Such a Power as this can

not be de

V. Fourthly, if then we fuppofe fuch a Power as this, 'tis plain, that the Agent endowed with it cannot be determined in its Operations by any preexiftent Goodnefs in the Object; for fince the agreeablenefs between it and the Objects, at least in most of them, is fuppofed to arife from the Deterjects, fince the Good- mination, the agreeableness cannot poffibly be the Cause of that Determination on which itself de

termined by Good nefs in Ob

nefs of

them depends upon its determination.

NOTES.

pends.

think, may be applyed to the Will itself in regard to Motives, &c. with much more Juftice than to thefe operative Powers. Nay thefe can scarce be called indifferent to Action after the determination of the Will; but follow inftantly (as we obferved in Note 42) in moft Cafes when they are in their right State. What I will or refolve to do, that I certainly effect if I have Power to do it, and continue in the fame Will or Refolution. However, this Indifference of the operative Powers is what can never conftitute Morality (as was obferved in the fame place) fince their Operations are no farther moral then as they are confequent upon, and under the direction of the Will.

There must then be another Indifference prior to them, in order to make the exertion of them free in any tolerable sense. Concerning this antecedent indifference Mr. Locke enquires whether it be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Underftanding, as well as to the Decree of the Will? We anfwer 'tis antecedent to and independent on any particular Thought or Judgment, and continues equally independent after them; it remains after the Determination of the Judgment in the very fame state as he fuppofes that of the operative Powers to be after the Determination of the Will. Its Liberty is placed, as he says, in a State of Darkness; and fo is that of the operative Powers; which he allows: "Tis indeed in itfelf (as it is commonly ftiled) a blind Principle, and fo is every Principle in Nature but the Understanding and though the Exercife of the Will, as well as of the operative Powers, be generally accompanied with Intelligence, without which there can be no Moral Liberty: yet there are, I think, very different Faculties and often exercifed feparately, and therefore should always be confidered diftinctly; Freedom is one thing, Intelligence another; a Moral or accountable Being confifts of both.

For a more complete View of this Queftion, fee Epifcop. Infiit Theol. L.4. C. 6. and Tract. de Libero Arbitrio. There's allo a good defence of our Author's Notion of Indifference in Limborch, Theol. Chrift. L. 2. C. 23. Sect 20, &c.

Ibid.

pends. But the congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodness in it, therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at least in thofe Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embraced it, nor Evil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power to the Object is prior to the Goodness and the Cause of it, this Power cannot be determined by that Goodness in its Operations.

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be grant- Nor by ed to exift, cannot be determined by any Uneafi- any Un nefs arifing from the things about which it is con- eafiness. verfant. For it is fuppofed to be indifferent, not only in respect of external Objects, but also of its own Operations, and will please itself, whether it accepts the thing or rejects it, whether it exerts this Act or another. Thefe Objects then will neither please nor difplease till this indifference be removed; but it is fupposed to be removed by the Application or Determination of the Power itself therefore Anxiety does not produce but pre-fuppose its Determination. Let us fuppofe this Power to be already determined (it matters not how) to embrace a certain Object, or to exert the proper Actions relating to it, Defire manifeftly follows this Determination, and Defire is followed by an Endeavour to obtain and enjoy the Object pursuant to the Application of the Power. But if any thing fhould hinder or stop this endeavour, and prevent the Power from exerting thofe Operations which it undertook to discharge in relation to the Object, then indeed Uneafinefs would arife from the hindrance of the Power. Anxiety would therefore be the Effect of the Determination of this Power, but by no means the Cause of it.*

NOTES.

VII,

Obferve what follows from Mr. Locke, "There is a "Cafe wherein a Man is at Liberty in refpect of willing, and "that is the chufing a remote Good as an End to be pursued.

Here

Not by

VII. Sixthly, Suppofing fuch an Agent as this the Under- to be endowed alfo with Understanding, he might Standing use it to propofe Matters fit to be done, but not to

Yet fuch

has need

determine whether he should do them or not. For the Understanding or Reafon, if it speak Truth, represents what is in the Objects, and does not feign what it finds not in them: Since therefore, before the Determination of this Power, things are fuppofed to be indifferent to it, and no one better or worfe than another; the Understanding, if it performs its Duty right, will represent this Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more eligible than another; For the Understanding directs a thing to be done no otherwise than by determining that it is better; as therefore the Goodness of things, with refpect to this Power, depends upon its Determination, and they are for the most part good if it embrace, and evil if it reject them, 'tis manifeft that the Judgment of the Understanding concerning things depends upon the fame, and that it cannot pronounce upon the Goodness or Badnefs of them, till it perceives whether the Power has embraced or rejected them. The Understanding therefore muft wait for the Determination of this Power, before it can pass a Judgment, instead of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that Understanding before it can be determined.

