Page images
PDF
EPUB

own history and hope in a glorious national future all act as qualifying factors and emotionally loaded forces defying objective measurement or even cursory analysis. Hundreds of additional impulses and motivating influences could be culled from the history of the last two or three centuries. It could be accurately stated in each case that men base their nationalism on a frequently irrational mixture of tangible realities and ideological intangibles.

The short-term perspective of modern nationalism must focus on some of the climactic events of nineteenth century European history. In the early eighteen thirties the spirit of a revolutionary, belligerent nationalism suddenly swept across continental Europe exploding in political crises and great ideological excitement in such countries as France, Italy, Germany, Hungary and Bohemia. The most significant outburst of nationalism was that of the Young Italy (Giovine Italia) movement masterminded by the great Italian writer and patriot, Giuseppe Mazzini. "The people," Mazzini proclaimed in 1847, "are penetrated with only one idea, that of unity and nationality . . . There is no international question as to forms of government, but only a national question." [Emphasis added.]

Whenever Mazzini and his contemporaries talked of nationality, they were in reality discussing the problem of modern nationalism. 1848 thus became the most memorable milestone in the history and evolution of this idea. Although most of the individual national uprisings happened to turn into bitter disappointments and even disasters from a strictly short-term point of view, in the long run (within a twenty or twenty-five year period) these same national revolts produced phenomenal political upheavals and social earthquakes. To paraphrase one of Lord Acton's remarks taken from his classic essay on Nationality, "The revolution of 1848. unsuccessful in its national purpose, prepared the subsequent victories of nationalism . . in several different ways.

[ocr errors]

Above we noted briefly that nationalism is a highly relative concept dealing with a fluctuating and flexible theme. Now we should also add that it is a divisible concept composed of many concentric circles or "outer layers" of content which greatly complicate or color the fundamental phenomenon of nationalism proper.

Each person can observe this parallelity of concentric loyalties as applied to his own case. Beyond the feeling of belonging to one's hometown, there are the patterns of allegiance to county and state-governments, to United States

citizenship, to the New World or Western Hemisphere, and finally to the broadest notion of a modern Western civilization (or some sort of world government and international organization). Beyond these broader loyalties there lies the much narrower circle of such local involvements as activity in one's college or professional group, PTA, Rotary, etc. The composite sumtotal of nationalism includes all the individual strands and strains as part of the whole picture; thus it cannot be reduced to any single factor, but emerges as a highly complicated and divisible concept made up of many parallel and often overlapping parts.

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN NATIONALISM

1. NATIONALISM AS A POWER-ORIENTED CONCEPT

It would be impossible to understand fully the impact of nationalism if we did not relate it immediately to the modern nation-state. The enormous growth in the power of the state is largely responsible for the violence and the political power-characteristics of nationalism itself. Especially the totalitarian forms of state organization are bound to produce violent types of nationalistic outbursts. Ataturk's Turkish revolution of the interwar period resulted in the related phenomena of statism-plusnationalism.

In this context, the state itself becomes the object of deification by the masses, and an exaggerated movement toward statism will clearly indulge in the slogan created for popular consumption: "All for the State, nothing without the State!" Statism thus implies the complete subordination of society to the state: everyone must obey and must serve in iron discipline. Linked to the emergence of this omnipotent state there also appears a systematically encouraged and governmentally promoted version of belligerent nationalism, one that will be of utmost help and use to the dictatorial government. It is justifiable to generalize at this point and suggest that the prevailing pattern of 20th century nationalism is its power orientation. In effect, there seems to be a fairly direct ratio between the totalitarian characteristic of the government and the relative virulence of its people's nationalism. Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and Stalin's Soviet Russia well illustrate the validity of this argument.

This close correlation between total forms of government and strong nationalism has frequently inspired writers to theorize about the

reverse possibility: the more democracy and the higher the cultural level, the less (or the less obvious) the incidence or intensity of nationalism. Living in an age of genteel refinement, Goethe, for example, wrote to his friend Eckerman:

You will always find nationalism strongest and most violent where there is the lowest degree of culture. But there exists a degree of culture where national antagonism vanishes altogether and where one stands, so to speak, above nations.

The great German poet undoubtedly envisioned here an exceptionally idealistic and culturally motivated type of internationalism in complete contrast with the narrow forms of powerinspired nationalism discussed above. However, 20th century politics does not give us much encouragement in terms of dreaming about high state of universal civilization where all national aspirations would automatically "wither away". Although it is not easy to draw up airtight categories for the various power-types of modern nationalism, a few major distinctions are worth stressing here.

