Source: I II III IV V Mental Groups Data provided by Bernard D. Karpinos, Human Resources Research Organization (April 1973). a/ Based on AFQT tests taken by draftees, August 1969 to January 1970. Sources: Military data provided by the Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (April 1973). Total male population, U.S. Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, pp. 1-269, 1-273. a/ Percentages for 1970 based on data for first nine months of fiscal 1973. b/ Males aged 17-22 in 1970. The longer term implications of this increase in minority enlistments on total force composition are difficult to predict. Actual force composition depends not only on the rate of accessions, but on the attrition rate (the proportion of men who leave the service before reaching the end of normal enlistment); the screening rate (the proportion of men who are not given the chance to reenlist); and the reenlistment rate (the proportion who reenlist among those given the opportunity). Evidence suggests, however, that the racial composition of accessions is the most important factor. In the long run, racial proportions in the total force will probably be similar to those of accessions. This means that if the nonwhite component of total accessions stabilizes at, say, the 20 percent level, nonwhites can be expected to ultimately comprise about 20 percent of total military enlisted manpower. Economic Background Very little is known about the relation between the economic status of a recruit's family and his likelihood to volunteer. The military services do not collect data on family earnings on a routine basis. Sketchy information obtained from surveys of Air Force recruits over the past few years, however, fails to show a strong relationship between the two. As Table 1-3 demonstrates, the distribution of recruits among different family earning groups (parents' earnings) remained relatively stable during the period (1970-73) in which the proportion of Air Force true volunteers grew from 53 to 85 percent of its total enlistment. Moreover, the distribution shown does not differ markedly from that of the general population, suggesting, at least for the Air Force, the absence of a connection between parents' income and the inclination of an individual to enlist. TABLE 1-3. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS, PARENTS OF RECRUITS AND APPLICANTS: U.S. AIR FORCE COMPARED WITH U.S. FAMILY INCOME, CALENDAR YEARS 1970-73 Sources: Undated survey material provided by Department of the Air Force, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis (April 1973); and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 85, "Money Income in 1971 of Families and Persons in the United States," (1972), table 42, p. 96. To the extent that a strong correlation exists between parents' income and level of education and test scores of the recruit, distributions for the other services would be expected to be clustered around the lower income categories since Air Force recruits on average have higher test scores and have achieved a higher level of education than other recruits. But these Air Force data are too limited. Before any conclusions can be reached, more data will be needed. Steve Chapel, "The Racial Composition of the Army Under A Volunteer Force," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), (March 1973; unpublished paper). A Successful Transition: Rationale The number of appropriately qualified true volunteers rose during this period because of a wide variety of measures, chief among which were substantial pay increases at the entry level and greater emphasis on recruiting. The Military Selective Service Act of 1971 provided incentive increases in military pay and allowances similar to those recommended by the Gates Commission. These were mainly for enlisted personnel, especially those just entering the service. The disproportionately low pay for new recruits was increased by roughly 60 percent. By raising military pay levels to those prevailing in the private sector, it was expected that the military services would be able to compete in the labor market. Figure 16 shows the effect of that pay legislation and subsequent annual comparability increases in January 1972 and January 1973. Average weekly earnings of new recruits, which had lagged behind those of 19-year-old civilian male workers by about 30 percent in 1970, had attained reasonable comparability by fiscal 1972. Figure 16 A Comparison of Median Weekly Earnings of Civilian Full-time Wage and Salary Workers (Ages 18, 19, and 20) and Weekly Earnings of Enlisted Males, during the First Year of Military Service, Fiscal Years 1967-73a, Sources: 1967, 1969-72, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics a/ Military earnings refer to base pay, plus allowances for subsistence and housing and tax advantage. First year earnings are based on a weighted combination of the pay grades normally attained during the first year of service. Estimate of civilian earnings for fiscal 1973 assumes 5.5 percent increase; estimate of military earnings includes the January 1973 pay raise. Beyond the entry level, men's earnings, enlisted and civilian, roughly corresponded for all groups; enlisted earnings were higher for women than in civilian jobs, as seen in Figure 17. These data probably understate military compensation. If fringe benefits such as retirement, commissary and exchange privileges, and medical services are included, the military pay advantages would be even more pronounced. 95-825 0-73-5 Figure 17 Comparison of Median Weekly Earnings of Civilian Full-time Wage and Salary Workers and Military Enlisted Personnel on Active Duty, by Age and Sex, May 1972 Sources: Undated material provided by Department of Labor, a/ Military earnings are not given beyond age 54 since almost all of the military personnel are retired by this age. Estimates of median military salaries are based on age, pay grade, and representative salaries for each grade. However, years of service for each age group was not available so that a more rigorous calculation has not been possible. In addition to increases in pay and allowances, bonuses were authorized to help increase enlistments in the ground combat arms components. This program, initiated on a test basis in June 1972, provided for bonus payments of $1,500 to Army and Marine Corps ground combat volunteers enlisting for four years. Together with options allowing the volunteer a wider choice in selection of training courses, as well as unit and location of assignment, the bonus is considered to be one of the major factors influencing the growth in combat arms enlistments (see Figure 4). The whole issue of bonus incentives is investigated in the following chapter. Beyond these monetary incentives, other measures upgraded the quality of life at military installations; barracks were modernized, KP duties were assigned to civilian rather than military personnel, and additional health and dental care programs were provided. The importance of recruiting and advertising in achieving an allvolunteer force was recognized early by the military services and major changes took place during the transition period. From fiscal 1970 to fiscal 1973, the recruiting budget more than doubled while personnel involved in recruiting programs increased 70 percent (see Figure 18). Figure 18 Trends in Department of Defense Recruiting Resources Recruiting and Support The Recruiting Budget Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant of Defense, Transitional Cost of the Volunteer Service The costs associated with the volunteer service are difficult to pin down. According to the administration, the annual costs will be approximately $3 billion in fiscal 1974. This estimate includes only the cost of legislatively enacted programs specifically identified with the allvolunteer force, such as the special pay incentives authorized in fiscal 1972. These costs are shown in Table 1-4. They do not include the cost of other programs to improve military life, which have been justified in part as helping to attract volunteers, but authorized as a part of regular defense manpower programs rather than specifically identified for all-volunteer purposes. The General Accounting Office estimated in May 1973 that these related costs could exceed $1 billion per year. Such estimates, however, depend on assumptions as to whether the improvements in fact were tied to an all-volunteer service or whether they would have been made in any event. 10 10 "Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force," Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States (May 2, 1973; processed), p. 5. |