"The doctrine of continued or continuous voyages, which Sir W. Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, originated, deserves to be noticed, and may be noticed here, although it first arose in reference to colonial trade with another country, carried on by neutrals. As the English courts condemned such trade, the neutrals in the first part of this century, especially shippers and captains belonging to the United States, tried to evade the rule by stopping at a neutral port and seeming to pay duties, and then, perhaps, after landing and relading the cargoes, carried them to the mother country of the colony. The motive for this was, that if the goods in question were bona fide imported from the neutral country, the transaction was a regular one. The courts held, that if an original intention could be proved of carrying the goods from the colony to the mother country, the proceedings in the neutral territory, even if they amounted to landing goods and paying duties, could not overcome the evidence of such intention; the voyage was really a continued one artfully interrupted, and the penalties of law had to take effect. Evidence, therefore, of original intention and destination was the turning point in such cases.' Woolsey, Int. Law, § 207, p. 355, citing The Polly, 2 Rob. 361-372; The The advantages claimed to be derived by Great Britain from the adoption of the rule of continuity, and the injury inflicted on neutrals by the application of this restriction, are thus stated in the London Quarterly Review: "It will be sufficient for our purpose to observe, that so far was the rule of 1756 relaxed, that the ports of the United States of America became so many entrepôts for the manufactures and commodities of France, Spain, and Holland, from whence they were reexported, under the American flag, to their respective colonies; they brought back the produce of those colonies to the ports of America; they reshipped them for the enemies' ports of Europe; they entered freely all the ports of the United Kingdom, with cargoes brought directly from the hostile colonies; thus, in fact, not only carying on the whole trade of one of the belligerents, which that belligerent would have carried on in time of peace, but superadding their own and a considerable part of ours. Valuable cargoes of bullion and specie and spices were nominally purchased by Americans, in the eastern colonies of the enemy, and wafted under the American flag to the real hostile proprietors. One single American house contracted for the whole of the merchandise of the Dutch East India Company at Batavia, amounting to no less a sum than one million seven hundred thousand pounds sterling. The consequence was, that, while not a single merchant ship belonging to the enemy crossed the Atlantic, or doubled the Cape of Good Hope, the produce of the eastern and western worlds sold cheaper in the markets of France and Holland than in our own. The commerce of England became every month more languid and prostrate, till reduced, as justly observed by a member of the House of Commons, 'to a state of suspended animation." " 7 London Quarterly Review (March, 1812), 5, 8. 6 "The British rule, proclaimed in 1756, by which direct trade with the enemies' colonies was made subject to restrictions,' is discussed in a work under the title of 'An examination of the British doctrine which subjects to capture a neutral trade, not open in time of peace,' written by Mr. Madison. (See 2 Madison's Works, 229.) The British view of the question is stated in a pamphlet, by Mr. James Stephen, entitled War in Disguise.' The object of the British Gov' ernment, in which it was zealously supported by Sir W. Scott, was to stamp with illegality voyages from French or Dutch colonies to the United States and from thence to France or Holland. To sustain this the doctrine of continuity of voyages' was invented, a doctrine which was caught up and applied in the case of the Springbok. The doctrine, as applied by the British admiralty courts in 1801, was that unless a ship from a French colony landed her goods and paid her duties in the port of the United States to which she intermediately resorted on her way to France, her voyage to the United States was to be held to be continuous with that from the United States to France. In 1805, however, it was held in the case of the Essex, that if the duties were not actually paid, but were provided for by means of debentures, the importation into the United States was not bona fide, and the voyage was held to be continuous, notwithstanding the goods were disembarked in New York. But aside from the technical difficulties attending the doctrine of continuous voyages, as thus stated, and the ruin to which it subjects neutral interests, it is repugnant to those principles of sovereignty which are at the basis of international law. A sovereign has a right to regulate his trade as he chooses. He may impose tariffs, embargoes, nonintercourse, as he deems best. He may say, 'At peace no one shall trade with my colonies but myself.' If he has power to impose one kind of limitation in peace, he can impose another kind of limitation in war. Since no one disputes a neutral's right to trade between ports of the mother country, it is difficult to see on what ground rests the denial of a neutral's right to trade between the port of a colony and that of the mother country. War necessarily greatly abridges neutral commerce by exposing it to confiscation for contraband and for blockaderunning. To permit one belligerent to shut out neutrals from a commerce which the other belligerent may open to them, such commerce not being in contraband of war or in evasion of blockade, would impose upon neutrality burdens so intolerable as to make war, on its part, preferable to peace. The doctrine of continuous voyages,' also, as thus interpreted, is open to all the objections of a paper blockade; it enables a belligerent cruiser to seize all neutrals going to a belligerent port if they hold produce of the colonies of that belligerent, though there be no pretense of a blockade of either colony or the mother state. Great Britain, also, it was urged, had no right to complain of this relaxation by a hostile sovereign of his colonial regulations, since she had repeatedly varied in war her colonial policy of trade, relaxing it so as to enable her colonies to have the advantage of neutral commerce." Wharton Int. Law Digest, III. 501, § 388, citing 2 Lyman's Diplomacy of the United States, chap. i. The following proposal was made: "And it is to be particularly understood that under the denomination of enemy's property is not to be comprised the merchandise of the growth, produce, or manufactures of the countries or dominions at war which shall have been acquired by the citizens or subjects of the neutral power, and shall be transported for their account, which merchandise can not in any case or on any pretext be excepted from the freedom of the neutral flag." On this Mr. Madison makes the following observations: "This enumeration of contraband articles is copied