Negative versus Positive Nationalism

Speaking to members of the U.N. General Assembly in August 1958, the then Iranian delegate, Dr. Djalal Abdoh defined "negative nationalism" as the overpowering of small nations by larger states. He then warned the Arab nations of the Middle East that this form of nationalist aberration might in the end cause their destruction. Ambassador Abdoh also added that a healthy attempt to counterbalance such negative nationalism would be the lifting of standards of living in the Middle East and the search for "harder political agreements" protecting the small countries against large-state exploitation.

Positive forms of nationalism would obviously stress strategies of dynamic action, a forceful advance rather than the cautious maintenance of the status quo or especially a call for retreat. It would be the "big stick" policy so forcefully advocated by Theodore Roosevelt, an aggressive assertion of the nation's manifold "vital interests" with minimum regard paid to the legitimate concerns of other countries. In a period of uninterrupted Cold War tactics by the two major power blocs of world politics, it is exceedingly easy to illustrate such national efforts of positive nationalism. Any psychological, political, propaganda or economic warfare campaign of the contemporary Cold War pattern would clearly fit the broad definition of positive

nationalism. These are the types of nationalist assertions which tend to threaten peace, whether regional or global, and which continually test the leaders and organizational structure of the United Nations in its attempts to deter individual aggression and develop a workable system of collective security.

Overt Vis-à-Vis Covert Forms of Nationalism

Overt nationalism usually appears in the form of unmistakable acts of popular demonstrations, mass actions or explosions which are motivated by obvious and clearly identifiable national objectives. This concept also assumes majority consent in the formulation and execution of national goals-a mass approval of the people in backing their government and in identifying themselves with its policies and actions.

Covert or latent nationalism, on the other hand, implies feelings or attitudes usually shared only by a minority of the population, an elite group which works undercover and surreptitiously toward an indirect realization of its nationalistic goals or expectations. Covert nationalism thus appears as a pattern of minority behavior; whenever a society reaches the emotional "boiling point". It is not society as a whole which reacts in that manner, but usually a minority group. It is the latter that feels free to react with vigor to all forms of "sensed injustice." Such latent sources of nationalism will explode into the open not merely because of the existence of intolerable social circumstances, but just as often because of the parallel presence (or the mushrooming) of individual private anxieties which suddenly will induce members of this minority or elite group not to tolerate the intolerable. Covert nationalism is translated into practical action by a group of activists, of professional rioters in a discontented society, while the non-rioters are usually the majority of interested bystanders and spectators to such minority action. The frantic eruption of latent forms of Hungarian, Polish, Egyptian and Iraqi nationalisms in the last five or six years have given the interested student a number of relevant case-studies helpful for a more accurate clinical diagnosis of covert national movements.

Violent Vis-à-Vis Non-Violent Nationalism

These two are self-defining concepts of most significance to the observer when he attempts to study and define the explosion point of a society under great strain and stress. When, under what provocation, and how does a political and military eruption occur-thus qualitatively

changing the non-violent underground pattern into an openly and brusquely violent approach to modern nationalism? What combination of specific factors was, for example, necessary to produce a remarkably successful silent revolution in Poland as against the unsuccessful bloodbath which drowned the nationalist uprising in Hungary?

It is practical and important to raise these questions, but almost impossible to answer them. Violent forms of nationalism seem to characterize the exploited satellite areas of Eastern Europe as well as the politically unsettled former colonial regions of Africa and Southeast Asia. Beyond the indigenous sources of deep social dissatisfaction the picture is further clouded by such external pressures as the impact of Communism, pan-Arabism or anti-Western Xenophobia which add to the fuel of local nationalism and inevitably contribute to broader and more violent conflagrations. Frequently such external influences are responsible for transforming non-violent and practically dormant situations into national riots of open mass violence.

2. NATIONALISM AS A REGIONAL CONCEPT

Possibly one of the greatest paradoxes of twentieth century world politics is the fact that nationalism itself has ceased to be a national phenomenon, and instead has emerged as a set of regional products. Regionally oriented nationalism, rather than one-state nationalism, seems to be the order of the day. Nationalism, in the modern aviator's term, has hedge-hopped across the traditional and more narrowly drawn previous boundaries of the single sovereign state and has faced a much broader horizon. Its contemporary "sphere of influence" consists of a regionally linked group of five or six states which seem to share the same national aspirations, phobias, problems and expectations and project the old-fashioned type of nationalism onto a wider stage embracing a far broader scope.

This regional nationalism, cutting across individual state boundaries in the form of an "Operation Hedge-hop", greatly complicates the existing picture and adds to the aura of political confusion. Undeniably, the regional appeal of Nasserism as a pan-Arab idea makes it a more complex political phenomenon and harder to define than the nationalism of a single Middle Eastern Arab state. Political leadership generally justifies itself in the name of the "public good"; but-asks Professor Daniel Lerner in his important The Passing of Tradi

tional Society-how shall the "public good” be defined in Middle Eastern politics? Shall leaders act in the name of nations-Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iran? Shall they seek some larger constituency-an "Arab nation" or an "Islamic unity"? The professional literature agrees that the attraction of larger units for political leaders operates in all times and places, and that particularly throughout the Middle Eastern area such claims of regional and racial unity are continuously bolstered (and frequently compromised) by the fervent demands of explosive nationalism.

