Opinion of the Court. dor's lien was just as efficacious against it in the hands of the receiver as it was in that of the marshal; and, had it made proper and seasonable application to the judge a quo, possibly he might have permitted the marshal to retain in his possession the property seized under the writ of attachment in the Circuit Court. However vain and nugatory such an effort may have proven, it was none the less its duty to have made the effort at least. "Surely the receiver cannot be said to have committed a wrong or trespass upon the plaintiff's rights by advertising and making a sale of corporate assets in pursuance of an order of court to pay debts, especially when such sale was neither enjoined nor opposed by it. "Presumably the proceeds of the sale are yet in the hands of the receiver for distribution according to law, and plaintiff can exercise its rights thereon. "In our opinion, this is not a case in which we are called upon to examine and scrutinize the legality of the appointment of a receiver, for the reason that the complaining creditor has not suffered any injury thereby and is itself seeking a preference. "We think the ends of justice would be best subserved by preserving and maintaining the status quo.” The assignments of error are somewhat involved in statement, but they are based on the ground that the order appointing Watson receiver was null and void because the ownership of property of the Louisiana Printing and Publishing Company, the debtor of plaintiff, "could not be divested to the prejudice of creditors on an arbitrary order without due process of law," and the use of such order to obtain the ruling of the United States Circuit Court, which directed the United States marshal to restore to him the property attached, deprived the plaintiff in error of a right without due process of law, and that therefore the judgment of the lower court was erroneous. The appointment of a receiver to take possession of the property of an insolvent corporation upon the petition of a creditor is certainly "due process." This, of course, is not denied, but Opinion of the Court. the invalidity of the order of appointment is asserted because it was made ex parte, and because Watson had not fully qualified. It is hence argued that the appointment was a nullity -constituted "no legal obstacle" to the proceedings in the United States Circuit Court. This view was not entertained by that court, but, on motion of Watson, the court ordered the property which had been, attached restored to him and remitted the plaintiff (plaintiff in error here) to the state court. Its order was "that the marshal restore the property seized in this court under the writs of attachment and sequestration to John W. Watson, receiver, unless within five days the plaintiff applies for and ultimately receives authority from the civil district court which appointed Watson or from the appellate court to hold same under said writs." If this was error its review cannot be had on this record. The plaintiff did not apply to "the civil district court which appointed Watson," the Supreme Court in its opinion says, but brought an action for nullity of the order of appointment under the code of the State (Code of Practice of Louisiana, Art. 604 et seq.) and for damages. The action was regularly proceeded with, and was determined against plaintiff in error on grounds which did not involve Federal questions, and therefore it is not within our power to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State. The plaintiff in error thus sought in the state court, and was given opportunity, to ligitate the rights claimed by it, and it cannot complain that the guarantees of the Constitution of the United States were denied because the litigation did not result successfully. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 112; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 113 U. S. 9, 26; Morley v. Lake Shore &c. Railway Co., 146 U. S. 162, 171; Bergmann v. Backer, 157 U. S. 655. It follows that this writ of error cannot be maintained. The rule was announced in Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, 370, "that when we find it unnecessary to decide any Federal Opinion of the Court. question, and when the state court has based its decision on a local or state question, our logical course is to dismiss the writ of error." See also Fort Smith Railway v. Merriam, 156 U. S. 478; Hamblin v. Western Land Co., 147 U. S. 531; Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674. Writ of error dismissed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in this decision. Ex parte HENRY WARD. ORIGINAL. No number. Submitted February 20, 1899. - Decided March 20, 1899. Where a court has jurisdiction of an offence and of the accused, and the pro ceedings are otherwise regular, a conviction is lawful although the judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto; and the validity of the title of such judge to the office, or his right to exercise the judicial functions, cannot be determined on a writ of habeas corpus; this rule is well settled, and is applicable to this case. The title of a person acting with color of authority, even if he be not a good officer in point of law, cannot be collaterally attacked. THIS was an application for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. R. C. Garland and Mr. W. W. Wright, Jr., for the petitioner. No one opposing. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. Ward was tried and found guilty before Edward R. Meek, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas, for "having in his possession counterfeit moulds," and was sentenced October 22, 1898, to Opinion of the Court. the penitentiary at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, at hard labor for a period of one year and one day, and committed accordingly to the custody of the warden of said prison. He now makes application for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the sentence was void because Judge Meek was appointed July 13, 1898, after the adjournment of the previous session of the Senate of the United States, and commissioned by the President to hold office until the end of the next succeeding session of the Senate; and that from the date of the appointment and commission, until after the conviction and the sentence, there was no session of the Senate, though it is not denied that the appointment was afterwards confirmed. By the act of February 9, 1898, 30 Stat. 240, c. 15, provision was made for an additional judge for the Northern Judicial District of the State of Texas, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate, and that when a vacancy in the office of the existing District Judge occurred, it should not be filled, so that thereafter there should be only one District Judge. It is stated that Judge Rector was District Judge of the Northern District of Texas when the statute was passed (February 9, 1898), that he died (April 9, 1898) before Judge Meek's appointment and while the Senate. was still in session; and argued that the appointment could not be treated as one to fill the vacancy caused by Judge Rector's death, because that was forbidden by the act, and must be regarded as an appointment to the office of "additional District Judge" created thereby. Clause three of section two of article two of the Constitution provides that "the President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session;" but it is insisted that the office in this instance was created during a session of the Senate, and that it could not be filled at all save by the concurrent action of the President and the Senate. And it is further contended that the President could not during the recess of the Senate and without its concurrence, Opinion of the Court. by his commission invest an appointee with any portion of the judicial power of the United States Government as defined in article three of the Constitution, because that article requires that judges of the United States courts shall hold their offices during good behavior, and hence that no person can be appointed to such office for a less period and authorized to exercise any portion of the judicial power of the United States as therein defined. We need not, however, consider the elaborate argument of counsel in this behalf, since we regard the well settled rule applicable here that where a court has jurisdiction of an offence, and of the accused, and the proceedings are otherwise regular, a conviction is lawful although the judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto; and that the validity of the title of such judge to the office, or his right to exercise the judicial functions, cannot be determined on a writ of habeas corpus.1 1 Note by Reporter. The following historical facts have some bearing on the constitutional questions which the court was shut out from considering. On the 1st day of July, 1795, the Senate having on the 26th day of the previous June "adjourned without day," the resignation by Mr. Jay of the office of Chief Justice of the United States took effect. President Washington wrote to Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina: I directed the Secretary of State to make you an official offer of this honorable appointment; to express to you my wish that it may be convenient and agreeable to you to accept it; to intimate in that case my desire, and the advantages that would attend your being in this city the first Monday in August, at which time the next session of the Supreme Court will commence; and to inform you that your commission as Chief Justice will take date on this day, July the 1st, when Mr. Jay's will cease, but that it would be detained here, to be presented to you on your arrival." In the third volume of Dallas, under the head of " August Term, 1795," it is said: "A commission bearing date the 1st of July, 1795, was read, by which, during the recess of Congress, John Rutledge, Esquire, was appointed Chief Justice until the end of the next session of the Senate." Two important cases are reported in that volume as decided at this term. In the first, United States v. Peters, the decision is announced "by the court." In the second, Talbot v. Jansen, the justices give their opinions seriatim, Chief Justice Rutledge closing and announcing the decree. The Senate met on the 9th of December, 1795, and the nomination of Mr. Rutledge "to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States |