from the treaty of 1781 between Great Britain and Russia. It is sufficiently limited, and that treaty is an authority more likely than any other to be respected by the British Government. The sequel of the article, which protects the productions of an hostile colony converted into neutral property, is taken from the same model, with the addition of the terms in any case or on any pretext.' This addition is meant to embrace more explicitly our right to trade freely with the colonies at war with Great Britain and between them and all parts of the world in colonial productions, being at the time not enemy's but neutral property; a trade equally legitimate in itself with that between neutral countries directly and in their respective vessels and such colonies, which her regulations do not contest. "In support of this right, in opposition to the British doctrine that a trade not allowed by a nation in time of peace can not be opened to neutrals in time of war, it may be urged that all nations are in the practice of varying more or less in time of war, their commercial laws from the state of these laws in time of peace, a practice agreeable to reason as well as favorable to neutral nations; that the change may be made in time of war on considerations not incident to a state of war, but on such as are known to have the same effect in time of peace; that Great Britain herself is in the regular practice of changing her navigation and commercial laws in times of war, particularly in relation to a neutral intercourse with her colonies; that at this time she admits a trade between neutral countries and the colonies of her enemies, when carried on directly between them or between the former and herself, interrupting only a direct trade between such colonies and their parent state, and between them and countries in Europe, other than those to which the neutral trade may respectively belong; that as she does not contest the right of neutrals to trade with hostile colonies within these limitations, the trade can be and actually is carried on indirectly between such colonies and all countries, even those to which the colonies belong; and consequently that the effect of her doctrine and her practice is not to deprive her enemy of their colonial trade, but merely to lessen the value of it in proportion to the charges incident to the circuitous course into which it is forced, an advantage to her which, if just in itself, would not be sufficiently so to balance the impolitic vexations accruing to neutral and friendly nations." Mr. Madison, Sec. of State, to Mr. Monroe, min. to England, Jan. 5, 1804, · With respect to the particular rights to be placed under the guaranty of a general treaty of peace, it will naturally occur that the one having the first place in the wishes of the United States is that which is at present violated by the British principle subjecting to capture every trade opened by a belligerent to a neutral nation during It will be recollected that this right stands foremost in the list comprised in the two plans of armed neutrality in 1780 and 1800. In general it is to be understood that the United States are friendly to the principles of those conventions, and would see with pleasure all of them effectually and permanently recognized as principles of the established law of nations." war, Mr. Madison, Sec. of State, to Mr. Armstrong, min, to France, March 14, 1806, MS. Inst. U. States, Ministers, VI. 322. An action was brought on certain policies of insurance on the brig Salmon and her cargo, in which policies it was declared (1) that the assurance was made only against the capture by the British, and (2) that the brig was warranted to be an American bottom and her cargo American property. It appeared that the brig when captured had just left Port au Paix, whither she had carried a cargo of flour from Philadelphia under a contract with the French minister. At Port au Paix she was compelled to take on board a French officer and a few soldiers, all of whom were invalids, to bring them for their health to America. The brig when captured was taken to Bermuda, where with her cargo she was condemned. The libel set forth various causes of condemnation, but the decree of condemnation was general and specified no particular cause of forfeiture. McKean, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said the first ground of defense to the action was that the vessel was engaged in trade with the French islands, which, being unlawful before the war, must be regarded as unneutral afterwards. He rejected this view, maintaining that there was no violation of neutrality. The mere acceptance of a bounty to commerce, such as the opening of a free port or the relinquishment of duties, was not an act of partiality or unneutral. The colonial governments of Great Britain herself had even invited in time of war the trade which was forbidden in time of peace. The true rule, said Chief Justice McKean, was that the neutral power should not do any act in favor of the commercial or military operations of one of the belligerents; or, in other words, it should not by treaty afford succor or grant a privilege which was not stipulated for previously to the war. The second ground of defense was that the decree of condemnation alleged the property to be French, and that this was conclusive. This could not be admitted. The libel contained various allegations, but as the decree of condemnation was general it could not be said to have affirmed any particular one. Evidence might be received to establish the American ownership. The court observed that an American citizen might lawfully at any time carry flour and other articles of provision or despatches for a French minister from an American to a French port. The third ground of defense was that there was a concealment of material facts in regard to the risk. The court held that this was not supported by the testimony. The court observed that the cargo was at the risk of the plaintiff till it was actually delivered; and he had "never heard of any law, in any civilized nation, that deemed it contraband, or unlawful, to carry a few, unarmed, invalid sodliers, to a neutral country, in pursuit of health and refreshment." The fourth ground of defense was that some household furniture on board, belonging to the passengers, came within the description of cargo, and that the warranty therefore had not been strictly performed. The court said that household furniture could not be regarded as baggage and must constitute a part of the cargo, but that the exception could not be admitted under the peculiar circumstances of the shipment in question. In conclusion the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Vasse v. Ball, Supreme Court of Pa., 2 Dall. 270. An American vessel in April, 1812, before the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain, sailed from Boston, with a cargo of merchandise, to Liverpool and the north of Europe, and thence directly or indirectly to the United States. Having discharged her cargo, she sailed from England in June, 1812, with |