The area is rocked by deep-seated conflicts of loyalty, some on the regional level, others purely local. The term "Middle East" is by itself devoid of any specific and clearly tangible content. All local leaders speak of a larger unity, but they are divided among themselves and stress either Arab or Muslim symbols of identity. Lerner offers the most imaginative definition of this region when poetically observing that:

Any accurate Middle East landscape will depict the political ties that bind in pale pastels over a distant horizon; the bold primary colors in the foreground will represent multiplicity and diversity. [Emphasis added.]

It is axiomatic that such conflicting values as multiplicity and diversity can add up only to vagueness, disharmony and to an irrational political system of beliefs. An eminent French political observer, Jean Vigneau, paints the following profile of Nasser's regionally oriented nationalism concept in his recent work on The Middle East in Transition:

Nasser's ideology of revolution appears confused and contradictory. It arises from religious mystagogy and emotional thinking more than from any social doctrine or theory, and seems not to be attached to anything systematic. Borrowed from a variety of ideologies, ancient and modern, it presents a mixture of fascism, communism, racialism, and Kemalism, "topped off" with some ideas from the Qur-an. In the sphere of Arab nationalism it only repeats and amplifies by giving them an expression apt to flatter and excite the crowd, themes that were announced at the beginning of this century by an elite of Arab patriots in revolt against the yoke of the Ottoman Empire. Considered as an ideology of revolution, Nasser's contributes no new element and contains very little that is original. [Emphasis added.]

The regional foundations of modern nationalism are indeed both obvious and multi-faceted. The Arab Middle East has no ideological monopoly or exclusive claim to this particular approach to an ancient and vexing political prob

lem.

A characteristic statement from a high Communist Chinese official raised the issue of a specifically Western Pacific region earmarked for the nationalism of the Western Pacific peoples. In a message sent on October 6, 1958, to the Chinese Nationalist government in connection with the off-shore island crisis, Marshal Peng Teh-huai, Red China's Defense Minister, had this to say:

Why should a country in the East Pacific have come to the West Pacific? The West Pacific belongs to the people in this region, just as the East Pacific belongs to the people over there. This is common sense, which the American should have. There is no war between the People's Republic of China and the United States Friends in Taiwan, there are flames of war between us. They should be stopped and extinguished . . .

The siren voice is clearly heard behind the camouflaged suggestion of an all-Chinese, allWestern Pacific nationalism that is supposed to bring the "two Chinas" close together-on Communist terms, of course-in order to turn them afterward against the hated intruder from the East Pacific. The West should belong to the West and the East to the East-and the two should never meet, this seems to be the dubious rationale of the "threat plus promise" message cited here. If such thoughts on a regionally oriented nationalism were allowed to crystallize, they would undoubtedly lead to rigidly (and regionally) isolated political systems at constant loggerheads with each other. An area-wise closed system of Nasserism or Communist-controlled Chinese nationalism could never act as a guardian of regional peace or stability on the contrary, it would add further explosive features to an already precarious and teetering world order. Like Hitler's Fortress Europe or Japan's super-ambitious Co-Prosperity Sphere dream, these nationalistically inspired and belligerently fortified geopolitical regions would, in the long run, inevitably lead to a subdivision of the world in two or three fully mobilized armed camps engaged in deadly competition with each other. To this extent then, the idea of a regionally motivated nationalism takes the student right back to the power-oriented concept briefly analyzed above. Modern nationalism and political power seem to be inextricably interwoven phenomena, one strengthening or triggering off the other in the shape of a continuously revolving circle.

Nationalism as a Revolutionary Doctrine

The concept of nationalism is intimately connected both with the idea of freedom and with

that of revolution. There are two simultaneous aspirations built into the political phenomenon of nationalism: one individual and one collective. The former implies the freedom of the individual to join the nation of his choice, while the latter presupposes the freedom of a nation from domination by another nation. Thus the revolutionary struggles of 16th and 17th century Europe gain added significance when viewed from the parallel perspective of nationalist struggles for collective freedom as well as for individual self-assertion.

Western Concepts of Nationalism

In 1848 a handful of new European political leaders engaged in violent revolt against a feudal and dynastic past which had shackled down the emerging forces of modern nationalism. The nation, at this point, came to be regarded as a kind of collective personality with certain inalienable rights of its own. A nation should be free from oppression, so the theory postulated, both from within and from without. Political evil was equated here with the enemies of freedom and of a collectively expressed feeling of national consciousness. The most significant value appeared to be the determination of the state to lay down the limits of its own competence, its own national aspirations and its own convictions relative to individual and collective freedoms within its own national boundaries. Thus was born one of the Western world's key political principles: national self-determination which at first successfully fulfilled the postulates of both democracy and nationalism.

