not having any slaves, must employ both their women VI. 8. and children as servants. offices in states. 24 Once more: there are three forms of the highest Different elective offices in states-guardians of the law, probuli, different councillors, of these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. Enough of the different kinds of offices. The indivi dual and the state; what is the BOOK VII. VII. I. HE who would duly enquire about the best form of a Prooemium. state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be uncertain; for, in the natural order of best life; things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. We ought therefore to ascertain, first of 2 all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals. and is it the same for both? For the best life all the three classes of goods are required. Assuming that enough has been already said in exoteric discourses concerning the best life, we will now only repeat the statements contained in them. Certainly 3 no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz. external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three. For no one 4 would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of half-a-farthing, and is as This would feeble and false in mind as a child or a madman. These 5 be generally admitted, propositions are universally acknowledged as soon as but people differ about they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or the relative relative superiority of this or that good. Some think of them. that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, importance a Cp. N. Eth. i. 8. § 2. b Omitting σTep, which is bracketted by Bekker in his second edition. 7 not ac external virtue. 6 reputation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal VII. 1. to facts, which easily prove that mankind do not acquire Virtue is or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but ex- quired or 1323 b.ternal goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, by external preserved whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more goods, but often found with those who are most highly cultivated goods by in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, The goods the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful 8 as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No excess; proof is required to show that the best state of one thing primary, in relation to another is proportioned to the degree of of secondary, excellence by which the natures corresponding to those importance. states are separated from each other: so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. 9 Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. of the soul never in they are of other goods nature 10 Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of The divine this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of witnesses to any external good, but in himself and by reason of his the truth own nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference ness is independent between good fortune and happiness; for external goods of external a Cp. i. 8. § 15. b Cp. c. 3. § 10; N. Eth. x. 8. §7; Met. xii. 7. that happi goods. VII. 1. come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, The best life; 2. the same for indi state. but no one is just or temperate by or through chancea. Thus much may suffice by way of preface: for I 13 could not avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the arguments affecting them; these must be reserved for another discussion. 1324a. Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, having external goods enough for the performance of good actions. If 14 there are any who controvert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider their objections hereafter. There remains to be discussed the question, Whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the viduals and state, or different? Here again there can be no doubtno one denies that they are the same. For those who 2 hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is. Two points here present themselves for con- 3 sideration first (1), which is the more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of an alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which is the best form of constitution or the best condition of a a Ethics i. 9. § 6. state, either on the supposition that political privileges VII. 2. are given to all, or that they are given to a majority only? 4 Since the good of the state and not of the individual is the proper subject of political thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political discussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our enquiry. 5 ent lives of Now it is evident that the form of government is best The differin which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best men: some and live happily. But even those who agree in thinking say that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is or is not more eligible than one which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a 6 philosopher. For these two lives-the life of the philosopher and the life of the statesman-appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily 7 regulate his life according to the best end. There are (1) that even a political some who think that while a despotic rule over others is or constituthe greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even though not unjust, is a great impedi- to the ment to a man's individual well-being. Others take an (2) that the opposite view; they maintain that the true life of man political is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits true life; 1324 b.of being practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers 8 as by private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion (3) that happiness is that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with despotic happiness; indeed, a in some states the entire aim of the power. laws is to give men despotic power over their neigh9 bours. And, therefore, although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if a Or, inserting kai before vóμwv (apparently the reading of the old translator), 'in some cases the entire aim both of the constitution and the laws.' tional rule is detrimental character; is the |