Space Shuttle Accident: NASA's Actions to Address the Presidential Commission Report : Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of RepresentativesThe Office, 1987 - 42 pages |
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51-L accident abort According to NASA additional Administrator for Space Administrator for SRM&QA assessment Associate Administrator astronauts in management carbon brake system Category Commission recommended contractor Corrective Action Critical Items List Deputy Director developed Director for Operations Engineering Integration Office external tank facilities failure field joint Flight Crew Operations Flight Readiness Reviews FMEA following specific recommendations hardware Hazard Analysis implementation Installing Johnson Space Center June 1987 report Kennedy Space Center landing gear launch constraints logistics MSFC NASA Administrator NASA established NASA Headquarters NASA officials NASA's June nosewheel steering system O-ring performance Pole Escape Concept Presidential Commission report problem reporting project element projected flight rate Quality Assurance redesign reliability requirements rocket powered extraction runway Safety Advisory Panel scheduled Shuttle Program Manager SIAP solid rocket booster solid rocket motor Space Flight Safety space shuttle Space Shuttle Challenger split-s System Integrity Assurance tests theodolite vehicle waived
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Page 7 - Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor.
Page 12 - The National Research Council is the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, serving government and other organizations.
Page 30 - The Commission recommends that NASA: Make all efforts to provide a crew escape system for use during controlled gliding flight. Make every effort to increase the range of flight conditions under which an emergency runway landing can be successfully conducted in the event that two or three main engines fail early in ascent.
Page 15 - ... the safety of flight 51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle program management. • NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, whether by changes of personnel, organization, indoctrination or all three. A policy should be developed which governs the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch constraints. Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission Management Team meetings should be recorded . The flight crew commander, or a designated representative,...
Page 12 - OTA at the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
Page 14 - ... Management. The Commission observes that there appears to be a departure from the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating to the use of astronauts in management positions. These individuals brought to their positions flight experience and a keen appreciation of operations and flight safety. • NASA should encourage the transition of qualified astronauts into agency management positions. • The function of the Flight Crew Operations director should be elevated in the NASA organization structure....
Page 1 - NASA's actions to address the recommendations presented in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, dated 6 June, 1986.
Page 34 - Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch capability should be avoided in the future. NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources.
Page 22 - Maintainability — A measure of the ease and rapidity with which a system or equipment can be restored to operational status following a failure, expressed as the probability that an item will be retained in or restored to a specified condition within a given period of time when the maintenance is performed in accordance with precribed procedures and resources.
Page 21 - Safety Organization. NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance to be headed by an Associate Administrator, reporting directly to the NASA Administrator. It would have direct authority for safety, reliability, and quality assurance throughout the agency. The office should be assigned the work force to ensure adequate oversight of its functions and should be independent of other NASA functional and program responsibilities.