See VOLUNTARY Gift, 1, 2.
Although the bill of exceptions in this case does not state, in so many
words, that it contains all the evidence, it sufficiently appears that it
does contain all, and this court can inquire on this record whether
the Circuit Court erred in giving a peremptory instruction for the
defendant. Gunnison County Commissioners v. Rollins, 255.
1. In proceedings taken by a District Attorney of the United States, by
order of the Attorney General at the request of the Secretary of War,
and conducted under directions of the latter, to secure the condemna-
tion of private lands within the limits of his district for the purpose
of erecting fortifications thereon for the use of the United States, he
is performing his official duties as District Attorney of the United
States, and is not entitled to any extra or special compensation for
them. United States v. Johnson, 363.
2. The authority conferred upon the Attorney General by the act of
March 3, 1891, c. 542, 26 Stat. 985, to offer rewards for the detection
and prosecution of crimes against the United States, preliminary to
the indictment, empowered him to authorize the Marshal of the
Northern District of Florida to offer a reward for the arrest and
delivery of a person accused of the committal of a crime against the
United States in that district, the reward to be paid upon conviction;
and a deputy marshal, who had complied with all the conditions of
the offer and of the statute, was entitled to receive the amount of the
reward offered. United States v. Matthews, 381.
FOX RIVER WATER POWER.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3.
The facts in this case, as detailed in the statement of the case and the
opinion of the court, show that a gross fraud was committed by the
plaintiffs in error against the defendants, to dispossess them of
the property in question; and in view of the peculiar circumstances
of the case, the fraud, so glaring, the original and persistent intention
of McIntire through so many years to make himself the owner of the
property, the utter disregard shown of the rights of the plaintiff as
well as of the mortgagee, the false personation of Emma Taylor, and the
fact that the decree can do no harm to any innocent person, this court
holds that these facts do away with the defence of laches, and demand
of the court an affirmance of the action of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia, granting the relief prayed for by the plaintiffs
below. McIntire v. Pryor, 38.
1. This is one of the cases in which it is proper to issue a writ of habeas
corpus from the Federal court under the rule as stated in Ex parte
Royall, 117 U. S. 241, instead of awaiting the slow process of a writ
of error from this court to the highest court of the State where the
decision could be had. Ohio v. Thomas, 276.
2. Where a court has jurisdiction of an offence and of the accused, and
the proceedings are otherwise regular, a conviction is lawful although
the judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto; and the
validity of the title of such judge to the office, or his right to exer-
cise the judicial functions, cannot be determined on a writ of habeas
corpus; this rule is well settled, and is applicable to this case.
parte Henry Ward, 452.
3. The title of a person acting with color of authority, even if he be not
a good officer in point of law, cannot be collaterally attacked. Ib.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 1, 3, 6.
1. With regard to the operation of a voluntary, or common law assign-
ment of his property by an insolvent debtor for the benefit of his
creditors upon property situated in other States, there is a general
consensus of opinion that it will be respected, except so far as it
comes in conflict with the rights of local creditors, or with the laws
or public policy of the State in which it is sought to be enforced.
Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 624.
2. With respect to statutory assignments of the property of an insolvent
debtor, the prevailing American doctrine is, that a conveyance under
a state insolvent law operates only upon property within the territory
of that State, and with respect to property in another State it is given
only to such effect as the laws of that State permit, and in general
must give way to claims of creditors pursuing their remedies there. Ib.
3. The execution and delivery by Merrill & Company to the Security and
Trust Company in Minnesota of an assignment of their property for
the benefit of their creditors, made under the insolvent laws of that
VOL.. CLXXIII-46
State, and the acceptance thereof by the assignee and its qualification
thereunder, and the notice thereof to Mudge & Sons in Massachusetts,
who held personal property belonging to the said assignors, did not
vest in the assignee such a title to that property that it could not,
after such notice, be lawfully seized by attachment in an action
instituted in Massachusetts by creditors of the insolvents who were
citizens of New York, and who had notice of the assignment, but had
not proved their claims against the assigned estate, nor filed a release
thereof. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
1. A receiver of a railroad in a State, appointed by a Circuit Court of the
United States, is not authorized by the fact of such appointment to
bring here for review a judgment in a court of the State against him,
when no other cause exists to give this court jurisdiction. Bausman
v. Dixon, 113.
2. On the facts stated by the court in its opinion, it declines to hold that
it affirmatively appears from the record that a decision could not have
been had in the Supreme Court of the State, which is the highest
court in the State; and this being so, it holds that the writ of error
must be dismissed. Mullen v. Western Union Beef Co., 116.
