The Commission recommended that NASA stop the practice of removing parts from one orbiter to supply another. NASA officials stated that this cannibalization will not be eliminated; however, actions relating to spare parts and logistics have been initiated to alleviate the need for routine removal of parts. In addition, the removal of components from one orbiter for installation in another must now be approved by a NASA Headquarters-chaired board. NASA officials also stated that the closed-loop accounting system it is establishing will track and report on cannibalization. NASA has performed extensive work since January 1986 to return the shuttle to safe flight. In many cases, NASA has exceeded the specific recommendations in the Presidential Commission report in order to address related issues and/or problem areas. For example, NASA has established a safety reporting system to provide the capability for NASA and contractor personnel to confidentially notify the NASA Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Office of problems that could result in loss of life or mission capability, injury, or property damage. In appendix II, we discuss each of the 39 specific recommendations and identify many of the actions NASA is taking on them as well as on related matters. Several of the 39 specific recommendations require actions that will not or cannot be completed until flights are resumed. We note these throughout the appendix. We developed the information in this report through an examination of NASA documents and discussions with NASA officials at NASA Headquarters, the Kennedy and Johnson Space Centers, and the Marshall Space Flight Center. We also met with officials from the National Research Council, which was charged with certain responsibilities by the Presidential Commission, and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, which is a senior advisory committee to NASA and the Congress. We discussed a draft of this report with NASA officials and incorporated their views and comments in the report. In general, NASA officials said that they found the report to be accurate and complete. Their comments were primarily of a technical nature and included updates where changes had occurred since our audit work was completed. Our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 3 4 We are sending copies of this briefing report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and other interested parties upon request. Should you have any additional questions, please contact me at 275-4268. Sincerely yours, Hawk Finly Harry R. Finley Senior Associate Director KSC MMT MSFC NASA PCASS PRACA Kennedy Space Center Mission Management Team Marshall Space Flight Center National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Space Transportation System Program Compliance Assurance and Status System System Integrity Assurance Program Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance BACKGROUND On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger (Mission 51-L) was destroyed shortly after lift-off from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). A Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger accident was sworn in on February 6, 1986, under the chairmanship of William P. Rogers. The Commission report, dated June 6, 1986, stated that the cause of the accident was a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor. In addition to the mandated Presidential Commission study, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight initiated a review, in March 1986, of the overall management structure of the space shuttle program. Further, in June 1986, NASA established a National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Management and Communications Study Team to assess the NSTS program operation and organization in order to be able to address recommendations in the Commission report. This assessment, completed in August 1986, was followed by an implementation decision in November 1986 by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The implementation decision defined the direction for the organization and operation of the NSTS program. In May 1986, the NASA Administrator requested Lieutenant General Samuel C. Phillips (U.S. Air Force, retired) to review the overall NASA management structure and to recommend changes necessary to improve the management of its programs and people. This study, completed in December 1986, recommended that NASA establish centralized headquarters responsibility for all programs and restructure the agency to improve the lines of communication. study contained a number of specific recommendations for NASA management. The NASA has testified and issued two status reports on its actions to address the recommendations contained in the Presidential Commission report. The more recent report, dated June 30, 1987, represents NASA's fulfillment of a commitment made to the President in July 1986 to issue a status report 1 year after the Presidential Commission report. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER As reported in the Presidential Commission report, the cause of the accident was a failure in the solid rocket motor, which is a major subassembly of the solid rocket booster. The other major |