be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which the Understanding can difcover, be the very best before or independent of our Choice, it were proper for us to be neceffarily determin'd to it; for the fruition of it, howfoever obtained, would make us happy, and be fo much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not depend upon Chance, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a manner supposed to do: nor need we much regard the Glory arifing from a well-made Choice; fince the fruition of the greatest Good would give us Happiness without it; nay, fuch Glory would be empty and despicable in competition with the greateft Good. Hence it appears, that the Free-will, according to this Hypothefis, cannot be reckon❜d any Advantage.

NOTES.

VI, Se

contemplating, in embracing or rejecting any kinds of kinds of apparent Good, by giving it a power of raifing, improving or fufpending any of its Defires, of governing and moderating the Paffions, and forming to itself an Appetite or Relifh of things; Sect. 45, and 53. All which is exactly agreeable to our Author's Principles, as well as Truth, and 'tis a wonder one that fo attentively confider'd the Operations of the Mind should not be led on to that other part of its Liberty which is equally confirm'd by Experience, viz. of choofing arbitrarily among different kinds and degrees of Pain, of over-ruling any ordinary Defire of obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, and by confequence of its Will being properly active or phyfically indifferent with regard to either. But though he has inferted feveral Paffages in the fubfequent Editions, which come near to Liberty, yet he takes in the greatest part of his firft paffive Scheme, and generally mixes both together. This has occafioned that great confufion in the Chapter abovemention'd, which cannot but be observ'd by every Reader.

Dr. Clarke's Argument for abfolute Freedom, because all Motives or Senfations are mere abftract Notions, and have no phyfical power ¶, feems not conclufive, or at least not clear. For who knows, fay the Fatalifts, how far reasons, motives, c. may affect a Spirit? Why may not one immaterial Subftance determine another by means of Thought, as well as a material one can move another by means of Impulse? Nay,

Remarks on the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 10.

his

place in

VI. Secondly, If it be faid, that the Underftand- It only ing is dubious in many Cafes, and ignorant of what takes is the beft, and in thefe Liberty takes place; nei- doubtful ther does this clear the Matter. For if the things matters, to be done be Good or Evil in themselves, but un- and then known to the Intellect, there's no help in the Will; 'tis of no nor does its Liberty affift us in difcovering or ob- portance. taining the better Side; if they be indifferent, it is no matter what we do, fince the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies are equal on both Sides. If then we admit of Liberty in these Cafes, it will be of no ufe or Importance to Life or Happiness: Nay, it must be esteemed an Imperfection, as deriving its Origin from the Imperfection of the Understanding. For if the Understanding could certainly determine what were the best to be done, there would be no room for Liberty. (46.)

66

NOTES.

VII. Third

his adherent Mr. Jackson grants ¶, "That abftract Notions will by a forcible and irrefiftible impulfe, compel the Mind to move the Body whether it will or no. Which impulfe, if it were conftant, would fufficiently acquit the Maintainers of Neceffity. But that there can be no fuch forcible impulse, will, I hope, appear below, where it will be fhewn to be both agreeable to reafon to fuppofe that there are active or self-moving Beings, which, as fuch, must have a phyfical power of refifting what we call the most cogent Motives: and to be confirm'd by Experience, that our own Minds exert fuch a Power; which is fufficient for our purpose. For an Explanation of the true Notion of Liberty, fee the following Subfections of this Chapter, and Note 58.

(46.) Thefe, with fome of the following confequences attending fuch a confufed Hypothefis of Liberty, are well urg'd by Mr. Locke (though I think they return upon himself) in his Chapter of Power, Sect. 48, 49, 50. and in the Philofoph. Enquiry, p. 63, &c. and feem to be unavoidable in any other Scheme but that of our Author; who fuppofes, that in most Cafes the Goodness of an A&t or Object entirely depends upon, and is produced merely by our choofing it; and of confequence Liberty, or a power of choofing, is according to his

Defence of buman Liberty, p. 198.

Prin

We are left in

VII. Thirdly, Thefe men are not well agreed what this Chief Good is, from the connection with doubt concerning which the Understanding must judge of the Goodthe Way nefs of other things, as may appear from their vato Happi- rious and contradictory Opinions about it. (47.) nefs, and We must neceffarily therefore be wavering and follicitous, and even rebel against Nature itself, which has neither fixt a certain End, nor granted any certain Means to attain it, but left us in anxiety and doubt about the way which leads to Happiness; neither is there any help here in our Liberty, fince it is blind, and can do nothing towards bringing us back into the right way.

can have

no help from Li

berty.

Since that

VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confefs'd by all, that Good is good in general is what is univerfally agreeable, and what which is all defire. Every Good therefore anfwers to fome and this is Appetite, and according to thefe Authors, Objects to be judg- are good on account of a natural and neceffary fuited of by

agreeable,

the Understanding,if

NOTES.

ableness

the Will Principles, fo far from being unneceffary, or an Imperfection, follow this that it is our nobleft Perfection, and conftitutes the greatest part Judgment, of our Happiness: For an Explanation of this, fee Sect. 2. of it is not this Chapter.

free, if it

does not, it acts against reafon. We had better

therefore be without fuch Liberty.

