combatant CINCs to whom TAC resources are forward assigned. To make TAC a specified command would be change for change's sake, not to fix a substantive organizational problem.

Question 12: Why is the Navy component command for the US European Command located in London when the Sixth Fleet and other Navy units are in the Naples area?

Gen. Butler: The question of the optimum location for the US Naval Forces Europe Headquarters has been reviewed on a number of occasions. The primary benefits of the current London location are the use of well established facilities, close contact with the Royal Navy and a very positive host nation environment. Relocation to Naples would afford better access to the Sixth Fleet although the Sixth Fleet operates at sea and is not routinely present in Naples. Of note, the present geographic separation between the headquarters and the Sixth Fleet is less than that between CINCLANTFLT and forward deployed naval forces in the North Atlantic or between CINCPACFLT and forces in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Other considerations favoring retention of the Headquarters in London include the significant relocation costs, limited availability of facilities in the Naples area and the potential diplomatic repercussions in the United Kingdom and Italy. For these reasons, relocation of the Headquarters is not considered advisable at this time. The tradeoffs will continue to be reviewed periodically, however, an eventual relocation is conceivable.

Question 13: We thought that the military departments trained and equipped the forces. Why does the US Atlantic Command have a training command and why does the US Pacific Command have both a training command and a logistics component? Why shouldn't they be disestablished?

Gen. Butler: Training and equipping forces are in fact functions of the military departments. The Commanders in Chief of the US Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, in addition to serving as the naval component commanders of the Atlantic and Pacific Commands, are responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for these Service functions. Within the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, the two fleet training commands (TRALANT/TRAPAC) and the Naval Logistics Command, US Pacific Fleet (LOGPAC) play a key role in training and equipping naval forces.

TRALANT and TRAPAC, located in the major homeports of Norfolk and San Diego, focus on training directly related to fleet readiness. They also provide the primary interface between the Fleet CINC's and the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET). Disestablishment of the fleet training commands would serve to isolate fleet training requirements from CNET's training efforts. Further, no overall manpower savings would be achieved because other commands would have to assume the TRALANT/TRAPAC training functions. LOGPAC oversees the extensive shore-based logistics establishment which supports the Pacific Fleet. The size of this establishment, and thus the magnitude of the support and oversight required, is driven by geographic distances from CONUS and the large forward deployed force structure in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Disestablishment of LOGPAC would necessitate transfer of functions to other commands, primarily CINCPACFLT. While alternative command arrangements are possible and are under review, few billet savings would occur from LOGPAC's disestablishment.

Question 14: Why are you convinced that the component commands should not be disestablished for the supporting unified commands?

Gen. Butler: The CINCS, and the JCS are unanimous in strongly rejecting the proposal. Indeed, it runs directly contrary to the combatant commanders' authority provided in the DOD Reorganization Act, which states that a CINC has the inherent function of "organizing commands and forces . . as he considers necessary to carry out mission assigned to the command."

USCINCTRANS provided especially cogent rebuttal arguments which capture the fundamental concerns voiced by virtually every respondent regarding the issue of components. He noted first that, "The Services are charged by law and the JCS to train, equip, support, and administer forces. To effect this recommendation would violate that basic doctrine and require changes to Title 10, US Code. USTRANSCOM is charged with a go to war mission and the addition of this peacetime support role will divert the command from its primary task. Additionally, divestiture of Serviceunique missions of the components will likely provide no manpower savings and in many cases may require more to maintain the same level of service. Furthermore, each component interfaces in a daily basis with their respective Service staffs in matters pertaining to fiscal and business negotiating policy, law, programming, contracting, personnel policy, and procurement. channels are vital to the component in performing their mission in both peace and war and are simply not available from any other sources within the DOD organization. The recommendation to create a unique unified transportation command, for example, without normal Service components fails to recognize the importance of these relationships of appreciate the scope of changes necessary to create this specialized support within either the unified command headquarters or the SECDEF staff organization."