VIII. Seventhly, But though this Power cannot be an Agent determined in its Operations by any Judgment of of Under- the Understanding, yet the Understanding is neftanding ceffary, in order to propofe Matters of Action, and

in order to diftinguish poffible things

from impoffible.

NOTES.

to

"Here a Man may fufpend the act of his Choice from being "determined for or against the thing propofed, 'till he has ex"amined whether it be really of a Nature in itself, and Con"fequences to make him happy or no. For when he has once

66

chofen it, and thereby it is become a part of his Happiness, it "raifes Defire, and this proportionably gives him Uneafness, "which determines his Will, and fets him at work in purfuit "of his Choice on all occafions that offer. B.2. C. 21. Sect. 56,

to distinguish poffible ones from those that are impoffible. For though the Goodness of things with refpect to the Agent, proceeds from the Determination, yet the Poffibility or Impoffibility is in the things themselves, and there is need of the Understanding to distinguish between Objects, left this agent falling upon Abfurdities, procure to itself Uneafinefs. Not that an Object is therefore Good because 'tis poffible; for if it be rejected it will be Evil, nor will it be immediately difagreeable because impoffible, for attempting an Impoffibility may be pleafing to us, as we may prefer the exercife of this Power, (which is the thing that pleases us, as we faid before) but he that makes this Attempt, must neceffarily be unhappy in the Event; for fince the thing which the Power undertakes is impoffible to be done, Uneasiness must neceffarily follow the hindrance of its Exercise, and the final Disappointment of its End.

infinite

IX. This then must be affigned as the first Limi- If the Atation of fuch a Power, viz. that it confine itself to gent be of Poffibilities, and there needs no other, if the Agent Power, he be of infinite Power, in order to the obtaining of needs no its End.

other Limitation.

muft alfo

X. Eightly, But if the Agent's Power be finite, it has need alfo to confult its Abilities, and not de- But an Atermine itself to any thing which may exceed them, gent of otherwise it will be as much disappointed in its En- finite deavour as if it had attempted abfolute Impoffibili- Power ties. And this is the fecond Limitation of this Power. confult his It is impoffible, you'll fay, for an Appetite to Abilities. purfue fuch things as the Understanding evidently declares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I answer, the Senfes and natural Appetites are gratified with their Objects, and please themselves, though Reason remonftrate against them, and condemn that pleasure as pernicious. How much more easily then may this factitious Appetite, which arifes in the Agent from Application only, be conceived

Q3

petites.

ceived to delight in its good, though the Underftanding oppose it, and condemn that Delight as foolish and of fhort Duration. Why Nature granted fuch a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the Good of the whole, will be fhewn afterwards.

Such an XI. Hitherto we have either confidered this PowAgent er alone in the Agent, or as joined with the Uncannot be derstanding. But the Agent endowed with it, may determin- alfo have other Powers and Appetites which are ed by his other Apdetermined to their Objects by a natural Congruity; yet neither can it be determined in its Operations by them. We must diftinguish between the Operations of these Appetites, and the Pleasure which arifes from the Exercise of them. Thefe, when rightly difpofed, muft neceffarily exert their Operations upon the prefence of their Objects; but it is not at all neceffary that they fhould delight and please themselves in thefe Operations. For inItance, a bitter and naufeous favour is difagreeable to the Tafte: but though this be felt, yet urgent Hunger makes it pleasant, the craving of the Appetite overcoming the Difagreeableness of the Taft. This Pleasure indeed is not pure, but mixed and diluted proportionably to the Excess of the prevailing Appetite. For, fuppofe that there are three Degrees of Uneafinefs from the Hunger, and two from the Bitterness; the Agent, to avoid three, must neceffarily bear two; which being deducted, there remains only one Degree of folid Pleasure; whereas if he had met with fuitable and fweet Food, there would have been three.

This

XII. Since therefore the Pleasure which arifes Power is from the Satisfaction of thefe natural Appetites may fuperior to be overcome by a ftronger Appetite, there's no all the Ap Reafon to doubt but this Power which is indifferent petites, and fub- to Objects may overcome all the other Powers and Appetites. For all these are limited by their Objects, and therefore have certain Bounds, but this

dued by

none.

Power