Opinion of the Court. ratified by the proper authorities of the Government, becomes the supreme law of the land, and the courts can no more go behind it for the purpose of annulling its effect and operation than they can behind an act of Congress." But we are now asked to direct the Court of Claims to find: First. What constituted the Onondagas at Onondaga, Oneidas at Green Bay, Stockbridges, Munsees and Brothertowns parties to the treaty of Buffalo Creek, as proclaimed April 4, 1840? Second. Whether or not the Oneidas at Green Bay, Stockbridges, Munsees and Brothertowns resided in the State of New York when the treaty of Buffalo Creek was proclaimed, or when they became parties thereto ? But if these be material facts, they were equally so when the findings were made at the first hearing, and the attention of the court should have been called to the matter, and a more particular finding requested. The motion contemplates an order upon the court to send up the testimony upon which it had found the ultimate fact that these three tribes were parties to the treaty, and inferentially for us to pass upon the sufficiency of that testimony to establish such ultimate fact. If the finding of these probative facts were deemed material within the case of United States v. Pugh, 99 U. S. 265, application should have been made when the case was first sent here for a finding of such facts. In the Pugh case the Court of Claims found certain circumstantial facts, and the question this court was called upon to decide was whether those facts were sufficient to support the judgment. But this court did not hold that, where the Court of Claims was satisfied that the evidence before it fully established a fact, it was bound to insert all the evidence upon that point, if the losing party thought the court made a mistake. This court has repeatedly held that the findings of the Court of Claims in an action at law determines all matters of fact, like the verdict of a jury, and that where there is any evidence of a fact which they find, and no exception is taken, their finding is final; Stone v. United States, 164 U. S. 380; Desmare v. United States, 93 Opinion of the Court. U. S. 605; Talbert v. United States, 155 U. S. 45; and in McClure v. United States, 116 U. S. 145, this court distinctly held that it would not remand a case to the Court of Claims with-directions to return whether certain distinct propositions, in requests for findings of fact, presented to that court at the trial of the case, were established and proved by the evidence, if it appeared that the object of the request to have it so remanded was to ask this court to determine questions of fact upon the evidence. In The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431, 444, it was said by Mr. Justice Story: "We think, therefore, that upon principle every existing claim which the party has omitted to make at the hearing upon the merits, and before the final decree, is to be considered as waived by him, and is not to be entertained in any future proceedings; and when a decree has been made, which is in its own terms absolute, it is to be carried into effect according to those terms, and excludes all inquiry between the litigating parties as to liens or claims which might have been attached to it by the court, if they had been previously brought to its notice." See also Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U. S. 415. But it is difficult to see how the proposed findings, if made, could be deemed material. This court held that the treaty of Buffalo Creek was a grant in præsenti of a certain tract of land in Kansas, described by metes and bounds. The second article of the treaty indicates that the grant was made upon the basis of 320 acres for each inhabitant, the recital "being 320 acres for each soul of said Indians as their numbers are at present computed." But the grant was not of 320 acres for each soul, but of a tract of land en bloc. Under the decision of the court a present title thereto passed to the Indians. This being the case, the United States are in no position to show that the Government erred in its computation of souls, or that certain tribes who are named in the treaty did not assent to it. If the land passed under the treaty, then it is only a question between the Indians themselves who were signatories thereto or assented to its terms. The only object of the proposed order, though it is but faintly outlined in the briefs, must be to show that if the Stockbridges, Munsees and Brothertowns Opinion of the Court. never assented to the treaty, the grant should be reduced in the proportion of 320 acres to each member of these tribes. But this is an indirect attack upon the decree. The case was remanded to the Court of Claims, not to determine who were actually parties to the treaty, or to recompute the number of souls, or in any other way to reduce the extent of the grant, but to render a judgment for the amount received by the Government for the Kansas lands, less an amount of lands upon the basis of which settlement had been made with the Tonawandas, and less the 10,240 acres allowed to thirty-two New York Indians, "together with such other deductions as may seem to the court below to be just." But there is nothing to indicate that the Court of Claims was at liberty to redetermine who were parties to the treaty, and entitled to the benefit of its provisions. That question had already been settled beyond recall. The motion for additional findings must therefore