that has once thoroughly reflected on fuch principles will not require a fecond Confutation of them, (P. 110, 111.) He labours to maintain the poffibility of an infinite feries of fucceffive Beings against all thofe arguments which fhew that either fome one part of it was not fucceffive to others, or that every part of it was, both which destroy the fuppofition," and therefore, fays he, they are "nothing to the purpose. For in a series of Beings exifting "from Eternity down to this prefent Time, there could be no firft, nor could there be a time when none of them "did Exift, for then these wou'd not have Existed from Eternity". But there is no one of them which was not once future, Ergo there must have been a time when none of them did exift, Ergo there was a first; and confequently the fuppofition contradicts itself. He goes on "Let us then suppose a series of Beings to begin to exift now, and "that they will exift to all Eternity, would any person be "fo abfurd as to fuppofe that there must be fome one not "previous to any other, (I fuppofe he means fubfequent to "all others,) that is, that there must be a last ?" We may add, and would any perfon be fo abfurd as to call fuch a perpetually growing feries pofitively or abfolutely infinite? or conceive it as any whole or entire thing really exifting? 'Tis an indefinite flux or aggregate of parts which are continually added, but never make up any thing at all; which is abfurd, fee Note 10. 2d Ed. Below he attempts to bring this feries off by afferting that it is infinite one way, but finite another; which feems to me the fame as affirming it to be partly infinite; and partly finite but we examin'd this before. 66 (P. 118, 119.) "That other Beings befides the felf-ex"iftent Being might have been eternal has been before "proved, though they would not be in the fame manner as He, because they would equally be dependent as if they had not existed from Eternity." i. e. they would depend on the felf-exiftent Being for their original, or derive their Beings from fomething pre-exiftent, and yet be all eternal, which appears to me fomething like a Contradiction. Here the Defender of Dr. Clarke feems to be in fome confufion. He begins "There's no impoffibility in an end"less series of dependent Beings exifting from Eternity. For 66 "as Dr. Clarke fays, If we confider fuch an infinite Pro greffion as one entire endless series of dependent Beings it is plain this whole feries can have no Cause from without, or " from within &c." and fo produces the Doctor's Demonftration directly against himself, and when he has done, fays "this is a true, if not the only reason-why it is im"poffible, that there fhould have exifted from Eternity “fuch an infinite independent series ;" though how he comes to allow this fame feries, whether it be dependent or independent, to be confider'd here by the Dr. as one entire thing or whole, which he had fo frequently complain'd of in others, or why this does not destroy the fuppofition as much as a first and last, I cannot apprehend. (P. 120.) He endeavours to invalidate the old Maxim, that a Cause is prior to its Effect, by a diftinction between priority in the order of our Ideas and priority in nature. "For as Dr. Clarke fays, Light would eternally proceed from “the Sun, or an impreffion from an impofed Seal, were "their Caufes Eternal. In the fame manner created Beings "might eternally fpring from the workmanship of the Al"mighty, as Light from the Sun." Anf. Whatever is neceffarily prior in the order of our Ideas, is for that reason prior alfo in the order of Nature, if we have any knowledge at all of Nature: or can prove any thing from our Ideas concerning it. Every mover must be previous to the moved as well in Nature as in Idea, though it cou'd not be properly a mover till it produced fome motion. In like manner as the Sun could not be what we now ftile Sun till it emitted Light, but yet the matter of it, as well as the motion excited in its parts, must be previous (except you will fuppofe it felf motive) both in Nature and Time to the actual Emiffion of these parts which cause the Idea of Light, and which require fome time for every Motion: i. e. their Motion is not inftantaneous, and confequently Light, which is the effect thereof, cannot be strictly coetaneous with the Sun. Your Father was no Father indeed till he had a fon, but will you say that his fon and he might poffibly have been coeval? The contrary is intuitively certain, and he that will demand a proof of it, or a reason why it is fo, does not know when he ought to be convinc'd. What What he brings in the following pages concerning Om- (P.124.) He concludes "What the Tranflator fay, about Abfolute Neceffity, in the fenfe it is fome times ufed, would Thefe few curfory Remarks may fuffice at prefent to ance. (a) Calumny no Conviction &c. p. the laft. This was performed by INDEX A. A Bolute Infinity what it is. pag. 14, 88, 89. Abfolute Neceffity an abfurd Term, 19, 20, 21. can- Abstract Ideas what. 5. of Subftances, Modes and Rela- Active Powers two. 208, 209. 220. Adam whether naturally mortal. 131. 136. 152. 189. whe- Agents free, the neceffity for such in the World. 346, 347. the better. 123. 146, &c. a total one inconceivable. ibid. Analogy not to be apply'd to the whole Nature of the Divine Ante- Antecedent Neceffity not the ground of the Divine Exift- Anxiety, in what Sense it may be faid to determine the Will. Appetites, may be oppofed and overcome by the Will alone. Arbitrary in what Senfe the Divine Will is fo. 70, 71. 255- Argument a priori, cannot be applied to the Divine Being. Attributes of God primary and fecondary. 45. how we get B. Being of God, proof of it. 42,43,44, &c. – Body muft neceffarily affect the Soul. 155,156.—162. its Bounds, why we can fet none to Space, Number, Duration, &c. C. Calvenifts, the confequences of their believing themselves to Chance, the Will not determined by it. 300, 301. the Au- Nn Chafm, |