3. As the controversy in this case involved the question on what basis
dividends in insolvency should have been declared, and therein the
enforcement of the trust in accordance with law, this court has
jurisdiction of it in equity, Merrill v. National Bank of Jackson-
ville, 131.
4. On the facts stated in the opinion, the court holds that the plaintiff in
error, a New York corporation, having, of its own motion, sought to
litigate its rights in a state court of Louisiana, and having been given
the opportunity to do so, no Federal question arises out of the fact
that the litigation there resulted unsuccessfully, and without the
decision of a Federal question which might give this court jurisdiction;
following Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 370, in holding that when a state
court has based its decision on a local or state question, the logical
course here is to dismiss the writ of error. Remington Paper Company
v. Watson, 443.
5. On a writ of error to a state court this court cannot take jurisdiction
under the allegation that a contract has been impaired by a decision
of that court, when it appears that the state court has done nothing
more than construe its own constitution and statutes existing at the
time when the bonds were issued, there being no subsequent legisla
tion touching the subject. Turner v. Wilkes County, 461.
6. This court is bound by the decision of a state court in regard to the
meaning of the constitution and laws of its own State, and its decision
upon such a state of facts raises no Federal question; though other
principles obtain when the writ of error is to a Federal court. Ib.
7. After the hearing of the former appeal in this case, 170 U. S. 1, and
after the decree of this court determining the rights of the parties,
and remanding the case to the Court of Claims with instructions to
enter a new judgment for the net amount actually received by the
Government for the Kansas lands, without interest, less the amount
of lands upon the basis of which settlement was made with the
Tonawandas, and other just deductions, etc., and after the Court of
Claims had complied with this mandate, in accordance with its terms,
a motion on the part of the United States to this court to direct the
Court of Claims to find further facts comes too late. United States v.
New York Indians, 464.
8. As the judgment of the Court of Claims now appealed from was in
exact accordance with the mandate of this court, the appeal from it
is dismissed. Ib.
9. The sixth section of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, did not change
the limit of two years as regards cases which could be taken from
Circuit and District Courts of the United States to this court, and
that act did not operate to reduce the time in which writs of error
could issue from this court to state courts. Allen v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 479.
10. As a reference to the opinion of the Supreme Court of California
makes patent the fact that that court rested its decision solely upon
the construction of the contract between the parties to this action
which forms its, subject, and decided the case wholly independent of
the Federal questions now set up; and as the decree of the court below
was adequately sustained by such independent, non-Federal question,
it follows that no issue is presented on the record which this court has
power to review. Ib.
11. In ascertaining the jurisdictional amount on an appeal to this court,
it is proper to compute interest as part of the claim. Guthrie National
Bank v. Guthrie, 528.
12. The court has the power in the absence of statutory provisions for
notice to parties, to make rules regarding it. Ib.
13. This court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the state
court in this case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it deprived
the defendants of any right, privilege or immunity set up by them
under the Constitution of the United States. Henderson Bridge Co.
v. Henderson City, 592.
14. The question raised by the eighth and ninth assignments of error,
relating to alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, are not presented by the record,
and do not result by necessary intendment therefrom, and are there-
fore not considered by the court, under the well-settled rules that the
attempt to raise a Federal question for the first time after a decision
by the court of last resort of a State is too late; and that where it is
disclosed that an asserted Federal question was not presented to the
state court or called in any way to its attention, and where it is not
necessarily involved in the decision of the state court, such question
will not be considered by this court. Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owens-
boro, 636.
See ABATEMENT;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 8;
B.. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
A Circuit Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review a decree of a
Circuit Court when that decree, as in this case, was not a final one.
Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 582.
See JURISDICTION, C, 10, 11.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
1. The Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Louisiana has jurisdiction of a suit brought in it by a citizen of New
York to recover from the city of New Orleans on a number of cer-
tificates, payable to bearer, made by the city, although the petition
contains no averment that the suit could have been maintained by the
assignors of the claims or certificates sued upon. New Orleans v.
Quinlan, 191.
2. Newgass v. New Orleans, 33 Fed. Rep. 196, approved in holding that
"A Circuit Court shall have no jurisdiction for the recovery of the
contents of proinissory notes or other choses in action brought in
favor of assignees or transferees except over, (1) suits upon foreign
bills of exchange; (2) suits that might have been prosecuted in such
court to recover the said contents, if no assignment or transfer had
been made; (3) suits upon choses in action payable to bearer, and
made by a corporation." Ib.
3. The instruments sued on in this case being payable to bearer, and
having been made by a corporation, are expressly excepted by the
Judiciary Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, from the general rule pre-
scribed in it that an assignee or subsequent holder of a promissory
note or chose in action could not sue in a Circuit or District Court of
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