchant ships or their manufactures, and thus, relieved from all care about these vital interests, they may send their fleets to bully and thunder where they please. Opposite results may be drawn from

an American view. Losing the right of privateering, in other words, of assailing the vital interests of our adversary, our means of aggression are nil. Our Navy must be docked; and we must be content with whatever terms the adversary in this national duel may prescribe for a peace, if indeed a peace would ever be desirable or attainable. You see, I have my misgivings on your great measure of change in the rights of nations at war. If our Navy approached anywhere near to the power of the one displayed off Portsmouth last spring. I should be quite willing to let it take its chance in defending our coast : but as it now is, and as I am afraid, by an unwise economy, it may be long kept, it is impossible to say how many points of landing. along our coast, a war would rapidly become one of invasion."

Mr. Dallas to Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, Dec. 12, 1856, 1 Letters from Lon-
don (1869), 117, 119.

On the subject of Maritime Law, see Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr.
Dallas, No. 48, Jan. 31, 1857, MS. Inst. Great Britain, XVII. 58.

"In relation to the communication of R. B. Forbes, esq., a copy of which was sent by you to this Department on the 16th ultimo, inquiring whether letters of marque cannot be furnished for the propeller Pembroke, which is about to be despatched to China, I have the honor to state that it appears to me there are objections to, and no authority for, granting letters of marque in the present contest. I am not aware that Congress, which has the exclusive power of granting letters of marque and reprisal, has authorized such letters to be issued against the insurgents, and were there such authorization I am not prepared to advise its exercise, because it would, in my view, be a recognition of the assumption of the insurgents that they are a distinct and independent nationality.

“Under the act of August 5, 1861, supplementary to an act entitled an act to protect the commerce of the United States, and to punish the crime of piracy,' the President is authorized to instruct the commanders of armed vessels sailing under the authority of any letters of marque and reprisal granted by the Congress of the United States, or the commanders of any other suitable vessels, to subdue, seize, take, and, if on the high seas, to send into any port of the United States any vessel or boat built, purchased, fitted out, or held,' etc.

"This allusion to letters of marque does not authorize such letters to be issued, nor do I find any other act containing such authorization. But the same act, in the 2d section, as above quoted, gives the President power to authorize the commanders of any suitable vessels to subdue, seize,' etc. Under this clause, letters permissive, under proper restrictions and guards against abuse, might be granted to the propellor Pembroke, so as to meet the views expressed by Mr. Forbes. This would seem to be lawful and perhaps not liable to the objections

of granting letters of marque against our own citizens, and that, too, without law or authority from the only constituted power that can grant it."

Mr. Welles, Sec. of the Navy, to Mr. Seward, Sec. of State. Oct. 1, 1861,
MS. Misc. Let.

"A bill to authorize the President, during the continuance of the civil war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, was introduced at the session of 1861-62, but failed in consequence of the position taken in opposition, that letters of marque could only be granted against an independent state, and that their issue might be regarded as a recognition of the Confederate States. It was also objected that the bill if passed would be regarded as an admission of weakness on the part of the Federal Navy, and as conflicting with the position that privateering, as conducted by the Confederate States, was piracy."

Lawrences' Wheaton (1863), 643, citing Cong. Globe (1861-1862), 3325, 3335.

With reference to the act of Congress of March 3, 1863, entitled "An act concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods," Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams: "Congress has conferred upon the President ample power for the execution of the latter measure [issue of letters of marque and reprisal] and the necessary arrangements for it are now engaging the attention of the proper departments."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, March 9, 1863,
Dip. Cor. 1863, I. 141.

Under the act of March 3, 1863, the Department of State formulated and printed "Instructions for the Private Armed Vessels of the United States," and a set of "Regulations," the latter being dated “Department of State, Washington, March 20, 1863." These documents were embodied in a printed circular of seven pages. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles, continued to oppose the policy, setting forth his objections in a letter to Mr. Seward of March 31, 1863. Mr. Welles says that no responsible person applied for letters of marque. It appears that in April, 1863, a citizen of New York applied for letters, and was invited by Mr. Seward to a conference, which resulted in the submission by the former of certain propositions. These were communicated by Mr. Seward to Mr. Welles, with the statement that, "in view of a slight improvement of the disposition of the British Government in regard to assisting the fitting out of piratical vessels," it seemed inexpedient to proceed at this moment to the issue of letters of marque."