(47.) This uncertainty about the Summum Bonum is own'd and well accounted for by Mr. Locke, B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 55. "Hence it was that the Philofophers of old did in vain enquire whether Summum Bonum confifted in Riches or Bodi"ly Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation. And they might "have as reasonably difputed whether the best relish were to "be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nutts, and have divided "themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Taftes depend "not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that particular Palate, wherein there is great variety; "fo the greatest happiness confifts in the having thofe things "which produce the greateft Pleasure, and in the abfence of "those which caufe any disturbance, any pain. Now thefe "to different Men are very different things." To the fame purpose are the 3d and 4th obfervations in the Religion of Nature delineated, p. 33, which may ferve to confirm the Notion which our Author propofes in the next Subfection, viz. that moft of the Good or Agreeableness in things arifes not from their own Natures, but our Choice of them; or that Objects are not chofen because they are good, but are generally good only because chofen.

ableness which they have to our Appetites. The Understanding therefore does not make good, but finds it in the things themselves: and when it judges any thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, according to them, must neceffarily be in respect of fome natural Appetite. All the Good then which is in things will be the Object of fome Faculty or Appetite, i. e. of the Understanding, Senfe, &c. But all these are determin'd by Nature in regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which they relate, i. e. in regard to their Pleafantnefs, or Agreeablenefs; and as to the relation which they bear to each other, i. e. as to their Profitableness and Honesty, they are to be judg'd of by the Understanding, and directed when and in what manner they must give place to each other, or afford their mutual affiftance. Free-will then appears to be of no manner of use; for if it certainly follow the decree of reafon, it is not free, at leaft from neceffity, If the fince that very reason which it follows is not free: Will if it does not neceffarily follow that, we had better could be without it, fince it perverts every thing, and fufpend its confounds the Order of Reafon, which is beft; fuch a Liberty as this would therefore be prejudicial the Judgto Mankind; it would make them liable to do amifs, ment of and produce no kind of Good to compenfate for fo the Ungreat an Evil.

act con

trary to

derstand

ing, it

it feems

IX. Fifthly, It is fuppofed that the Judgment of would run the Understanding concerning the Goodness of any directly thing, is a condition without which the Will is not into Evil; directed to the Object, but yet that it can either therefore exert or fufpend its act about any Good whatsoever. neceffary Let us fuppofe then that the Understanding has for it to determined it to be good to exert fome certain Ac- act at the tion and evil to fufpend it; while this Judgment in the continues, if the Will can fufpend its Act, it chooses Evil; if it cannot, it is not free. You'll fay, it which the can command the Understanding to change its UnderJudgment: be it fo. But it is evident, that the directs.

3

Man

time and

manner

standing

Man fufpends his Action before he can command the Understanding to change its Judgment, i. e. he fufpends the Action while the Judgment determines that it is Evil to fufpend; and of confequence chooses that directly which his Reafon judges to be Evil; which feems to overthrow their whole Hypothesis. (48.)

NOTES.

X.

(48.) Farther, if the Mind can fufpend the Satisfaction of any urgent defire (which Mr. Locke allows * and therein places all its Liberty) then it can as eafily quite ftop, or run counter to any natural Appetite; fince no greater Power feems to be requifite for the one than for the other. If we can hinder the Will from being determined by any defire of abfent Good without any appearance of greater Good on the other Side, which might raife an oppofite defire able to counterballance it, as our Author has fhewn that we can; then we shall be equally able to prevent its following the ultimate determination of the Judgment, even without any reafon for fo doing; after any Determination of the Judgment, it will be ftill as undetermined, and indifferent towards Volition, as Mr. Locke fuppofes the operative Powers to be in regard to Action, and confequently Good, whether abfolute or comparative, is neither the adequate efficient Caufe, nor a neceffary Means to the determination of the Will. This act of Sufpenfion therefore muft either be folely founded in the felf-moving Power of the Mind, and of confequence be naturally independent on all Motives, Reasons, &c. and an inftance of the Mind's abfolute Freedom from any external Determination; which is a contradiction to Mr. Locke's general Hypothefis; or else itself must be determined by fome Motive or external Cause; and then it will be difficult to make it free in any sense. Let us obferve how Mr. Locke endeavours to reconcile thefe two Notions together. Our Liberty, according to him, is founded in a general abfolute Inclination of the Mind to Happiness, which obliges us to fufpend the Gratification of our Defire in particular cafes, till we fee whether it be not inconfiftent with the general Good. "The ftronger Ties, fays he, Sect. 51. "we have to an unalterable purfuit of Happiness in general, "which is our greatest Good, and which, as fuch, our Defires always follow, the more are we free from any neceffary de"termination of our Will to any particular Action, and from a neceffary compliance with our Defire fet upon any parti"cular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly "examined whether it has a tendency to, or be inconfiftent " with

66

* Book 2. C. 21. Sect. 47. and 50. † See Note 49.