The first World War seemed to confirm the importance of self-determination as an active, operational symbol. The Western alliance fought the war in the name of self-determination and subsequently insisted on a peace treaty settlement that strongly reflected this principle. Austria-Hungary, Western Russia and the new frontiers of Germany followed in large measure the expressed will of the local populations concerned. At this point the clarity of an attractive, but highly abstract, theory became badly clouded by complex practical considerations. Woodrow Wilson may have been thoroughly realistic in accepting the widespread and insistent demand for self-determination; however, in many parts of Europe there simply did not exist adequate geographical lines separating rival nationalities into well-defined, politically and economically viable "homogeneous blocks." In addition, such essential criteria for state boundaries as strategic demands and historic claims seldom happened to coincide with

the prevailing lines of demarcation offsetting individual nationality groups. Hence, a Europe based on self-determination automatically implied a Europe of competing and conflicting minorities.

The spirit of nationalism, as embodied in the principle of self-determination, can assert itself successfuly only in such cases where at least three elementary requirements for successful self-government "co-exist" or parallel each

other:

1. an understanding of the role of law,

2. firmly ingrained national habits of civil discipline, and 3. the elements of an educated elite.

If these simple, but significant, pre-conditions do not exist, then the cause of good government is sacrificed for the idea of self-government resulting in such violent explosions of runaway nationalism as Nasser's Egypt or Castro's Cuba. Unhappily, not only are some of the fundamental criteria mentioned above missing in the newly emerging "independent" countries of Asia and Africa, but self-determination outside Europe now implies a great deal more than the mere absence of foreign control. It has gradually acquired an economic connotation and includes-as a positive accretion-the notion of economic well-being. Thus, the simple classic formula for natural self-determination has become a potentially perilous concept exposed to exploitation by "anti-imperialist" Communist propaganda.

In the present wild rush of nationalist aspirations, self-determination has clearly proved that it is a double-edged concept which can disintegrate as well as unify. Analyzing the exact wording of the United Nations' Covenant on Human Rights and the debates of its Human Rights Commission, the late Professor Clyde Eagleton arrived at the ineluctable conclusion that self-determination in the contemporary world applied only to colonies. Although, as he pointed out in his Foreign Affairs article on "Excesses of Self-Determination," the Western (so-called colonial) powers strenuously objected to this discrimination and argued for universal application of the principle, they were roundly defeated in United Nations deliberations. If, however, self-determination is applied only to colonies, it will inevitably be identified with anticolonialism-"a sad comedown for a great principle once thought applicable to all mankind." If it is a fundamental human right... why limit it to colonies? One could probably argue that the United Nations cannot do everything at once, and that it should therefore give top-pri

ority to colonial claims. But it would be a misinterpretation of the concept to exclude from its once-broad sweep the potential claims of oppressed groups, for example, those of the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Latin America or anywhere else.

Eagleton's note of warning is both timely and appropriate. If indiscriminately applied, selfdetermination will produce economically weak and politically non-viable failures, but if too narrowly interpreted and restricted merely to colonies, then national self-determination will arouse an immense amount of anti-colonial resentment. If this resentment were then coupled with the political opportunism of the Soviet bloc (or any other ideologically crystallized "bloc" of countries), the consequences of such a peculiar marriage could easily be fatal. Perhaps the term "self-determination" itself should be dropped due to the peculiar exigencies of mid-twentieth century world politics, and we should possibly think of such other categories (related to the problem of nationalism) as self-government, independence, collective security, economic security and the protection of human rights—all in the framework of the general safety and welfare of the world community.

EASTERN NATIONALISM: NATIONAL COMMUNISM OR COMMUNIST NATIONALISM?

In the Western world, as we have seen, the problem of nationalism has been closely interwoven with self-determination and the timely issue of colonialism. In the East, the crucial puzzle is clearly mirrored in the manifold compromises, conflicts and variations on the theme of Communist ideology vis-à-vis the impact of an ever-present nationalism. The combination of these two forces is a potent mixture whose ingredients are not always easy to isolate or analyze by themselves.

On the whole, two major alternatives are presented by the intermixing and cross-fertilization of Communism and nationalism: they are either in open conflict or seem to reinforce each other in a fairly harmonious-or at any rate, closely interrelated-manner. The former proposition raises a number of challenging questions. Which of the two is more permanent, more pervasive or deepseated? Which one is likely to outlast the other and vindicate itself in a long-run competition of fundamental political movements? Which has the more significant appeal to the masses of mankind, and

« PreviousContinue »