Since 1997, the Pentagon has issued impressive volumes of directives and Joint Staff policies on improved medical record keeping, battlefield environmental monitoring, troop location data and health surveillance before, during and after deployments. External panels of experts have echoed recommendations to standardize and integrate service-specific protocols and systems. The 1998 Defense Authorization Act directed the Department to implement many of the recommended improvements to medical tracking and disease prevention.

Witnesses today will describe substantial progress in applying the lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm about force health protection. But questions remain whether the ambitious plans and proposals of peacetime will be able to pierce the fog of war and yield the detailed, realtime information needed to assess health effects after the battle. Do the preand post-deployment questionnaires now being administered meet the statutory mandate for "medical examinations?” Will the brief, hastily administered surveys capture the data required by DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to reach valid epidemiological conclusions about service-connected health effects?

VA Secretary Anthony Principi recently concluded, "Much of the controversy over the health problems of veterans who fought in the 1991 war could have been avoided had more extensive surveillance data been collected." We agree. There should be no mysterious "Iraq War Syndrome" after this victory. Veterans of this era should not go empty handed into the battle to prove deployment exposures caused or contributed to their post-war illnesses.

In modern warfare, "smart" weapons dominate the battlefield and minimize collateral casualties. By far the smartest, most complex, most elegant system we send into battle is the human body. Accurate, timely health information is the life-cycle maintenance log of our most precious military asset-freedom's sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers. We look to those entrusted with their care to protect them.

We welcome our witnesses this afternoon and look forward to their testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time I'd like to call on our vice chairman of the committee.

Mr. TURNER. I don't have an opening statement. I look forward to hearing their testimony. This certainly is an important issue for

us.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Kucinich, I know you just walked in. Do you have a statement you'd like to make, or shall we just swear them in?

Mr. KUCINICH. I'd like to make a statement.

Mr. SHAYS. You've got it.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the witnesses.

The first Gulf war was 13 years ago, but as a country, we've not yet implemented the lessons that we've learned since that time. I believe that this failure may bring harm to our troops now in Iraq, and that is unacceptable.

Part of this delay, unfortunately, was caused by a series of misstatements perpetuated by the Defense Department itself.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, it took one group of dedicated veterans over 4 years to force the Pentagon to reveal that Iraqi stocks of sarin gas at Khamisiyah had been blown up by U.S. troops, exposing over 140,000 American soldiers.

Steve Robinson, who will testify before us later, said in a recent interview, "that was the first lie. Then the Pentagon said, maybe 100 soldiers had been exposed. Then it was maybe 1,000. Lie after lie. Now it's up to 140,000."

Similar concerns were raised about depleted uranium. Again, dedicated veterans spent years filing Freedom of Information requests to obtain information about friendly fire incidents involving depleted uranium. Although the Pentagon first said only 35 soldiers were exposed, this number soon increased to 122, then to 932, and then to thousands who breathed in depleted uranium.

Unfortunately, it appears that Dr. Winkenwerder, who will also testify here today, has become part of the cycle. In January he issued a press release, which I would like to make part of the record. In the press release he made this statement, "the U.S. military is prepared to protect its personnel against the use of biological weapons." In fact, many Pentagon and White House officials have declared that troops are prepared for war in Iraq. While they understand the desire to provide assurance that a problem is being addressed, broadly claiming total preparedness in the face of evidence to the contrary is reckless.

Last year the Army's own audit agency identified what it called, "a breakdown in the Army's primary control for ensuring the maintenance and sustained operability of chemical and biological equipment." They found that 62 percent of gas masks and 90 percent of chem-bio detectors didn't work. They said soldiers at 18 of 25 units they reviewed weren't proficient and couldn't operate basic equipment.

GAO has also testified before this committee about shortages of critical items. One military wing, for example, had only 25 percent of the protective masks required. In addition, the GAO discovered the General Accounting Office discovered, amazingly, that some military units were selling their protective suits on the Inter

net for $3, while other units were desperately clamoring for these critical items. In fact, the Pentagon's own inspector general raised these concerns, stating that, "420,000 suits were not on hand as recorded in the inventory balance."

