which of the two has the more profound impact in terms of the broad sweep of human history?

This last issue is possibly the least controversial and the most widely susceptible to optimistic interpretations. The great Chinese writer, Lin Yutang, phrased the most pertinent reply in his recent study of Communism, The Secret Name.

Nationalism as a human trait and human habit is deep-seated and universal . . . The last World War was not fought on an ideological basis, but was fought on a nationalist basis across ideological frontiers, capitalist countries fighting hand in hand with a Communist country to destroy a common enemy. Of the two, ideological loyalty and racial, national loyalty, the latter is a far stronger, vital force.

Studying the evidence of history, one must implicitly agree with this powerful statement. In case of any choice or open alternative, in any clear-cut showdown type of situation, nationalism was found to prevail over the short-run impact of any ideology, be it National Socialism or Communism. Short of tyrannical mass murder, Hitler-type genocides or Soviet-staged bloodbaths, nationalism proved to be the more vital force emerging from the final round with at least a partial, if not total, conquest. In such situations nationalism restored itself and arose Phoenix-like from the ashes of destruction or despair, while the ideology or "Ism" of the hour was generally incapable of reviving itself. Only infrequently could the impact of bayonets, the sheer terror of military or police methods succeed in restoring the hated political system at the expense of defeating the local nationalist movements. The five violent partitions of Poland, combined with suppression of a series of patriotic revolts, sadly illustrate the point that naked power is temporarily capable of silencing the protesting voice of nationalism.

It is clear that an internationally motivated, organized and oriented ideology like Communism cannot, in the long run, avoid open clashes or at least latent controversies with the all-pervasive impact of modern nationalism. Wherever Soviet-dominated Communism revived its international appeal and engaged in more vigorous activities involving foreign Communists, it had to resort openly to the familiar brutality of Stalinism to gain even limited objectives and accomplish even minimal international results. Conversely, wherever Stalin decided to turn inward into Soviet Russia and refocus his attention to such domestic goals as "Socialism in One Country," foreign Communists, even the most hardened Comintern agents, began to breathe

easier since they expected to be able to steer clear of an inevitable clash between the international aspirations of Communism and the localized ambitions of a fierce nationalism.

Is there a safe passageway between the Scylla of nationalism and the Charybdis of Communism. "If you can't destroy them, join them" claims a well-known proverb. Indeed, there are a few limited case-studies in which the initial vigor of one of these political motivating factors is reinforced by the other to the point where they seem to be inseparable ingredients of the entire, nationally applicable mixture. As long as the operational details of Chinese Communism remain obscure, remote and clouded by the immense social upheavals of domestic "communization," we are not entitled to classify Maoism in the category of national Communism. This major, but necessary, omission then restricts the interested observer to a study of Poland and Yugoslavia as the two prototypes of contemporary national Communism. Features in Common

In order to appraise the entire gamut of national Communism, three or four major characteristics have to be carefully analyzed. The most fundamental "common denominator" of all such belief systems is the peculiar combination of a social protest against international Communism (the negative feature, as it were) coupled with a vigorous assertion of national unity and political independence (the positive ingredient). Qualitatively both elements must be present, while in quantitative terms they might be at some variance. Yugoslavia, for example, has exhibited a great deal more of both than Gomulka's Poland.

The autonomist formula offered here is the heart of national Communism. It implies the Balkan and Eastern European peoples' (and possibly the Chinese people's) fundamentally "let's go it alone" attitude which has always been uniformly antipathetic to foreign domination, whether direct or indirect. This longterm, historic perspective has recently been reinforced by a short-term and dramatic component, namely the challenge (more-or-less open) of Soviet supremacy and infallibility. We witness here a refusal to accept the lightest word of Soviet leadership as gospel, and an expression of the innate tendency to argue and answer back. The subject or exact occasion of a SovietYugoslav or Soviet-Polish dispute is generally speaking of secondary importance. What matters is the incidence of the dispute itself, namely that there should be a dispute at all. The Soviet

system is based on the absolute infallibility of the Kremlin; the crux of the deviationist pattern of national Communism is that Tito, and to a lesser extent Gomulka, keep challenging the essence of the doctrinal and practical infallibility of the Soviet Union.

The external challenge-with its national Communist action and Soviet Communist reaction-then leads to further significant ramifications in the internal affairs of the challenging small nations. A secondary feature in common for all national Communist regimes is a demand for "elbow room", for leeway in their internal policies and actions. Given the assertion of national unity discussed above, this pattern suggests that the Yugoslav and Polish rulers (and potential national Communist regimes anywhere else in the world) are fully aware of the delicate and perilous task they face in reconciling:

(a) the historically proven sturdy nationalism of their people with

(b) such unpleasant and practical realities of the Marxist-Leninist program as land collectivization, forced industrialization, and particularly with (c) the ever-present and highly unpalatable overtones of contemporary Stalinism which can be reduced to one general theme: a continuously subservient relationship to the Soviet Union. This is the essential distinctive feature between internationally and nationally oriented Communism; the objection to subservience indeed penetrates most aspects of the "deviationist" nation's domestic life.

