total male enlistments is shown in Figure 3. The important result, of course, is the attainment of an estimated level of true volunteers in fiscal 1973 (356,000) that approximates the total male enlistment needs projected for fiscal 1974 (354,000). Figure 3 Total Male Enlistments and True Volunteers, All Services, Fiscal Years 1971-74 Source: "All-Volunteer Force and the End of the Draft," Special Report of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson Trends by service in Table 1-1, show that with the exception of the Army and to a lesser extent the Marine Corps each service attracted true volunteers at a rate, which if sustained, would be adequate to meet their specific fiscal 1974 needs. The shortage shown for the Army stems, in large measure, from its adoption of more stringent quality criteria.1 TABLE 1-1.-ENLISTMENT OF MALE TRUE VOLUNTEERS, BY SERVICE, FISCAL YEARS 1971-74 Source: "The All-Volunteer Force and the End of the Draft," Special Report of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson (March 1973; processed), pp. 5-8. three times the estimate for group 241-366. Those without lottery numbers (all 17-year-olds and those 18year-olds who have not yet received lottery numbers) are considered to be true volunteers. This is one of several models used to estimate volunteers; other model and survey estimates have been, for the most part, in agreement. 4 Because of a sharp decline in enlistees who had completed high school, in February 1973 the Army placed a ceiling of 30 percent per month for those who had not completed high school, "The All-Volunteer Force and the End of the Draft," Special Report of the Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson (March 1973; processed). A special case was the recruiting experience for the ground combat forces. Those responsible realized early, and with justification, that it would be difficult to recruit men for the infantry, armor, and artillery units particularly as long as the Vietnam war was an influence. From July to December 1970, for example, Figure 4 shows that the number of true volunteers enlisting in the ground combat arms averaged 224 per month; this was at a time when the monthly requirement was about 5,000. A dramatic growth throughout the transition period leading to a monthly rate that will probably exceed fiscal 1974 needs is witness to the special recruiting efforts made in this area that are discussed in Chapter Two. Figure 4 True Volunteers, Ground Combat Arms, Selected Monthly Averages, 1970-72 Sources: True volunteer data provided by David W. Grissmer, General The Profiles of Enlisted Personnel, 1960-74 The quality of an all-volunteer force has been a key factor in the transition period. Has quality declined with the increasing advent of true volunteers? Also constantly raised are questions of race and economic background: Is racial distribution among true volunteers similar to that in the nation as a whole? Are volunteers coming from poorer or richer families than the recruits who were drafted during prior years? Below are available data concerning the characteristics of enlisted men from 1960 through 1972 with estimates for 1973 and projected data for 1974. Mental Ability The two yardsticks most frequently used to assess the quality of enlistees are standardized test scores and level of education (whether or not the enlistees have completed high school). In terms of standardized test scores, quality has been maintained among volunteersand, in some instances, improved-during the transition period. Standardized tests are administered to all new personnel. The most commonly used standard is the mental group designation based on scores of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). This test encompasses word knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, tool knowledge, and pattern analysis. On the basis of test scores, examinees are divided into the following groups representing the range from very high military aptitude (Category I) to very low military aptitude (Category V): Mental category: Percentile score 93 to 100. I_ II. III 65 to 92. 31 to 64. 10 to 30. IV. V.. 9 and below. The test is used principally to differentiate between Mental Groups I and II (above average), III (average) and IV-V (below average). Test scores below 10 (mental Group V) disqualify an individual from military service by law. Those scoring below the 30th percentile (Mental Group IV) are considered by the services to require more training and present greater disciplinary problems than those in the higher groups. During the Vietnam buildup, the services were required to meet directed quotas for Category IV accessions. "Project 100,000," a program for expanding the manpower pool to include more men with marginal mental abilities, was instituted in 1966, and quotas continued to be used until the passage of Public Law 92-204 5 prohibited their use. Since that time the services have recruited men of higher quality as measured by test results. Figure 5 shows the trends in the distribution of new accessions by these categories. For the transition period, Figure 5 Percent Share of Male Initial Accessions Identified by AFQT Mental Group, Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (February 1973). a/ Percentages for 1973 derived from data for first nine months of fiscal 1973. 5 92 Cong., approved December 18, 1971, Sec. 744. there is a steady, but modest, decline in the proportion of enlistees with above-average scores, a moderate increase in those with average ability, and, of most importance, a steady decrease in enlistments of those scoring below average. On balance, by this measure, the average mental ability of new accessions has increased during the last few years and in fiscal 1973 closely approximated pre-Vietnam experience. Figure 6 indicates that between 1970 and 1973, there was a tendency in all services to recruit a larger proportion of men of average ability. Figure 6 Percentage Distribution of New Accessions by Service and AFQT Mental Group, Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of a/ Percentages for 1973 derived from data for first nine months of fiscal 1973. Trends in the mental ability distribution among true volunteers are quite similar to those characterizing total accessions (enlistments and inductions), as Figure 7 shows. This means that, on average, the quality of true volunteers-as measured by standardized test scores Figure 7 Percentage Distribution for "True" Volunteers by Service and AFQT Mental Group, 1970 71 72 73 Source: January 1970 70 71 72 73 70 71 72 73 70 71 72 73 70 71 72 73 Navy Marine Corps October 1972, D. W. Grissmer, J. D. Pearson, and R. Szymanski, "Evaluation of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) Program, "RAC-R-147 (Research Analysis Corporation, 1972; processed) Vol 2, pp. 52, 94, 136, 171, 270; November and December, 1972, data provided by the General Research Corporation (April 1973); January-March 1973, data provided by the Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (April 1973). a/ Percentages for 1970 and for 1973 derived from data for last six months of fiscal 1970 and first nine months of fiscal 1973, respectively. has kept pace with that of the draftee and draft-motivated volunteers. Moreover, the average scores of true volunteers for all services, with the exception of the Marine Corps, are above the average of the total population over the entire period, as Figure 8 shows. 95-825 0-73- -4 |