These

TRANSCOM went on to say that, "The addition of the component commands peacetime responsibilities to the USTRANSCOM charter would create a great potential to divert the attention of the unified commander from his primary war-fighting mission. Involving USTRANSCOM in peacetime cargo movement, at this time, would mire the staff in the myriad day-to-day management problems associated with multiple mode transportation assets when we are trying to build our ability to mobilize in wartime."

Regarding resource allocation, he says "Removal of the Services and their departments from the resource allocation process would significantly complicate programming and budgeting. The healthy scrutiny and priority review afforded programs by the Services and departments during the PPBS process would be lost. This might not be as important a factor if we had sufficient resources for our needs--but we don't. In addition, there is a potential loss of Service advocacy due to less direct involvement in key transportation and procurement actions."

USCINCSOC states, "This should not be implemented. . . . Recommendation would require incorporation of administrative and managerial elements of Service component commands. While the proposal might result in personnel reductions for Services, it is unacceptable for the following reasons:

(a) The principal function of unified CINCS is to command force employment in execution of OPLANS developed through close coordination with Service components. USCINCSOC needs linkage with the Services through Service component commands to support functional requirements.

(b) Unified commands are organized and staffed for integration of land, sea, and air forces for employment. They are not staffed to accomplish Service component functions--basic

training, planning, administration, and logistics, or to provide oversight of component management and base support organizations. (c) Elimination of component commands would hinder close working relationships, coordination, and support of all Services. Integration of the Service component commands into USSOCOM would end a Service element's capability to voice specific concerns from a land, sea, and air perspective on resource needs to their parent Services. It is essential that our components

work issues with their respective Services. Elimination of Service component headquarters would stretch span of control. Moving responsibility for unique Service administrative and managerial functions to USSOCOM staff would impede Services' legal responsibility for training, equipping, and sustaining."

USCINCSPACE echoes that, "The Naval Space Command component provides a cadre of personnel who represent USCINCSPACE priorities and have an established role in the Navy POM process. It is my most effective input to Navy POM deliberations."

Finally, the Secretary of Defense, in his 26 September 1988 Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the importance of the component structure to the unified commands. He said, "The senior military leadership make a compelling case on a number of counts, particularly with regard to preserving the Service components of the Joint commands. I am persuaded that execution of the statutory Service responsibility to organize, train, and equip forces is an appropriate role for the component commanders, thereby freeing the CINCS to focus on their assigned wartime tasks."

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you.

The subcommittee stands adjourned until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene tomorrow morning, Wednesday, March 1, 1989, at 9:30 a.m.]

DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 1, 1989.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Earl Hutto presiding. STATEMENT OF HON. EARL HUTTO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. HUTTO. The Subcommittee on Readiness will come to order. Each year the Defense Personnel Support Center in Philadelphia purchases nearly $1.2 billion worth of textiles and clothing in order to outfit and equip our military personnel with everything from socks to sleeping bags. It is a tall order to meet this requirement and requires a complex system of thousands of transactions with hundreds of companies each year. This system has been jolted by one of the most pervasive cases of procurement fraud to hit the Pentagon in recent years.

The corruption was widespread and involved conspiracy within the agency and outward to industry dating back to the early 1960s. Top civilians, consultants, and manufacturers participated in the schemes to rip off the American taxpayer and the military personnel who are the end users of these products.

The corruption was so entrenched that it took some 20 years to uncover and 5 years of investigation to unravel. Years of wiretap, videotapes, informers, and audits produced an avalanche of evidence that uncovered a corrupt and greedy system of payoffs, kickbacks, bribery, conspiracy, and racketeering.

The investigation involved thousands of hours of work by the Justice Department and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. This investigation has resulted in suspensions, debarments, prison sentences, and millions of dollars in fines.

The damage to our military is difficult to estimate, but it is huge in terms of faulty products delivered to our forces in the field, and shortages caused by fraud and mismanagement of this sector of military acquisition.

This subcommittee is interested in learning how this situation was allowed to reach such a critical point and how it was detected. We want to be assured that necessary corrective actions have been implemented.

The subcommittee also will be addressing some other matters related to the DPSC mission, including overseas transportation for (389)