A tertiary, but important, structural feature of national Communism is its insistence on an independent foreign policy. This implies the capacity of taking opposite sides in ideological disputes, the freedom to disagree on any theoretical or practical interpretation of Communist dogma and the right to determine the nation's own course in international politics along the entire gamut of conflict-issues ranging from disarmament to bloc-voting in the United Nations.

Since this pattern of behavior poses an open challenge to the global ideological unity and cohesion of international Communism, modern nationalism at this point calls for heresy and disloyalty in the Communist camp. These are the foreign policy aspects of "deviationism." In its original meaning, to "de-viate" refers to getting off the road, straying into unknown and uncharted regions. Tito (and to a lesser extent Gomulka and the other "pocket-Tito's") have found to their surprise or sorrow that in the rigidly disciplined world of contemporary Communism the crime of deviation consists of any,

even the slightest, questioning or modification of the original dictate from higher authority. Refusing to recognize any shades of gray-zone type colors in its narrowly defined black and white conception of loyalty, Soviet-dominated Communism leaves practically no "elbow room" for reinterpretations of domestic or foreign policies by individual leaders or nation-groups. The challenge offered by national Communism is most serious and fundamental when the role of the Soviet Union as the permanent base for a Communist-organized and controlled world revolution is being questioned by the "deviationist" national Communist. This is the crux of Titoism which has presented the most highly publicized, outspoken and direct challenge to the Stalinist and post-Stalinist world of the Soviet Union and to its satellite dependencies in colonial Eastern Europe. Furthermore, as a prototype of Communist nationalism, Tito's movement has already demonstrated that it is not confined to Yugoslavia alone, but is quite capable of causing further-and not always localizedinfections throughout the Communist camp of nations, in large and small countries alike.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of nationalism presented above either ignored or brushed lightly aside such factors as problems of under- or over-population, agricultural productivity, industrial development, the shortage or plenty of capital, or the extent of traditional ties between ruling elites and the masses of the ruled. Instead, our concept of nationalism stressed the all-pervasive role of its ideological components and viewed it as a complex, but dynamic, set of political beliefs. Within this framework, an important distinction must be drawn between Western and non-Western forms of nationalism. The contrasting features and mushrooming conflict areas between these two major patterns form the salient part of any discussion of contemporary national problems.

One must agree with the general conclusion drawn from recent political literature that despite the emergence of numerous supra- and anti-nationalist trends, nationalism in the Western World is "still the most potent force for bringing about unity of action in our western society." In effect, the impact of two total wars has merely further accentuated nationalism as the global conflicts themselves became primarily wars for national liberation. They have engendered a great and ubiquitous upsurge of national feelings and particularly the smaller states of continental Europe and the adjoining

Middle Eastern area have been engaged in a desperate struggle to gain or retain the right to a life of national freedom.

Since nationalism remains a continuing force able to move and motivate masses of men, the problem is one of directing its myriad manifestations into constructive channels of international cooperation. To that end, explosions of national pride and of an overly exuberant national spirit will have to be curbed by mutual agreement and common sense, enforced by certain supra-national agencies of international organization.

MINING LAW

(Continued from page 58)

It is

Many writers maintain that establishment of blockade by mines alone is illegal, because international law requires adequate naval forces for the maintenance of an effective blockade. also claimed that a blockade established by mines alone violates Article 2 of Hague VIII. This prohibits the use of mines the sole object of which is the intercepting of commercial shipping. Modern warfare with the use of radar, of aircraft and other means of establishing an effective blockade without the need of keeping adequate naval forces in the vicinity to intercept blockade runners, will make mines more important in the establishment of blockades in the future. The Harvard draft research Article 73 permits the use of mines for blockade purposes, but makes the presence of adequate naval forces in addition to mines mandatory for the establishment of an effective blockade.

CONCLUSION

MINES ARE LEGITIMATE weapons of war and open sea mining will have a part in future naval warfare, in spite of opposition from noted writers. The Harvard draft research would forbid open sea mining except during immediate naval operations with or without pursuit by the enemy (Article 85).

Though mines may be used in an area of actual combat, they are required by the terms of the draft convention to become harmless a half hour after launching. This convention has not been adopted. It recognizes that open sea mining incident to tactical operations is legal, and such procedure as it becomes practically possible through technical improvement, will undoubtedly be used and recognized as permissible.

Open sea mining incident to blockade, incident to tactical operations, or as a measure for the enforcement of contraband control may be

legal. The main problem lies in the extent of the actual mining operations in time and space. Probably all that can be said now is that the general rules of international law impose limitations of both direct relation and reasonableness. Interpretation of these rather indefinite factors awaits the future practice of nations in open sea mining. In any interpretation the logic of necessity, self-defense and preservation will be important. The only certain principle today is that open sea mining cannot be employed indiscriminately in a fashion to interfere solely with commercial shipping and to deny to neutrals the freedom of the sea.