For these reasons, Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, a former member of this subcommittee, wrote to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to ask him do the troops going to Iraq have the minimum required levels of chem-bio protective equipment. She asked him to certify this to Congress. On February 27, just 3 weeks before the war in Iraq began, she got her answer, and that answer was no. The Defense Department refused to certify to Congress that it had provided to troops in Iraq the minimum levels of chem-bio equipment as those levels were established by the Pentagon itself. And I would like to ask that this letter also be included into the record. [The information referred to follows:]

I am writing to express xny concern that if President Bush decides to deploy U.S. military forces against Iraq, the service men and women who are sent into battle may not be adequately protected against chemical and biological attacks.

During a press briefing on October 17, 2002, you discussed several issues that you believe should be considered before U.S. military force is deployed. In the context of sending U.S. Armed Forces to Iraq, you said: “If an engagement is worth doing, then we need to recognize that ultimately lives could be put at risk." You also made this cornment:

When there's a risk of casualties, that risk should be acknowledged at the outset, rather
then allowing the American people or others to think that an engagement can be executed
antineptically.

I agree. I believe the American people have a right to know the true risks of any military
engagement the President decides to undertake. I am concerned, however, that Pentagon officials
may be downplaying the actual risks to our service man and woman, particularly with respect to
the preparedness of our forces for chemical and biological attacks. On September 18, 2002, for
example, General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Armed
Services Committee. He was asked whether forces that would be deployed against Imq are
prepared to handle potential chemical and biological attacks by Iraqi forces. In response, he
made this assertion: "Obviously our forces prepare for that, they train for that, and they would be
ready to deal with that type of environment.”

On October 8, 2002, however, the House Democratic Cancus received a briefing by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and was provided with testimony from the Defense Department Inspector General (IG) regarding this issue. The caucus was presented with information about various pieces of equipment, including 250,000 protective suits that are known to be defective and that were delivered to commanders in the field, but that can no longer be located or recalled by the Department because of flawed inventory controls. The caucus also

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The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
November 27, 2002

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received information regarding existing shortages in other equipment, as well as questionable levels of training to prepare units for possible chemical and biological attacks. Although this unclassified information was extremely troubling, the classified information provided by GAO and the IG was even more disturbing, especially in light of the Defense Department's previous expressions of confidence on this issue.

As you know, during the Gulf War, we gained a great deal of intelligence about Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological capabilities. His resources, combined with his demonstrated penchant for using them, fuumed the basis for Security Council resolutions that have governed Iraq ever since. Indeed, the threat of Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological arsenals has been cited as one of the primary and most vugent reasons for making military action against kaq.

Our experience during the Gulf War, however, also exposed our own military's limitations in facing finis type of threet. Our service members did not have enough protective gear, such as suits and masks. They had inadequate equipment to detect the release of deadly agents. And as thousands of veterans who contine to experience the full range of Gulf War Ilisesses can attest, our service members were ill-prepared for the medical regimes they were rushed to implement. During the Gulf War, we were fortunate that Iraq did not nac its chemical or biological arsenals because our forces were not ready.

According to GAO and the 13, the military's progress since the Gulf War in preparing our troops for these threats has not occursed as rapidly as necessary. For this reason, and because this issue is critical to hundreds of thousands of service members, their families, and the American public, I ask that prior to the deployment of U.S. forces, you personally make the following certification to Congress:

I, Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, certify that all United States Armed Forces that could be deployed, or are intended to be deployed, against Iraq pursuant to the exercise of authority specified in HJ. Res. 114 have been provided with squipment to protect against chemical and biological attacks in quantities sufficient to meet minimoan required levels previously established by the Department of Defense,

As you can see, this certification addresses only equipment. It does not deal with training deficiencies or medical concerns that conceivably are equally important. In addition, I recognize the obvious concern with revealing to our adversacies potential vulnerabilities with specific its or commands, so this certification does not require you to revoal arry classified information with respect to specific valumabilities of specific units. If our forces are in fact "ready to deal with that type of environment,” as Chairman Myers asserted, you should have no difficulty certifying that our troops possess miningun established levels of protective equipment.