MS. Circulars, I. 218-221; Welles's Lincoln and Seward, 145-164; Mr.
Seward to Mr. Welles, April 20, 1863, 60 MS. Dom, Let. 270.

"You have rightly interpreted to Mr. Drouyn de l'Huys our views concerning the issue of letters of marque. The unrestrained issue of piratical vessels from Europe to destroy our commerce, break our blockade of insurrectionary ports, and invade our loyal coast, would practically be an European war against the United States, none the less real or dangerous for wanting the sanction of a formal declaration. Congress has committed to the President, as a weapon of national defense, the authority to issue letters of marque. We know that it is a weapon that cannot be handled without great danger of annoyance to the neutral and friendly commercial powers. But even that hazard must be incurred rather than quietly submit to the apprehended greater evil. There are now, as you must have observed, indications that that apprehended greater evil may be averted through the exercise of a restraining power over the enemies of the United States in Great Britain. Hopeful of such a result, we forbear from the issue of letters of marque, and are content to have the weapon ready for use if it shall become absolutely necessary."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, min. to France, April 24, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, I. 662.

"Thoughtful and hopeful minds generally favor the proposition to exempt private persons and property on the high seas from the inflictions of war. So far as I have learned, this opinion has, however, been by no means universally accepted. There is a large class of persons who habitually regard foreign war as always a probable contingency, besides many who are continually expecting a conflict with some particular state or states. These persons regard privateering not only as the strongest arm of naval defense, but as one which the United States could use with greater advantage than any foreign enemy. These persons are so jealous on the subject of privateering that they are always unwilling to consent to waive the right in any one treaty for fear that the treaty may become a precedent for the entire abandonment of that form of public war. Certainly this latter class very strongly prevailed throughout the entire period of our civil war. I have not recently made any careful inquiry to ascertain how far that popular sentiment has been modified by the return of peace."

Mr. Seward, See. of State, to Mr. Bancroft, Feb. 19, 1868, Dip. Corr. 1868, II. 46, 47.

In view of the fact that Spain had not adhered to the first article of the declaration of Paris of 1856, the United States, April 15, 1898, in view of the strained situation between the two countries instructed its diplomatic and consular officers to be on the watch to prevent the possible fitting out or departure of privateers against the United States.

For. Rel. 1898, 1169.

With his despatch No. 356 of April 16, 1898, Mr. Hay, United States ambassador in London, inclosed a letter addressed to The Times by Sir George Baden-Powell, proposing that in the event of hostilities between the United States and Spain the powers should treat privateers, if any, as pirates. With his number 358 of April 18, 1898, Mr. Hay enclosed two letters from The Times of that day, one by Professor T. E. Holland and the other by Sir Sherston Baker. By the former the proposal was characterized as "an inadmissible atrocity," and by the latter as "an uncivilized act, subversive of one of the clearest and best defined rules of international law."

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April 23, 1898, Mr. Sherman, Secretary of State, telegraphed to Mr. Hay: In the event of hostilities between United States and Spain, the policy of this Government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the following recognized rules of international law: First, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; second, neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag; and, third, blockades in order to be binding must be effective."

July 6, 1898, the Department of State cabled to Mr. Hay a rumor communicated by the United States consul at Vancouver, British Columbia, that a Spanish privateer was lying in the Gulf of Georgia. The rumor was also communicated to the British ambassador at Washington. Investigation proved it to be erroneous.

For. Rel. 1898, 970, 971, 984–987.

"The Spanish Government, while maintaining their right to issue letters of marque, which they expressly reserved in their note of the 16th May, 1857, in reply to the request of France for the adhesion of Spain to the declaration of Paris relative to maritime law, will organize for the present a service of auxiliary cruisers of the navy,' composed of ships of the Spanish mercantile navy, which will cooperate with the latter for the purposes of cruising, and which will be subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the navy."

War decree of Spain, April 23, 1898, London Gazette, May 3, 1898, For.
Rel. 1898, 774.

XIII. DECLARATIONS OF MARITIME LAW.

1. THE ARMED NEUTRALITY.

§ 1220.

See Fauchille, Le Ligue des Neutres de 1780.

"Previous to the war which grew out of the American Revolution, the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents had been settled and clearly defined by the conventional law of Europe, to which all the

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