WAR ZONES WILL probably be established in future wars, and enforced by all types of mines. Certain protected sea lanes for use of legitimate neutral shipping will be necessary, but neutrals will probably have to accept a certain degree of curtailment of their rights to the free and unimpeded use of the high seas in the reasonable exercise of the right of self-defense by belligerents. War zones directed against neutral shipping are illegal, but war zones established to limit the enemy in his movements may well be recognized as a legitimate exercise of belligerent rights. Open sea mining was more extensive in World War II than in World War I, and probably will be more extensive in any future war. However, the freedom of the high seas and the right of neutral countries for the peaceful pursuit of commerce will require that these measures be directed primarily against belligerents only, and that any restrictions of neutrals be reasonable so as to preserve the freedom of the high seas.

The preservation of freedom ashore and afloat is the goal of the United States. Our rules and practices should be guided by our goal, tempered only by the necessity of surviving to preserve the cause of freedom.

ARMS CONTROL

(Continued from page 62)

To consider this matter further, assume for the moment that agreement is reached on a useful definition. U.S. forces now are deployed throughout the world. Where should the United States effect the 400,000 man reduction? In NATO? In the Far East? Should we absorb the reduction here at home? Or should we seek some reduction in each of the areas?

A substantial reduction in NATO could conceivably bring about its collapse, an objective long sought by the Soviet Union.

In the Far East, the Peking regime in China exerts continuous pressure on its neighbors.

Fundamental to this policy, is an effort to force U.S. forces out of the Western Pacific where they are in position to join in the common defense with our Allies-to whom we have made the most solemn commitments.

At home, U.S. forces must maintain strategic deterrent capabilities; provide, in coordination with Canada, for the defense of North America; and include elements capable of moving quickly to the aid of Allies to the South, East or West, who might be threatened elsewhere in the world.

An additional problem is that of deciding how the reduction should be made. The need for highly mobile forces with the flexibility to react immediately to various kinds of actions throughout the world indicates that the required balance of forces does not remain the same under all circumstances.

IN THE ARMAMENT portion of the proposal, we find equally perplexing problems. Again, we must first define the term-the word "armaments". The definition may be as restrictive as "guns and ammunition", or it may include delivery vehicles. It could conceivably include even more. After this matter is settled, and negotiations begin, how should armaments be equated as to location? For example, if hostilities break out in Europe, is one tank located in the United States equal to one tank in Russia? Obviously, the answer is "no". How do we equate, regardless of location, the value of a submarine as opposed to some other delivery vehicle, such as an airplane?

These complexities make it difficult to achieve a reliable system for arms control; nevertheless, there is hope for the future. In my view, armaments-like fevers-are only symptoms of disease. Fevers may be reduced without dealing with the basic disease, but this will not necessarily save the patient's life. If the disease is correctly identified and properly dealt with, it may be expected that the fever will subside and the patient recover. If the political issues which give rise to armaments are settled, we can expect armaments levels to be reduced; but it is unlikely that international issues will be eliminated. Unless they are, it would be unwise, if not fatal, to eliminate all armaments. As with fever, it is necessary to keep armaments within reasonable limits while the disease is being treated.

There is much that might be done between the zenith and nadir of “no arms control” and “no armaments". Success here, we may hope, would lead toward the lessening of tensions. But disarmament, even total disarmament, cannot be expected to prevent war. Men fought with clubs

and stones before modern arms were available. Furthermore, destruction of all armaments would not eliminate the knowledge and ability to construct atomic and other weapons if nations and peoples engage in war. Therefore, if armed conflict took place, modern armaments including atomic weapons would likely reappear in the arsenal of one or both adversaries.

With respect to arms control, there are conditions which must be present in some degree before there can be much hope of negotiated agreements. All parties should seek to create these conditions, which probably include at least the following:

a. Mutual interest in arms control measures. b. A mutual desire to negotiate.

c. Mutual trust.

d. A willingness to pursue diplomatic actions to lessen tensions.

e. A mutual view that agreements should be such that even if they are violated, the security of participants will not be jeopardized.

There are those who regard the United States and its Allies as being inflexible in their attitude toward disarmament. I firmly believe that this is not so. However, we are inflexible with reference to the preservation of our national security and of our sovereignty.

Armaments are maintained to protect our national security and to fulfill our commitments for the security of others. With disarmament, we must have an adequate substitute if our security and that of our Allies is to remain unimpaired.

Lacking political agreements which would lead to a reduction in world tensions, lacking conduct on the part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc which would demonstrate willingness to abandon its aggressive course, we can have no alternative, in considering the subject of disarmament, but to insist on balanced, safeguarded, measures under effective inspection and verification. To do less would be to jeopardize our fundamental principles and our survival.

MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION CAPT Ashton C. Miller, Jr., USN, from COMINPAC to JAGO.

LTJG Willisam H. Napier, USNR, from SNJ, Newport (under inst.) to ComThirteen.

LT Brian J. Newman-Crawford, USNR, from ComThree to USS LOS ANGELES.

LTJG Bruce B. O'Dea, USNR, from SNJ, Newport
(under inst.) to NAAS, Saufley Field, Florida.
CDR John W. Shields, USN, from COMFAIRQUON-
SET to Com SuBase, New London.

LTJG Dale A. Simonson, USNR, from SNJ, Newport (under inst.) to JAGO.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961