be denied. The denial of this motion practically disposes of the appeal, as the action of the court below in its supplemental findings was in strict conformity with the mandate of this court. It found the amount of land sold by the United States, the cost and expense of surveying and platting said lands, the number of acres allowed to the Tonawanda band, the number allotted to the thirty-two Indians, and, after deducting the expense of surveying and platting, the amount paid by the United States in settlement of the Tonawanda band and thirty-two Indians, there remained of the value of the land at $1.25 per acre the sum of $1,967,056. The court further found who the New York Indians were, who were parties to the treaty, and as a conclusion of law judgment was entered for the above amount. This court has repeatedly held that a second writ of error does not bring up the whole record for reëxamination, but only the proceedings subsequent to the mandate, and if those proceedings are merely such as the mandate command, and are necessary to its execution, the writ of error will be dismissed, as any other rule would enable the losing party to delay the issuing of the mandate indefinitely. The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431; Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. 467; Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Syllabus. Wall. 253; The Lady Pike, 96 U. S. 461; Supervisors v. Kennicott, 94 U. S. 408; Stewart v. Salamon, 97 U. S. 361. In Stewart v. Salamon, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Waite observed: "An appeal will not be entertained by this court from a decree entered in the Circuit or other inferior court, in exact accordance with our mandate upon a previous appeal. Such a decree, when entered, is in effect our decree, and the appeal would be from ourselves to ourselves. If such an appeal is taken, however, we will, upon the application of the appellee, examine the decree entered, and if it conforms to the mandate, dismiss the case with costs. If it does not, the case will be remanded with proper directions for the correction of the error. The same rule applies to writs of error." Humphrey v. Baker, 103 U. S. 736; Clark v. Keith, 106 U. S. 464; Mackall v. Richards, 116 U. S. 45. The appeal win therefore be Dismissed. The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissented. BROWN v. HITCHCOCK.1 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 581. Argued February 23, 24, 1899. Decided April 8, 1899. Under the act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, known as the Swamp Land Act, the legal title to land passes only on delivery of a patent, and as the record in this case discloses no patent, there was no passing of the legal title from the United States, whatever equitable rights may have vested. Until the legal title to land passes from the Government, inquiry as to all equitable rights comes within the cognizance of the land department. Although cases may arise in which a party is justified in coming into the 1 The docket title of the case is Brown v. Bliss. Mr. Bliss having resigned as Secretary of the Interior, his successor was substituted in his place. Statement of the Case. courts of the District of Columbia to assert his rights as against a proceeding in the land department, or when that department refuses to act at all, yet, as a general rule, power is vested in the department to determine all questions of equitable right and title, upon proper notice to the parties interested, and the courts should be resorted to only when the legal title has passed from the Government. ON May 10, 1898, the appellant, as plaintiff, filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia his bill, setting forth, besides certain jurisdictional matters, the Swamp Land Act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519; the extension of that act to all the States by the act of March 12, 1860, c. 5, 12 Stat. 3; a selection of lands thereunder by the State of Oregon (evidenced by what is called "List No. 5,”) and an approval on September 16, 1882, of that selection by the Secretary of the Interior; a purchase in 1880 from the State by H. C. Owen, of certain of those selected lands, and subsequent conveyances thereof to plaintiff. Then, after showing the appointment of Hon. William F. Vilas, as Secretary of the Interior, the bill proceeds: "That, as plaintiff is informed and believes, on the 27th day of December, A.D. 1888, the said Secretary of the Interior, then the said William F. Vilas, made and entered an order annulling, cancelling and revoking the said 'List number 5,' and the approval thereof, and annulling and revoking the said judgment and determination so made by his said predecessor in said office, the said Henry M. Teller, whereby his said predecessor had adjudged and determined that the lands aforesaid were swamp and overflowed lands within the meaning of the acts aforesaid, and made and entered an order purporting to adjudge and determine that certain of the lands described in said 'List number 5,' including the lands herein before described, were not swamp and overflowed lands within the meaning of the acts aforesaid. "That thereafter, as plaintiff is informed and believes, divers proceedings were taken before the said Secretary of the Interior and in the general land office of the United States by the State of Oregon and by the grantors of this plaintiff to set aside and have held for naught the orders and rulings so made |