laws as to entitle him, if not obstructed or prevented, to complete his
claim.
8. Ard v. Brandon, 156 U. S. 537, is decisive of this case. Ib.
RAILROAD.
See COMMON CARRIER;
CONSTITUTIONAL Law, A, 7, 14, 15.
The act of August 28, 1894, c. 349, does not grant a right in præsenti to all
persons who may, after the passage of the law, use alcohol in the arts,
or in any medicinal or other like compounds, to a rebate or repayment
of the tax paid on such alcohol, but the grant was conditioned on use,
in compliance with regulations to be prescribed, in the absence of
which regulations the right did not so vest as to create a cause of
action by reason of the unregulated use. Dunlap v. United States, 65.
1. The provisions in the Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1887, c. 42, § 3,
concerning the commencement of process for attachment, are incon-
sistent with those concerning the same subject contained in the act of
March 6, 1891; and although chapter 42 is not expressly repealed by
the act of 1891, it must be held to be repealed by the later act on the
principle laid down in United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 92, that
"when there are two acts on the same subject the rule is to give effect
to both if possible; but in the two are repugnant in any of their pro-
visions, the latter act without any repealing clause operates, to the
extent of the repugnancy, as a repeal of the first." Henrietta Mining
& Milling Co. v. Gardner, 123.
2. When the language of a statute is clear, it needs no construction.
Yerke v. United States, 439.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED JURISDICTION, C, 3, 5, 9;
The manufacturer of the sugar, and not the producer of the sugar cane, is
the person entitled to the "bounty on sugar" granted by the act of
March 2, 1895, c. 189, to "producers and manufacturers of sugar in
the United States." Allen v. Smith, 389,
1. The system of taxation adopted in Ohio was not intended to be un-
friendly to, or to discriminate against owners of shares in national
banks, and, in its practical operation it does not materially do so;
and there is nothing upon the face of these statutes which shows such
discrimination. First National Bank of Wellington v. Chapman, 205.
2. The term "moneyed capital" in the act of Congress fixing limits to
state taxation on investments in national banks, Rev. Stat. § 5219,
does not include capital which does not come into competition with
the business of national banks, and exemptions from taxation, made
for reasons of public policy, and not as an unfriendly discrimination
against investments in national bank shares, cannot be regarded as
forbidden by those statutes. Ib.
3. This court is bound by the construction put by the highest court of
the State of Kentucky upon the provisions in the Constitution of that
State, relating to exemptions from taxation of property used for
"public purposes," however much it may doubt the soundness of the
interpretation. Covington v. Kentucky, 231.
4. The provision in the act of the legislature of Kentucky of May 1, 1886,
c. 897, that "the said reservoir or reservoirs, machinery, pipes, mains
and appurtenances, with the land on which they are situated," which
the city of Covington was, by that act authorized to acquire and
construct, "shall be and remain forever exempt from state, county
and city tax," did not, in view of the provision in the act of February
14, 1856, that "all charters and grants of or to corporations, or amend-
ments thereof, and all other statutes, shall be subject to amendment
or repeal at the will of the legislature, unless a contrary intent shall
be therein plainly expressed," which was in force at the time of the
passage of the act of May 1, 1886, tie the hands of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, so that it could not, by legislation, withdraw such ex-
emption, and subject the property to taxation. Ib.
5. Before a statute-particularly one relating to taxation - should be
held to be irrepealable, or not subject to amendment, an intent not to
repeal or amend must be so directly and unmistakably expressed as
to leave no room for doubt; and it is not so expressed when the
existence of the intent arises only from inference or conjecture. Ib.
6. A municipal corporation is a public instrumentality, established to aid
in the administration of the affairs of the State, and neither its
charters, nor any legislative act regulating the use of property held by
it for governmental or public purposes, is a contract within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States: and if the legisla-
ture choose to subject to taxation property held by a municipal
corporation of the State for public purposes, the validity of such
legislation, so far as the National Constitution is concerned, cannot
be questioned. Ib.
7. The tax authorized by the act of June 13, 1898, by the board of trade
or exchanges upon the sale of property is not a direct tax, nor a tax
upon the business itself which is so transacted, but is a duty upon the
facilities made use of and actually employed in the transaction of the
business, separate and apart from the business itself, and is a consti-
tutional exercise of the powers of taxation granted to Congress. Nicol
v. Ames, 509.
8. A sale at an exchange forms a proper basis for a classification which
excludes all sales made elsewhere from taxation. lb.
9. The means actually adopted by Congress, in the act in question, do not
illegally interfere with or obstruct the internal commerce of the States,
and are not a restraint upon that commerce, so far as to render illegal
the means adopted. Ib.
10. There is no difference, for the purposes of this decision, between the
Union Stock Yards and an exchange or board of trade. Ib.
11. The city of Henderson had authority to tax so much of the property
of the Henderson Bridge Company as was permanently between low-
water mark on the Kentucky shore and low-water mark on the Indi-
ana shore of the Ohio River, it being settled that the boundary of
Kentucky extends to low-water mark on the Indiana shore. Hender-
son Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 592.
12. The declaration of the state court that Kentucky intended by its
legislation to confer upon the city of Henderson a power of taxation
for local purposes coextensive with its statutory boundary is binding
in this court.
13. In order to bring taxation imposed by a State within the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the National Constitution, the case should
be so clearly and palpably an illegal encroachment upon private
rights as to leave, no doubt that such taxation, by its necessary
operation, is really spoliation under the guise of exerting the power
to tax. Ib.
14. The taxation by the city as property of the Bridge Company, of the
bridge and its appurtenances within the fixed boundary of the city,
between low-water mark on the two sides of the Ohio River, was not
a taking of private property for public use without just compensation,
in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
15. The Bridge Company did not acquire by contract an exemption from
local taxation in respect of its bridge situated between low-water
mark on the two shores of the Ohio River. 1b.
16. The provision in the city's charter that "no land embraced within
the city's limits, and outside of ten-acre lots as originally laid off,
shall be assessed and taxed by the city council, unless the same is
divided or laid out into lots of five acres or less, and unless the same
is actually used and devoted to farming purposes," has no reference
to bridges, their approaches, piers, etc.
17. The power of Kentucky to tax this bridge is not affected by the fact
that it was erected under the authority or with the consent of Con-
gress. lb.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 13;
NATIONAL BANK, 2, 3, 4, 5;
REBATE OF TAXES.
1. In the case of a child's gift of its property to a parent, the circum-
stances attending the transaction should be vigilantly and carefully
scrutinized by the court, in order to ascertain whether there has been
undue influence in procuring it; but it cannot be deemed prima facie
void; the presumption is in favor of its validity; and, in order to
set it aside, the court must be satisfied that it was not the voluntary
act of the donor. Towson v. Moore, 17.
2. The same rule as to the burden of proof applies with equal, if not
greater, force to the case of a gift from a parent to a child, even if
the effect of the gift is to confer upon a child, with whom the parent
makes his home and is in peculiarly close relations, a larger share of
the parent's estate than will be received by other children or grand-
children.
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