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After considering the file, the state agency wrote respondent that, based upon the evidence, it had made a proposed determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972 (A. 12–13). The letter included a statement of reasons (ibid.).

The state agency asked respondent to furnish within ten days any further evidence relating to the rea5 The letter stated (A. 12-13; emphasis supplied):

"We previously informed you that we were asked by the Social Security Administration to help determine whether your impairment still prevents you from working. Although you indicate on the report you recently completed for us that you do not feel your condition has improved so that you are able to return to work, the other information and evidence in your case shows that you are able to work, and have been since May, 1972.

"You were initially found to be disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain. In addition you have been found to have diabetes. Medical evidence shows no significant motion limitation of your back which would impose severe functional restrictions. Diabetes is under control and no complications have been noted, secondary to this. Although you remain somewhat anxious, there is no indications [sic] of continued emotional problems of sufficient severity to preclude all work for which you are qualified.

“Therefore, disability benefits being paid on your social security number may be stopped unless additional evidence is submitted which shows that you are still unable to work because of your impairment.

"If you have additional information you want us to consider, please let us know immediately, using the enclosed envelope; a reasonable additional amount of time will be granted where necessary for you to obtain and submit additional evidence. If we do not hear from you within ten days, we will forward your records to the Social Security Administration and when a formal decision is made you will be notified.

"Under the Social Security Law, benefits may be paid for a three-month period of adjustment. This period includes the month in which you have a regained ability to work and two additional months.

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sons it gave or to request further time to obtain such evidence (A. 13). In response, he disputed one characterization of his claim made in the state agency's statement of reasons and stated that the agency already had "enough evidence" in the file upon which to base a decision (A. 13).

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Upon the basis of this information, the state agency determined that respondent had ceased to be disabled in May 1972 and forwarded that determination to the Social Security Administration, which accepted that conclusion and on June 12, 1972, determined that payments of benefits to respondent should cease, effective in July 1972 (A. 14), after the two-month statutory grace period (see p. 16, infra). Social Security notified respondent in writing of this determination. and of his right to request reconsideration within six months (A. 14).

Respondent did not seek reconsideration. Rather, on August 3, 1972, he filed his complaint in this case seeking a declaration that the administrative procedures established by the Secretary for determining whether there was a continuing disability were unconstitutional, and an injunction requiring the Secretary to continue paying respondent benefits until he is afforded an oral evidentiary hearing concerning the cessation of his disability (A. 1-3). The Secretary moved to dismiss on the ground that respondent's benefits had been terminated pursuant to lawful regulations that do not violate due process (A. 3-4), and on Feb

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• Respondent claimed that he had arthritis of the spine rather than a strained back (A. 13).

59-762 O 75 20

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ruary 13, 1973, the district court ordered respondent's benefits reinstated pending its final disposition on the merits (A. 15-16).

On April 6, 1973, the district court held that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary terminated respondent's benefits were unconstitutional (Pet. App. 6A-18A). The court noted that since respondent did not contend that the Secretary had failed to comply with the applicable procedures the only issue was whether those procedures satisfy due process. The court ruled that respondent's interest in continued receipt of Social Security disability benefits is indistinguishable from the state welfare beneficiary's interest involved in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, and Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (Pet. App. 8A-10A), and that, because disability determinations may involve subjective judgments in resolving conflicting medical evidence and are not exclusively based upon "objective" medical evidence, a due process standard different from that required by Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, for termination of welfare benefits is not justified for termination of Social Security disability benefits (Pet. App. 10A-13A).

The court rejected the Secretary's contentions that the protections against possibly erroneous decisions contained in the procedures complied with minimum standards of due process when viewed in the context of the administrative burden and immense costs that would result if the Secretary were required to provide an oral evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of benefits (id. at 12A-17A).

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The court remanded the case to the Secretary for the payment of disability benefits and for further proceedings not inconsistent with the court's opinion (id. at 18A).'

The court of appeals affirmed on the opinion of the district court (id. at 2A).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. Respondent's Social Security disability insurance benefit payments were terminated by the Secretary pursuant to procedures evolved to cope with the enormous burdens presented in administering a multibillion dollar program in the context of a cooperative federal-state institutional structure. Those procedures are fair and satisfy due process requirements.

Before his benefits were terminated, respondent was given the opportunity to submit evidence demonstrating his continuing disability, and he did so. After the state agency involved in administering the disability program tentatively determined that he was no longer disabled, respondent was told the basis for that conclusion and was given a further opportunity to submit evidence. Though many take advantage

"The court's order continued the reinstatement of respondent's benefits. At current levels he is entitled to receive benefits of $163.60 per month. As a result of his disability, he is also entitled to receive both hospital and supplementary medical insurance under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395, et seq., in which case a monthly premium of $6.30 would be deducted from his monthly benefits, so that his net monthly benefit would be $157.30. Respondent's children would also be entitled to receive, as his auxiliary beneficiaries, a monthly benefit totalling $151.00 as a result of his disability, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 402 (d) (1).

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of that opportunity, with favorable results, respondent declined to do so, saying that the state agency already had "enough evidence."

After the state agency, with the concurrence of the Secretary, made its "initial determination" that respondent was no longer disabled, respondent did not seek reconsideration or request an evidentiary hearing, although many beneficiaries, taking advantage of the continuing right to submit additional evidence and to obtain de novo review, successfully seek both.

The courts below held that those procedures unconstitutionally deprived respondent of property without due process because prior to termination of disability insurance benefits respondent had no opportunity to appear personally or confront and cross-examine the witnesses who provided the evidence upon which the termination decision was based. The courts thus extended to the termination of Social Security disability payments the procedures that this Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, required for termination of welfare benefits. The two situations are sufficiently different, however, to justify different procedures.

2. This Court has held that, in determining what procedures for denying or terminating statutory benefits satisfy due process, the competing interests must be accommodated. Those interests are: the worker's interest in continued receipt of disability insurance benefits assessed in light of the reliability of the existing procedures, and the government's interest in avoiding unneeded administrative burdens and costs that would deplete the ability of the disability insur